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Abstract 
Agency theory predicts that ownership structure monitoring mechanisms can effectively align 
the interests of managers with those of the shareholders. In additions, it views external audit 
as a function that lends credibility to the information disclosed in financial reports. Prior 
research sustains these predictions in developed markets such as in the US. However, 
institutional settings such as ownership structure and regulatory oversight bodies differ 
around the world and accordingly, the sustainability of agency theory predictions might also 
differ. Further, little research differentiates between accruals and real activities earnings 
management in contexts such as the Jordanian where ownership is concentrated, investors’ 
protection is weak and capital market is still evolving. Therefore, this study addresses these 
issues and investigates the validity of agency theory predictions concerning the effectiveness 
of ownership structure and external audit monitoring mechanisms in mitigating both accruals 
and real activities earnings management in Jordan. 
In this study, four measures of earnings management are estimated through the models of 
Kothari et al. (2005) and Roychowdhury (2006). Magnitudes of abnormal accruals are 
obtained from the former model and magnitudes of abnormal cash flow from operating 
activities, abnormal production costs and abnormal discretionary expenses are obtained from 
the latter model. As a result, four empirical models are constructed in which the estimated 
earnings management measures represent the dependent variables. Independent variables in 
each empirical model are the same and are classified into three categories: first, ownership 
structure variables include ownership concentration, controlling shareholders, institutional 
ownership and foreign ownership. The second category includes external audit quality 
measured by auditor size. Third, a set of control variables include board size, leverage, 
growth and firm size. 
These models are tested using the population of all manufacturing firms listed on Amman 
Stock Exchange over the period 2005 – 2008. The results reveal that controlling shareholders 
appear effective in constraining accruals manipulations, sales manipulations and production 
costs manipulations. As for manipulations in discretionary expenses, the results show that 
only high levels of institutional ownership can effectively deter abnormal discretionary 
expenses. Moreover, contrary to the popular convention, the results suggest that non-big 5 
auditors in Jordan who in fact mitigate abnormal accruals not big 5 auditors. Finally, no 
evidence is found supportive of the substitutive effect. That is, firms that are prevented from 
managing their earnings through accruals due to the enhanced scrutiny of non-big 5 auditors, 
do not resort to sales manipulations, production costs manipulations or discretionary expenses 
manipulations as substitutes to achieve desired levels of reported earnings. 
Given these findings, the present study provides understanding and extension for agency 
theory literature that focuses on earnings management in general and in emerging markets in 
particular. It highlights challenges to applicability of agency theory in emerging markets 
where corporate governance mechanisms are supposed to mitigate the practice of earnings 
management. As such, these findings could be helpful to investors and other stakeholders in 
making rational contractual decisions, especially when such decisions involve non-owner-
controlled firms. Finally, Amman Stock Exchange could impose the corporate governance 
codes that actively promote internal corporate governance mechanisms to restrain accruals 
and real activities earnings management. 
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
 
1.1. Overview: 
Financial reporting represents a means that allows managers to communicate firms’ 
economic performance to stakeholders. It also provides a relatively low-cost and credible 
means that helps best-performing firms to distinguish themselves from poor-performing firms 
in the economy (Healy and Wahlen, 1999). However, managers may engage in earnings 
management practices to report earnings that do not accurately reflect their firms’ underlying 
economic positions (Bedard et al., 2004). As such, the integrity of financial reporting would 
be distorted and users of financial reports would be misled. 
In fact, accounting scandals such as Enron and WorldCom have drawn public attention 
towards managers’ opportunistic utilisation of earnings management (Jiraporn et al., 2008). 
Agency theory posits that managers’ decisions are motivated by self-interest behaviour. On 
this basis, researchers such as Arnold and Lange (2004) propose that the accounting scandal 
at Enron have occurred because managers manipulated Enron’s accounts to maximise their 
interests at the expense of other stakeholders. Such harmful effects have indeed lead 
researchers to use agency theory as a framework (i.e. opportunistic hypothesis) in most of 
accounting research in earnings management (Louis and Robinson, 2005; Alexander, 2010). 
One stream of this research argues that the financial reporting process of publically traded 
companies includes monitoring mechanisms that enhance the accountability and transparency 
of financial reports (Rezaee, 2005), and hence protect stakeholders’ interests from the 
harmful consequences of earnings management. As part of these monitoring mechanisms, 
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agency theory suggests that ownership structure mechanisms align the interests of 
managements with those of the shareholders. Moreover, it views external audit as the most 
important, independent and professional mechanism in terms of control and monitoring 
(Nordberg, 2011). As such, these corporate governance mechanisms are supposed to act as 
deterrence devices and preserve shareholders wealth.  
Bearing in mind that earnings management practices are classified accruals and real activities 
manipulations (McVay, 2006), the effectiveness of corporate governance monitoring 
mechanisms in constraining accruals earnings management has been extensively investigated 
(e.g. Warfield et al., 1995; Yeo et al., 2002; Wang, 2006; Teshima and Shuto, 2008; Ali et al., 
2008). This scholarly evidence suggests that the effectiveness of corporate governance 
deterrence mechanisms varies as institutional settings, governance structures, and litigation 
environments differ. Thus, previous conclusions are somewhat inconclusive concerning 
accruals earnings management.  
As for real activity earnings management, Graham et al. (2005) find that this type of 
manipulation has not received as much attention in the archival literature. Accordingly, the 
effect of corporate governance mechanisms on real activities earnings management has not 
been investigated as extensively as accruals earnings management outside the US market. 
Examples of US-based studies include, Cohen et al. (2008), Demers and Wang (2010) and Li 
(2010). Therefore, research in this particular area represents a fertile area for further 
investigation in general, and in emerging markets in particular. 
In general, the apparent difference of volume and timing between accruals-based and real 
activities-based earnings management studies might be due to a lack of causal models that 
accurately measures earnings manipulation through real activities in early studies (Alexander, 
2010). Since the introduction of Roychowdhury’s model in 2006, however, a noticeable 
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amount of work has been produced on real activities earnings management (e.g. Cohen et al., 
2008; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Zang, 2012). Jiambalvo (1996) considers accruals analysis 
as a comprehensive measure because accruals comprise the effect of both accounting choices 
and operating, financing and investment real decisions. Nevertheless, the distinction between 
the two types of manipulation is important for three reasons. First, unlike accruals, real 
activities earnings management has direct cash flow consequences (Gunny, 2010). Second, 
firms may use both types of manipulation simultaneously. This imposes the problem of 
arriving at tentative conclusions about the overall effect of earnings management activities 
(Fields et al., 2001; Zang, 2007). Third, although real activities earnings management has in 
fact been used at recent scandals such as Enron, it has often been overlooked in the literature 
(Yaping, 2005). 
In addition, the extent to which corporate governance mechanisms affect real activities 
earnings management differs between ownership structures and external audit. Specifically, 
external auditors cannot challenge real economic actions made in the ordinary course of 
business (Graham et al., 2005). Thus, enhancing the scrutiny of external auditors over 
accruals earnings management may drive managers to substitute the reduction of accrual 
earnings management with real activity earnings management. This argument gave rise to a 
new stream of research that investigates the substitutive effect (e.g. Garver, 2009; Gunny, 
2010; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010). 
Against all economical difficulties and political circumstances, Amman Stock Exchange has 
witnessed significant increases in the number of listed companies, trading volumes and 
market capitalisation in recent years.  Apparently, foreign ownership has contributed to that 
increase as Jordan became one of the favourable investment destinations in the Middle East. 
Given these characteristics, it is intuitive to expect the presence of earnings management in 
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Jordan. Hence, the Jordanian business environment has distinctive characteristics that make 
Jordan a well suited case to examine earnings management in light of agency theory 
predictions. Therefore, by investigating the effectiveness of ownership structures and external 
audit on both types of earnings management in Jordan, the present research is expected to 
reveal new perceptions about real activities earnings management in general and emerging 
markets in particular. 
 
1.2. Research Motivations: 
This research is driven by the following motivations.  
1- The phenomenon of earnings management has intrinsic importance, affecting 
stakeholders not only in the US, but also stakeholders in other countries including 
Jordan. As a matter of fact, little research has been conducted to document the 
pervasiveness of accruals earnings management, and no research is found considering 
the more costly real activities earnings management in Jordan. Therefore, reliable 
results would be of great value to regulators, practitioners, investors and other 
stakeholders. That is, although Jordan adopts the International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS), regulatory bodies in Jordan interfere in the implementation of these 
standards. For instance, Amman Stock Exchange banned listed companies from the 
use of fair value evaluation of property, plant and equipment stated in the 
International Accounting Standard No. 16.  As such, regulators in Jordan can limit the 
degree of flexibility offered to managers if empirical evidence is provided about the 
pervasiveness of earnings management in Jordan. Further, such evidence would 
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emphasise the importance for stakeholders to discount the amounts of managed 
earnings and hence, make informed business decisions.   
2- If the findings of this research document both types of earnings management in 
Jordan, it is important to specify whether limiting managerial discretion over accruals 
improves earnings quality; limiting accruals earnings management might induce the 
more costly real activities earnings management (Zang, 2012). The findings of US-
based research document that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act has led to decrease in the use of 
accruals earnings management. However, this induced managers to use real activities 
earnings management to substitute the reduction in accruals earnings management 
(e.g. Graham et al., 2005; Cohen et al., 2008). Therefore, should the presence of real 
activities earnings management be documented in this research, regulatory bodies in 
Jordan could incorporate this finding in future reforms in order to avoid undesirable 
consequences such as those exist in the US. Moreover, a study that considers the 
trade-off between accruals and real activities earnings management would extend 
earnings management research outside the US in general and Jordan in particular. 
3- There is a growing interest from regulators towards improving the governance of 
corporations in Jordan. Good corporate governance is a part of Jordan’s reform efforts 
to create a more attractive investment climate and protect investors interests (Regional 
Corporate Governance Working Group, 2003). Nevertheless, the Jordanian guidance 
of good corporate governance has not been actually enforced (Shanikat and Abbadi, 
2011) and investors protection in Jordan is weak (World Bank, 2009). The dearth of a 
research considering the effectiveness of corporate governance monitoring 
mechanisms in deterring both types of earnings management practices in Jordan 
shows that meaningful results would positively contribute to the ongoing regulatory 
reforms. For instance, empirical evidence that leads to an enhanced corporate 
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governance structure in Jordan would help the capital market avoid difficulties in 
convincing investors that their investments are managed responsibly. 
4- The fact that Jordan is considered one of the favourable investment destinations in the 
Middle East (Jaafar and El-Shawa, 2009), provides strong incentive to investigate the 
role played by foreign investors in the governance of their corporate shareholdings. 
Bearing in mind that there is little research on the effect of foreign ownership on 
accruals earnings management, it is important to mention that the effect of foreign 
ownership on real activities earnings management has never been investigated before. 
5- Although earnings management research has typically been implemented in the US 
(Jaime and Noguer, 2004), there is a considerable body of research examines the 
effect of corporate governance monitoring mechanisms on accruals earnings 
management in emerging markets such as Singapore (Yeo et al., 2002) and Malaysia 
(Ali et al., 2008). However, previous studies have turned up contradicting evidence 
concerning agency predictions of (i) the role of ownership structure mechanisms in 
aligning the interests of managers with those of shareholders, and (ii) the role of 
external auditors in providing credible and reliable information. Such inconclusive 
conclusions seem to be largely affected by differences in institutional settings, 
governance structures, and litigation environments. For instance, Maijoor and 
Vanstraelen (2006) find that audit quality provided by big auditors is affected by audit 
environments in different nations. Therefore, there is a strong incentive to empirically 
examine these relationships in Jordan. In addition, no research is found considering 
the effect of ownership structure deterrence mechanisms on real activities earnings 
management in developing markets. This provides another strong incentive to 
investigate these relationships in Jordan.  
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1.3. Research Objectives and Questions: 
 This study aims mainly to investigate the effectiveness of ownership structure and external 
audit corporate governance mechanisms in mitigating earnings management practices in 
Jordan.  Three objectives are derived from the aim and accordingly,  four research questions 
are formed to achieve the research objectives. 
. The first objective is to examine the effect ownership structure mechanisms in aligning the 
interests of managers with those of shareholders. The  second objective is to investigate 
whether clients of big 5 auditors in Jordan report lower levels of abnormal accruals than those 
reported by clients of non-big 5 auditors in Jordan. If so, then the final objective is to 
investigate whether the enhanced audit quality provided by big 5 auditors tempt managers to 
engage more in real activities earnings management that is beyond the scrutiny of external 
auditors. 
The following research questions are developed in line with the research objectives. 
Questions number 1 and 2 are formed to achieve the first objective. The remaining two 
questions are assigned to achieve the second and third objectives, respectively. 
1- What is the relationship between ownership structure monitoring mechanisms and 
accruals earnings management in Jordan? 
2- What is the relationship between ownership structure monitoring mechanisms and real 
activities earnings management in Jordan? 
3- Has the scrutiny of auditor size been effective in constraining accruals earnings 
management in Jordan? 
4- If yes, have managers in Jordan been induced to substitute the reduction in accruals 
earnings management with real activities earnings management? 
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1.4. Research Methodology: 
This research is primarily post-positivist due to the belief that there are no universal solving 
conclusions to the phenomenon of earnings management. The methodological approach of 
post-positivism is primarily quantitative. Research questions and/or hypotheses are 
manipulated in propositional form and subjected to empirical tests to verify them. 
To accomplish the research objectives empirically, an explanatory study is conducted. It 
involves the collection and analysis of secondary data to establish relationships between 
earnings management and corporate governance deterrence mechanisms in Jordan. Following 
the majority of accounting research on earnings management, the framework of agency 
theory is used where the opportunistic managerial behaviour is hypothesised.  
The data set of the current study comprises financial and non-financial information about all 
manufacturing firms listed on Amman Stock exchange (ASE) over the period 2005 - 2008. 
Data of manufacturing firms are used because IFRS offers more flexibility to managements 
of manufacturing firms to choose among a number of treatment alternatives for the same 
accounting transaction (e.g. several measurement options). The study period is restricted to 
those four years in particular due to the layout of data in ASE data base. 
Four proxies for earnings management are measured in this study. The first is abnormal 
accruals estimated through the model of Kothari et al. (2005). The remaining three dependent 
variables are abnormal cash flow from operating activities, abnormal production costs and 
abnormal discretionary expenses all estimated through the model of Roychowdhury (2006). 
Independent variables included in this study are ownership concentration, controlling 
shareholders, institutional ownership, foreign ownership and the only non-ownership 
structure independent variable of big 5 auditors in Jordan.  
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As a result, four empirical models are developed to examine relationships between dependent 
and independent variables. Pooled cross-sectional multiple regression analyses are conducted 
using ordinary least squares method to estimate the empirical models. Consequently, research 
hypotheses are tested and statistical inferences are made. Finally, theoretical and practical 
implications are concluded so as to accomplish the objectives of this research.   
 
1.5. Contributions to Existing Knowledge: 
The present research contributes to existing knowledge on three levels: the fields of earnings 
management and corporate governance as a whole, emerging markets level and country level 
(i.e. Jordan). The following is a summary of the theoretical and methodological contributions. 
1- Accruals-based earnings management has been the primary focus of earnings 
management research until recently (Xu et al., 2007). That is, real activity earnings 
management has not received as much attention in the archival literature relative to 
accruals earnings management (Graham et al., 2005). Currently, existing literature on 
real activities earnings management is still US-based. Hence, evidence documenting 
the presence of real activities earnings management in Jordan would contribute to the 
ongoing research by filling the gap concerning the pervasiveness of the costly real 
activities earnings management in emerging markets. 
2- To achieve the first contribution, the model of Roychowdhury (2006) is employed to 
compute abnormal levels of real manipulations. To the best of the researcher’s 
knowledge, no research has yet to employ this model using Jordanian data. 
3- Unlike real activities earnings management, the presence of accruals earnings 
management has already been documented in Jordan (e.g. Al-Fayoumi et al., 2010; 
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Shubita and Shubita, 2010). However, existing studies employ the modified Jones 
model to estimate abnormal accruals without controlling for firms’ performance. By 
employing the model of Kothari et al. (2005), this research is the first to control for 
performance in the estimation of abnormal accruals in Jordan. 
4- To the best of the researcher’s knowledge, this research considers abnormal levels of 
real manipulations in absolute terms for the first time. Although effects of corporate 
governance mechanisms on magnitudes of abnormal accruals have widely been 
investigated in the literature, such effects on magnitudes of real earnings 
manipulations have never been tested before. In addition, effects of corporate 
governance mechanisms on signed abnormal current accruals and abnormal real 
earnings manipulations are also examined in this research unlike previous research 
conducted using Jordanian data. 
5- Fields et al. (2001) argues that previous research examining a single type of earnings 
management imposes the problem of arriving at tentative conclusions about the 
overall effect of earnings management activities because firms usually use both types 
of manipulation simultaneously. In the same vein, this study investigates the effect of 
ownership structure corporate governance mechanisms on accruals and real activities 
earnings management in order to provide more reliable conclusions. Accordingly, this 
study is the first to comprehensively examine the effectiveness of ownership structure 
mechanism in deterring both types of earnings management in emerging markets in 
general and Jordan in particular.  
6- The measurement of managerial ownership in the extant research requires data about 
proportions of shares held by directors and officers in a firm (e.g. Warfield et al., 
1995). However, a review of the literature shows that such information are not 
necessarily available in databases in countries outside the US and UK. The database 
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in Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) suffers from such limitation. Therefore, the 
dummy variable approach in Peasnell et al. (2005) has been modified to proxy for 
managerial ownership as the largest shareholder who occupies the position of either 
chairman of the board or chief executive office. The novelty of this proxy is expected 
to overcome date limitation not only in the database of ASE but also any other 
database that suffers from similar limitation. As such, investigating the effect of 
managerial ownership (i.e. controlling shareholder) on both types of earnings 
management in Jordan for the first time contributes to the current debate of the 
effectiveness of managerial ownership in contexts where ownership is not dispersed 
as in the US and UK. 
7- In theory, foreign investors are expected to improve the governance of their 
shareholdings (Leuz et al., 2009). However, a review of the literature shows that no 
research has ever examined the effect of foreign ownership on real activities earnings 
management, and little research on accruals earnings management. Therefore, this 
research advances new theoretical perceptions in the fields of corporate governance 
and earnings management by empirically investigating the effect of foreign ownership 
on both types of earnings management. 
8- Last but not least, research examining the substitutive effect between the accruals and 
real activities earnings management is still young even in the US market. First, there 
is a new stream of research that examines the effect of enhancing the scrutiny of 
external audit, proxied by auditor size, over abnormal accruals on increasing the use 
of real activities earnings management (e.g. Cohen and Zarowin, 2010). Second, this 
research also investigates the substitutive effect in Jordan by employing the model 
developed in Zang (2012) that is based on costs associated with each type of 
manipulation. Therefore, with little research investigating issue in the US, this 
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research is the first to employ these new approaches in the setting of emerging 
markets. 
 
1.6. Structure of the Thesis: 
This chapter has demonstrated how earnings management has an intrinsic importance 
affecting stakeholders such as shareholders, investors, and regulators. A brief discussion has 
shown that there are several motivations for such study to examine the widely accepted 
agency theory predictions in the setting of Jordan. Consequently, research objectives have 
been identified and research questions have been devised. Finally, contributions of this study 
to existing research on earnings management have been presented. 
The remainder of this thesis has been structured in a manner that serves and helps achieve the 
objective of this research as follows,  
Chapters two and three provide a background for the current study. Beginning with chapter 
two, an overview is provided about Jordan’s economy, capital market, accounting and audit 
professions, corporate governance and ownership structure. The chapter shows the distinctive 
characteristics of the Jordanian business environment that make Jordan a well suited case to 
study earnings management issues. 
Chapter three aims mainly to establish a clear distinction between accruals and real activities 
earnings management. It first starts with a discussion of earnings management definitions 
based on three aspects: managerial intent, type and direction. The chapter also provides a 
critical review of methodological issues attached to earnings management research designs. 
Moreover, popular models used to detect and measure levels of earnings management in the 
extant studies are critically discussed. Accordingly, the chapter concludes that the models of 
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Kothari et al. (2005) and Roychowdhury (2006) are most appropriate to estimate abnormal 
accruals and abnormal levels of real earnings manipulations, respectively. 
As for the literature review, chapter four is dedicated to comprehensively review the literature 
on ownership structure monitoring mechanisms and the role of external audit. In an agency 
theory setting, prior literature considers ownership structure mechanisms (i.e. ownership 
concentration, controlling shareholders, institutional ownership and foreign ownership) and 
external audit as effective monitoring devises that deter earnings management practices. 
These views are critically evaluated in chapter. This chapter concludes that different settings, 
among other conclusions, largely affect the influence of the corporate governance 
mechanisms on earnings management. Hence,  this chapter provide the rationale for 
examining these relationships in Jordan. 
Research methodology is presented in chapter five. It first justifies the choice of post-
positivist paradigm for this research. Second, the chapter details the measurement of earnings 
management proxies and independent variables. Afterwards, it demonstrates the logical 
development of research hypotheses. The chapter then describes the process of population 
section and data collection method. Finally, the choice for statistical methods used for the 
secondary analysis is justified. 
Chapter six involves testing the hypothesised relationships between earnings management 
proxies and five of corporate governance deterrence mechanisms (i.e. ownership 
concentration, managerial ownership, institutional ownership, foreign ownership and external 
audit). Therefore, after the estimation of earnings management proxies, the statistical analysis 
in chapter six comprises four empirical models corresponding to each dependent variable, 
which are: abnormal accruals model, abnormal cash flow from operating activities model, 
abnormal production costs model, and abnormal discretionary expenses model. Eventually, 
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the results obtained from multiple regression analyses are interpreted in line with findings of 
prior studies.  
Chapter seven provides an overview of the research, summarises the findings and conclusions 
of the research, presents the contributions made to existing research and implication of the 
study, highlights the limitations of the study and suggests recommendations for future 
research. 
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Chapter Two 
Overview of Jordan 
 
2.1. Introduction: 
This chapter provides an overview of Jordan where the empirical study of this research takes 
place. The aim is to offer an overview of the Jordanian environment through knowing the 
economic situation, financial market, accounting and audit professions and corporate 
governance. The knowledge about these aspects of Jordan is essential. It shows how the 
Jordanian environment is different from other Arab and developed countries. Finally, it 
reviews the perceptions of professionals on earnings management practices in Jordan. Hence, 
this chapter provides the basis for the literature review and development of research 
hypotheses. 
 
2.2. Background: 
Jordan is an Arab country located in the Middle East. Although the whole population of 
Jordan is slightly over 6.1 million, around 40% of that population are accommodated in the 
capital city Amman. The official currency of Jordan is Jordanian Dinar, which is pegged to 
the USD at a fixed rate equals to 1.41 Dollars (Central bank of Jordan, 2011). 
Jordan is classified as a developing country with limited sources of income. According to the 
Central bank of Jordan (2011), main sources of income come from, 
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1- Limited number of natural resources such as phosphate, potash and cement. 
2- Foreign aid. 
3- Taxes which represent two thirds of the overall income. 
4- Foreign investments. 
5- Proceeds from providing medical and education services to Arabs from neighbouring 
countries; and 
6- Skilled and talented human capital. Jordanians have earned a reputation of being 
skilled, educated and well-trained workforce. By working in other countries whether 
as employees or by opening branches for local existing companies, Jordanians 
contribute to the local economy by injecting funds into local businesses. Further, the 
competitive cost of labour in Jordan makes Jordanians an ideal workforce for 
incoming businesses and potential investment ventures. 
The lack of natural resources such as expensive minerals and water resource, and heavy 
industries imposes several challenges against promoting the country’s economy to a higher 
level. The global financial crisis has also lead to a decrease of foreign aid amounts on which 
Jordan depends to fulfil its obligations. However, Jordan was able to alleviate the impact of 
the financial crisis through benefiting from the independence of its financial market from 
those in the Gulf area (Alnajjar et al., 2010). The stability and strong structure of Jordan’s 
banks and capital market have made Jordan the best destination to which investment, trade 
and economic interaction can be transferred (Al-Anani, 2009). Moreover, unlike western 
countries, banks in Jordan are not pure investments banks and complex financial instruments 
are not used in Jordan. Hence, Jordan was less exposed to the quake as was the west (Alnajjar 
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et al., 2010).  Table 2.1 shows some key economic indicators over the period from 2004 to 
2010. 
Table 2.1. Key economic indicators of Jordan from 2004 to 2010 
Economic Indicator 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
Per capita (JD) 
1,511 1,630 1,853 2,200 2,753 2,979 3,194 
Inflation (%) 3.4 3.5 6.3 5.4 13.9 -0.7 5.0 
Unemployment 12.5 14.8 14.0 13.1 12.7 12.9 12.5 
Exports (million JD) 4,222 4,704 5,751 6,496 8,657 7,749 8,650 
Imports (million JD) 6,626 8,408 9,380 11,118 13,559 11,573 12,644 
Source: Indicators of National Accounts, Department of Statistics (2011) 
In spite of the economical challenges and the surrounding political circumstances that 
dominate the region as in Iraq, the government has selected the route of continuous 
development in all fields. Long run strategies have been set for improving the essential needs 
of the populace such as, accommodations, transportations, telecommunications, all utilities 
and mainly, education and healthcare (Jordan Investment Board, 2007). 
Moreover, a thorough reforming process took place to create a favourable business 
environment. Legislations concerning international investor protection have been enacted, the 
banking system has been strengthened and attractive tax incentives and custom duty 
exemptions have been offered. As a result, the ratio of external debt to GDP has decreased 
from 66.1% in 2004 to 23.6% in 2010 (Jordan Investment Board, 2011). 
As a result of the attractive climate and incentive packages provided to investors by the 
government, Jordan became one of the favourable investment destinations in the Middle East 
(Jaafar and El-Shawa, 2009). They report that Amman Stock Exchange has witnessed 
significant increases in the number of listed companies, trading volumes and market 
capitalisation in recent years. 
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Given these economical and political circumstances, it is plausible to question the integrity of 
financial reports of listed firms in Jordan. Managers may engage in harmful earnings 
management practices to attract additional capital, obtain debt at low costs or even avoid high 
tax payments. This intuitively calls for investigating the effectiveness of current corporate 
governance deterrence mechanisms in Jordan. 
 
2.3. Jordanian Capital Market “Amman Financial Market”: 
The establishment of public companies in Jordan has started long before establishing the 
Jordanian Securities market. In 1930, the Arab Bank was the first public shareholding 
company whose shares were traded. One year later, the flotation of Jordan Tobacco and 
Cigarettes Company took place. It was not until 1951 that Jordan Cement Factories went 
public. At that time, Jordanians traded public companies’ shares through few brokerage firms 
in an unregulated market. In 1979, the number of trading transactions has risen to an extent 
with which it became impossible to continue without a financial market that organizes the 
issuance and trading of securities. This has led the Central Bank of Jordan to establish 
Amman Financial Market (AFM) (Jordan Securities Commission, 2011). 
Due to a constant annual economic growth, the capital market adopted a reforming policy in 
1997. The policy aimed mainly at improving the regulations of the market in compliance with 
international standards to enhance transparency and conditions of safe trading. As a result, 
the capital market has been restructured into three institutions to serve the purpose of 
distinguishing between the supervisory and legislative role and the executive role. The three 
institutions were and still named as: Jordan Securities Commission, Amman Stock Exchange 
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and Securities Depository Commission. The main role, duties and responsibilities of each 
institution are as follows, 
 
1- Jordan Securities Commission (JSC): 
JSC is considered as the regulator of the Capital market. The commission has been given a 
superior power over the other two institutions in order to execute roles of supervision, 
regulating and monitoring. In addition, the JSC organises the disclosure and transparency of 
information pertaining to issuers, securities, insider trading and major shareholders. 
Hence, the JSC has positively contributed to the restructuring process of the capital market in 
Jordan. It currently ensures a fair trading environment through the enactment of legal 
framework and the separation between the regulatory function and trading in accordance with 
international standards (JSC, 2011). 
 
2- Amman Stock Exchange (ASE): 
ASE was established in March 1999 as a private and non-profit institution.  This institution 
functions as an exchange for the trading of securities with a legal and financial independence. 
It is particularly concerned with the principles of transparency, fairness, liquidity, and 
efficiency. To that end, the exchange has implemented international standard regulations and 
listing system. Hence, ASE provides a secure and strong environment for its securities, and 
protects the rights of investors. In addition, ASE works directly with JSC and maintains 
strong connection with other exchanges and international organizations to act in accordance 
with international principles and best practices (ASE, 2011). 
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3- Securities Depository Commission (SDC): 
SDC has started operating in May 1999. It aims to fulfil the task of ensuring a safe custody of 
securities ownership. The commission’s main responsibilities include registration of 
securities, ownership transfer, clearance and settlement of trades and securities deposit (SDC, 
2011). 
 
2.4. Market Efficiency: 
Despite the fact that ASE was one of the earliest stock exchange markets in the region and, 
all studies that examine its efficiency report that ASE is an inefficient market even at the 
weak form level. Examples of studies that investigate the efficiency of ASE include Atmeh 
(2003) and Al-barghoughti (2005). The former employs advanced statistical techniques like 
GARCH, whereas the later uses traditional statistical techniques such as Autocorrelation and 
the Run tests. Both results contend that ASE is inefficient at the weak form level of 
efficiency. Accordingly, both researchers recommend that existing and potential investors 
consider the implications of the findings in the process of making an investment decision 
pertaining to companies in which they are interested.   
 
2.5. Accounting Profession: 
In 1989, many companies voluntarily started adopting the International Accounting standards 
(IAS) based on the recommendation of Jordan Association of Certified Public Accountants 
(JACPA) to replace the then existing Jordanian Accounting Standards (JAS) which was 
introduced by Income tax department. This move was carried out because those local 
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Accounting Standards did not define guidelines of keeping accounting books and preparing 
annual reports (Rawashdeh, 2003).  
In an effort to facilitate Jordan’s plans for implementing privatisation and making ASE an 
internationally recognised market, the government enacted the “1997 Company Law” and the 
“2002 Securities Law” which mandate the adoption of the full version of IAS (Al-Akra et al., 
2009). Those laws serve the purposes of ensuring holding legitimate accounts in compliance 
with the international accounting standards, and monitoring the disclosures of publicly traded 
companies in particular. For instance, Article No. 14 of Securities law No. 76 issued by 
Jordan Securities Commission states that “all institutions monitored by the Commission are 
subject to follow the International Accounting Standards in recording their financial 
information and disclose them to the public”. 
 
2.6. Audit Profession: 
Similar to the adoption of IAS, the adoption of the International Standards of Auditing (ISA) 
became compulsory in Jordan in 1998 to improve the overall status of financial reporting. 
Companies law of 1997 article 22 mandates all public shareholding companies, general 
partnerships, limited partnerships, private shareholding companies and foreign companies to 
prepare and present annual audited financial statements in accordance with international 
accounting and audit standards.   
Recently, the enactment of the new Accountancy Profession Law 73 of 2003 has led to the 
establishment of the High Council for Accounting and Auditing headed by the Minister of 
Industry and Trade. Moreover, under the Accountancy Profession Law 73, the JACPA 
became the main professional body in Jordan. The law also states the roles of, and working 
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mechanism between, the two bodies. While the High Council is entrusted with the 
responsibility for the oversight of auditing profession, the JACPA is the responsible body for 
monitoring compliance with the accounting and auditing standards. The JACPA recommends 
the adoption of auditing standards to the High Council which is entrusted for approval of 
accounting and auditing standards (World Bank’s Report on the Observance of Standards and 
Codes, 2004). As a result, a number of big international audit firms have entered the 
Jordanian audit market either on their own or as an affiliation to local audit firms (Naser et 
al., 2007). 
 
2.7. Corporate Governance: 
Corporate governance is the rule and practices that govern the relationship 
between the managers and shareholders of corporations, as well as stakeholders 
like employees and creditors. It contributes to growth and financial stability by 
reinforcement of market confidence, financial market integrity and economic 
efficiency (OECD 2004, p.1) 
Corporate governance reforms have been an important agenda item in Jordan’s pursuit of 
strengthened and sustainable economic growth since the 1990s (Jaafar and El-Shawa, 2009). 
Company Law of 1997 introduced the first provisions of the framework of governance-policy 
(Omran et al., 2008). However, it was not until 2006 that Jordan Securities Commission has 
issued a guidance of good corporate governance (Omran et al., 2008).  
The current corporate governance guidelines are mainly derived from the governance 
framework of the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Good 
corporate governance is a part of Jordan’s reform efforts to create a more attractive 
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investment climate and protect investors interests (Regional Corporate Governance Working 
Group, 2003). Yet the Jordanian guidance of good corporate governance has not been 
actually enforced (Shanikat and Abbadi, 2011). Rather, regulations for these guidelines have 
been enacted in the amendments of Company Law of 1997 and Securities Law of 2002. 
These laws mainly require listed companies to appoint independent directors, form audit 
committees and monitor the compliance with the requirements of the Securities Law of 2002 
(Al-Akra, et al., 2009). 
Nevertheless, according to World Bank’s “Doing Business” report (2009), investor protection 
in Jordan in 2008 was still below the average achieved by member states of the OECD. This 
implies that investors’ rights are weak and hence, the capital market may face difficulties in 
convincing investors that their investments are managed responsibly. This could be 
attributable to the Jordanian corporate legal framework that has its origins in French civil 
law, as the findings of La Porta et al. (1999) and Nenova (2003) contend that French civil law 
countries have weaker legal protection of investors than it in common law countries. 
 
2.8. Ownership Structure: 
Omran et al. (2008) find that ownership tends to be highly concentrated in Arab countries.  
This substantiates that ownership concentration is considered as a key characteristic of 
corporate governance in Arab countries to overcome the weakness of legal protection of 
investors.  
Although Omran et al. (2008) report that concentrated ownership in Jordan is the lowest 
among Arab countries, they note that levels of private ownership in ASE in higher than those 
in other Arab countries such as the Egyptian, Tunisian and Omani. The reason for this 
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difference is that the Jordanian government had to adopt economic measure including 
privatisation. Unable to repay its commitments, the government relinquished shares in 50 
major corporations which substantially increased the market capitalisation of ASE listed 
equity shares (Al-Akra et al., 2009). 
Moreover, approximately 80% of shareholdings are privately held by individuals and 
institutions, both foreign and Jordanian. The country adopts an open economic policy where 
both Arab and Non-Arab foreign investors are openly permitted to invest in most companies 
listed on Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) (Naser et al., 2007). For instance, total foreign 
investment amounted to 20% of total trading volume of shares in March 2002, divided almost 
equally between Arab and Non-Arab investors (ASE annual report, 2002). In addition, 
around half of private shareholdings (i.e. 40%) are owned by controlling individuals, families 
or institutions as they seek to manage companies in which they own large portion of shares 
(Jaafar and El-Shawa, 2009). Consequently, institutional ownership, foreign ownership and 
managerial ownership are also considered key corporate governance characteristic in Jordan. 
To sum up, ownership structure mechanisms in Jordan comprise four types: ownership 
concentration, managerial ownership, institutional investors’ ownership and foreign 
investors’ ownership. 
 
2.9. Earnings Management in Jordan: 
A research conducted by Al-Khabash and Al-Thuneibat (2009) investigate whether earnings 
management practices exist among manufacturing and service Jordanian firms. Through a 
questionnaire survey, they attempt to explore external and internal auditors’ perceptions 
regarding the existence, direction and legitimacy of earnings management in Jordan. The 
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researchers document that external auditors believe that income increasing and decreasing 
earnings management is legitimately practiced in Jordan. From the perspective of internal 
auditors, earnings management exists legitimately merely to increase reported income. 
However, the survey methodology suffers from several potential limitations (Graham et al, 
2005). Apparently, this survey measures beliefs of external and internal auditors although 
their research implications confirm the need “train external and internal auditors regarding 
earnings management techniques and measures of detection” (p.58). This also indicates that 
some of the survey questions are misunderstood. To avoid such problems, this research relies 
on regression analysis; using popular models used the vast majority of accounting research on 
earnings management. 
 
2.10. Summary: 
Understanding the economic conditions and regulatory environment of Jordan retains a 
particular importance in this research. This chapter shows the distinctive characteristics of the 
Jordanian business environment that make Jordan a well suited case to study earnings 
management issues. First, regardless of limited sources of income and reliance on foreign aid 
and capital, Jordan is considered one of the favourable investment destinations in the Middle 
East. Second, listed firms in Jordan are mandated to prepare their financial reports in 
compliance with international accounting standards, where the responsibility of oversight is 
assigned to external auditors. Finally, Jordan is characterised with limited awareness of 
corporate governance (Shanikat and Abbadi, 2011) and weak legal investor protection (World 
Bank, 2009), which highlight the importance of ownership structure corporate governance 
mechanisms. 
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Chapter Three 
Earnings Management: Definition, Types and Methodological 
Issues 
 
3.1. Introduction: 
The literature has long recognised that mangers can adjust reported earnings through taking 
both accounting and real economic actions (Graham et al., 2005). However, compared to real 
activity-based earnings management, much of the academic research focuses on accruals-
based earnings management (Roychowdhury, 2006). Since this study investigates both 
accruals-based and real activities-based earnings management, this chapter aims at 
establishing a clear distinction between the two types of earnings management.  
The chapter proceeds as follows. The next section discusses definitions of earnings 
management with an emphasis on three aspect; managerial intent, types and directions. 
Section three establishes the differences between accruals-based and real activities-based 
earnings management. Section four reviews the methodological issues regarding earnings 
management research designs. The last section presents a critical review of the most popular 
models that are used in the literature to document earnings management, and identifies the 
most suitable models for this study. 
 
3.2. Defining Earnings Management: 
In general, earnings management occurs when managers manipulate firms’ reported earnings 
in a manner that does not accurately reflect the actual underlying economic performance of 
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firms (Healy and Wahlen, 1999). However, this broad definition is less likely to provide a 
sufficient understanding about the phenomenon of earnings management. Further, from 
Beneish’s (2001) perspective, there is a lack of consensus on the definition of earnings 
management. Researchers have considered several aspects when defining earnings 
management due to the broadness of this subject. To fulfil the objective of defining earnings 
management, three essential aspects are considered as the criteria for summarising a variety 
of definitions. These aspects are: i) why earnings management exists, ii) how it is 
accomplished, and iii) the direction to which earnings are managed. Diagram 3.1 is designed 
to demonstrate each aspect and its components on which the following discussion relies. 
Figure 3.1 
Aspects of Earnings Management Definition 
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The first aspect focuses on managerial intent toward misstatements of earnings. Managerial 
intent, as it is shown below, occupies a prominent place in the definitions of earnings 
management in both the professional and academic literatures.  
Beginning with the professional literature, the National Association of Certified Fraud 
Examiners (1993) defines an extreme form of earnings management (i.e. financial fraud) as 
“the intentional, deliberate, misstatement or omission of material facts, or accounting data, 
which is misleading and, when considered with all information made available, would cause 
the reader to change or alter his or her judgement or decision” (as cited in Dechow and 
Skinner, 2000, p.238). 
In terms of the widely accepted definition in the academic literature, Schipper (1989, p.92) 
defines earnings management as “a purposeful intervention in the external financial 
reporting process, with the intent of obtaining some private gain (as opposed to, say, merely 
facilitating the neutral operation of the process)”. She adds later, “A minor extension to the 
definition would encompass real earnings management, accomplished by timing investment 
or financing decisions to alter reported earnings or some subset of it”. 
Moreover, in their comprehensive review, Healy and Wahlen (1999, p.368) state that 
“Earnings management occurs when managers use judgement in financial reporting and in 
structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead some stakeholders about 
the underlying economic performance of the company or to influence contractual outcomes 
that depend on reported accounting numbers”. 
Clearly, the term earnings management has been given a negative connotation as the above 
definitions encompass two main elements pertaining to managerial intent (Holland and 
Ramsay, 2003): first, managers’ deliberate intent to mislead, and second, managerial 
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opportunism which includes managers’ intentions to either transfer wealth from other 
stakeholders to shareholders or gain personal benefits (Healy and Wahlen, 1999).  
However, researchers do also articulate the beneficial purpose of earnings management. For 
instance, Beneish (2001, p.5) notes that “There are two perspectives on earnings 
management: the opportunistic perspective holds that managers seek to mislead investors, 
and the information perspective ... under which managerial discretion is a means for 
managers to reveal to investors their private expectations about the firm’s future cash flows”. 
Another definition that embraces signalling along with the opportunistic purpose is proposed 
by Fields, et al. (2001, p.260) as they state that earnings management occurs “When 
managers exercise their discretion over the accounting numbers with or without restrictions. 
Such discretion can be either firm value maximising or opportunistic”. Here, it is argued that 
the practice of earnings management may be motivated by beneficial intent. In other words, 
managers could utilise earnings management practices to signal inside value-relevant 
information that is unlikely to be transparent to stakeholders about firm’s future performance. 
Hence, earnings management could arise due to beneficial as well as opportunistic intents. 
In terms of the second aspect, Schipper (1989), Healy and Wahlen (1999) and Degeorge et al. 
(1999) tackle the matter of how earnings management is accomplished. They posit two main 
types: timing reported and/or actual economic events. That is, earnings management is 
accomplished principally by i) utilising the flexibility offered in the accounting standards for 
managers to use their judgement in manipulating timing of reporting accruals (i.e. accruals-
based earnings management), and/or ii) strategically timing real economic events such as 
investment, sales or expenditures (i.e. real activities-based earnings management).  
Thirdly, earnings management could have either upwards or downwards directions. Income-
increasing and income-decreasing manipulation decisions are conferred by managers’ 
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earnings targets. Mohanram (2003, p.1) state that “Earnings management does not always 
have to mean upwards manipulation.[…], there can be many instances when managers 
intentionally misreport earnings downwards”. 
The conclusion that could be stemmed from the above definitions is that managers may 
exercise discretion accorded by accounting standards and/or structure real activities to report 
earnings at desired levels. As such, they deliberately engage in earnings management 
practices to either increase or decrease current period’s income. Yet managers are not 
necessarily driven by opportunistic intentions and hence reduce the credibility of financial 
reports. The practice of earnings management could also provide investors with useful 
information for decision making. 
In this study, the term earnings management implies managerial opportunism following the 
definition provided by Healy and Wahlen (1999) which excludes the beneficial perspective of 
earnings management. Further, the definition of Healy and Wahlen (1999) is also used in this 
study because their definition emphasises that the types of earnings manipulation include not 
only accruals-based but also real activities-based types.  
 
3.3. Types of Earnings Management: 
The vast body of literature on earnings management classifies types of earnings management 
into two categories: accruals and real activities manipulations (McVay, 2006). Although real 
activities earnings manipulation has been aggressively used at recent scandals such as Enron, 
it has often been overlooked in the literature (Yaping, 2005). This has lead researchers to 
emphasise the problem of arriving at tentative conclusions about the overall effect of earnings 
management when investigating one type of manipulation and ignoring the other one (e.g. 
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Fields et al., 2001; Zang, 2012). Alexander (2010) attributes the dearth of literature on real 
activities earnings management to a lack of causal models that accurately measures earnings 
manipulation through real activities at that time. However, since the introduction of the 
Roychowdhury (2006) model, a noticeable amount of work that investigates the effect of both 
types of earnings management has been produced to fill this gab in the literature (e.g. Cohen 
et al., 2008; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Zang, 2012).  
In an attempt to contribute to the above literature, this study investigates the effectiveness of 
ownership structure mechanisms in deterring the harmful effects of both types of earnings 
management in the developing market of Jordan. To accomplish this, it is necessary first to 
establish the differences between accruals-based and real activities-based earnings 
management. 
 
3.3.1 Earnings Management through Accruals: 
Bodies of accounting standards setters, such as the International Accounting Standards Board 
(IASB), have introduced the accrual basis accounting due to the ever increasing evolutions in 
businesses internationally. Cash basis accounting was no longer efficient as it imposes 
problems associated with measuring firms’ performances when firms are in continuous 
operation. Complexities in economic transactions emerged and hence, necessitated the 
disclosure of earnings which are the summary measure of firms’ performances produced 
under the accrual basis (Dechow, 1994). Accrual basis maintains that all revenues (expenses) 
pertaining to a financial period must be recognised in the same period regardless of the actual 
receipt (payment) of cash. Thereby, the effects of entities continuous business transactions 
are recorded in the financial period in which they occur rather than only in periods in which 
cash is paid or received by the entity (IASB, 2008). 
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Entities are required to prepare their financial statements in compliance with accrual 
accounting in order to reflect entities’ performance as proximate as possible. However, the 
accounting standards may not include an accounting treatment for every single economic 
transaction (IASB 2008). Therefore, setters of accounting standards permit a range of 
flexibility for entities’ managements to use their judgements (i.e. discretion) to maximise the 
value of accounting information offered to its users. For instance, managers must exercise 
discretion in working capital management such as the timing of stock shipment or purchases 
(Healy and Wahlen, 1999).  
Nevertheless, management’s use of discretion also creates opportunities for earnings 
management. As by exploiting their discretion, managers may shift earnings between periods 
in a manner that does not reflect the underlying economic performance of firms (Degeorge et 
al., 1999). 
To amplify, the above literature suggests that accruals earnings management is merely about 
the timing of revenues and expenses recognition. It hence has no direct effect on the cash 
flow component of earnings. Managers may use income increasing (decreasing) accounting 
methods to shift excess (loss) in earnings between periods depending on managements’ 
anticipations for the next period’s income. So if managers expect to incur losses in the next 
period, they may postpone the recognition of revenues in the current profitable period to 
increase income in loss period or vice versa. For instance, in a loss period, managers may set 
a low level of provision for doubtful debts to shift that loss to the next period where income is 
expected to be high. 
The term “Discretionary Accruals” is widely considered as a means to proxy for the presence 
of earnings management in related literature. According to Ronen and Yaari (2008, p.372), 
discretionary accruals are “accruals that arise from transactions made or accounting 
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treatments chosen in order to manage earnings”. In other words, discretionary accruals are 
the reported accruals that deviate from an entity’s expected normal levels of accruals. 
Clearly, to comprehend this definition, it is necessary to distinguish the expected normal (i.e. 
unmanaged) accruals that are called “Non-discretionary Accruals” in the earnings 
management literature. Therefore, Ronen and Yaari (ibid) define non-discretionary accruals 
as “accruals that arise from transactions made in the current period that are normal for the 
firm given its performance level and business strategy, industry conventions, macro-
economic events, and other economic factors”1. 
Moreover, any overstatement of accruals in one period entails an understatement of accruals 
in another, and vice versa (Dechow and Schrand 2004). It is more like borrowing from, or 
lending, future earnings. Stated differently, any accruals-based earnings management 
transaction entails another transaction, in the forthcomings financial period, that reverses the 
effect of the manipulation practiced in the preceding period. According to Ronen and Yaari 
(ibid) Reversals “are accruals originating from transactions made in previous periods”. 
Ultimately, reported earnings must equal total cash, and total accruals must equal zero. 
Finally, it is worth noting that while accruals earnings management is totally based on the 
discretion allowed by accounting standards, exercising accounting discretion in a manner that 
violates the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) is considered as financial 
fraud. For instance, recording fictitious sales to book from inventory to revenues is a financial 
fraud whereas timing the recognition of sales could be merely utilising the flexibility offered 
by accounting standards. To that end, Table 3.1 aims to distinguish between financial fraud 
and accruals-based earnings management. 
                                                 
1 In the literature of earnings management, discretionary accruals and non-discretionary accruals are used 
interchangeably with abnormal accruals and normal accruals, respectively. 
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Table 3.1. The Distinction between Fraud and Earnings Management 
Type of Earnings Management Accounting Choices 
Within GAAP 
Conservative Accounting (i.e. 
Income-decreasing choices) 
- Overly aggressive recognition of provisions or 
reserves. 
- Overvaluation of acquired in-process R&D in 
purchase acquisition. 
- Overstatement of restructuring charges and asset 
write-offs. 
Neutral Accounting - Earnings that result from neutral operation of the 
process. 
Aggressive Accounting (i.e. 
Income-increasing choices)  
- Understatement of the provision for bad debts. 
- Drawing down provisions or reserves in an overly 
aggressive manner. 
Violates GAAP 
Fraudulent Accounting - Recording sales before they are realisable. 
- Recording fictitious sales. 
- Backdating sales invoices. 
- Overstating inventory by recording fictitious 
inventory. 
Source: Dechow and Skinner (2000, p.239) 
 
3.3.2. Earnings Management through Real Activities: 
Recently, the focus of many researchers has turned to the measurement of the managerial 
intervention in the process of reporting through manipulating real operational activities. Real 
earnings management is a relatively new hypothesis that is concerned with the manipulation 
through changing the underlying operations of a firm in order to achieve target earnings 
through the strategic timing of making an actual investment, sales, expenditures, or financing 
decisions. For instance, offering discounts to boost sales or reducing maintenance 
expenditure to increase reported earnings (Degeorge et al., 1999). Roychowdhury (2006) 
defines real activities earnings management as “management actions that deviate from 
normal business practices, undertaken with the primary objective of meeting certain earnings 
thresholds”.  
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Real activities earnings management entails a sacrifice or a reduction in the value of a firm 
(i.e. sacrifice future cash flows to achieve the desired current period’s income). Therefore, 
accruals-based earnings management type is advantageous because there is no direct cash 
flow consequences associated with its application (Roychowdhury, 2006). 
It is worth noting at this point that the direction of real earnings management practices might 
differ from that of cash  management. The adoption of income-increasing real activities 
practices affects Cash Flow from Operation (CFO) either positively, negatively, or even 
ambiguously (Gunny, 2010). To illustrate, a reduction in cash expenditures for maintenance 
will lead to an increase in both reported earnings and CFO. However, an overproduction that 
aims at decreasing the cost of goods sold will increase reported earnings but will also result in 
higher holding cost which in turn lowers CFO. Hence, if a manger engages in both, or even 
more of real activities practices, the effect on CFO will be ambiguous. 
Further, the manipulation of real activities must take place during a fiscal period to arrive at 
target earnings. This is mainly because such manipulation would not affect reported earnings 
if practiced at the end of the financial period. Here, accruals earnings management might 
seem advantageous because it is usually practiced at the end of the fiscal financial period 
when the need for meeting target earnings is most certain. However, if the accruals available 
for manipulation have been constrained by the manipulation in prior periods and/or the 
scrutiny of auditors, firms might run at the risk of a shortfall on meeting target earnings 
(Gunny, 2010). 
While accruals earnings management could be either a GAAP violation or not, managing real 
activities is not a GAAP violation as long as the transactions are recorded properly (Dechow 
and Schrand 2004). So unlike accruals earnings management, real activities earnings 
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management is less likely to be subject to the scrutiny of regulators, standard setters and 
external auditors (Cohen and Zarowin, 2010).  
Finally, Beneish (2001) argues that it is implausible to consider any real decision that departs 
from rational business behaviour as a means of real activities earnings management. 
Managers may forego a profitable investment opportunity simply because of their judgment 
on such an opportunity at the time of occurrence. Even if bad business decisions have been 
made, Lo (2008) remarks that it is difficult to find managers and directors liable for such 
decisions because they are protected by the law of “business judgement rule”. 
To conclude, the fact that firms may use both types of manipulation as substitutes makes 
examining either type of manipulation in isolation leads to tentative conclusions (Zang, 
2012). Especially because of much of previous research on earnings management focuses on 
discretionary accruals and gives little attention to the widely used and more costly real 
activities manipulation (Graham et al., 2005; Roychowdhury, 2006; Alexander, 2010). 
 
3.4. Earnings Management Research Design: 
Although competing models differ in the process of predicting the normal levels of earnings, 
the statistical inference remains the critical research design issue that all models share. 
Models misspecifications impose methodological problems of which researchers should be 
aware. Interestingly, a thorough analysis of the design of the tests used to detect earnings 
management has been provided by Dechow et al. (1995). Therefore, this section draws 
mainly on Dechow et al. (1995) in discussing the framework of statistical testing procedure 
used to detect earnings management and the methodological issues related to it. 
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3.4.1. The Framework of the Testing Procedure for Earnings Management: 
The estimation of the amount of managed earnings (ME) requires the researcher to identify 
an estimation period during which no systematic earnings management is hypothesised. 
Hence, the estimation period represents a benchmark which allows the comparison of 
earnings between this period and an event period where earnings management is predicted to 
take place.  
According Dechow et al. (1995), tests for earnings management can be fashioned in a linear 
framework around a stimulus (i.e. condition) identified by the researcher. This stimulus is 
usually measured by a partitioning variable PART. Hence, if ME were observable, the 
following linear regression would characterise the tests of earnings management:   
ME = α + β PART + ε           (1) 
Where, 
ME : the amount of managed earnings 
PART : a dummy variable that partitions the data into two groups for which earnings   
management predictions are specified by the researcher 
ε : an error term that is independently and identically normally distributed 
The variable PART is set equal to one during firm-years in which earnings are predicted to be 
systematically managed in response to the stimulus identified by the researcher (i.e. the event 
period) and zero in other periods in which no earning management is predicted (i.e. the 
estimation period). The researcher would reject the null hypothesis of no earnings 
management and hence attribute earnings management that does take place to the research 
stimulus if the estimated coefficient on PART (  ) has the hypothesised sign and statistically 
significant at conventional levels (Dechow et al., 1995). 
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In other words, the null hypothesis would be rejected and earnings management would be 
attributed to the stimulus identified by the researcher if: 
(i) Earnings management does take place is response to the researcher’s stimulus; the 
magnitude of earnings management is statistically significant [which is measured 
by the absolute difference between the estimation period and the event period], 
and 
(ii) The actual direction of earnings management matches that of the predicted; the 
sign of the estimated coefficient on PART (  ), is the same sign of the 
hypothesised coefficient on PART (β). [Noting that positive sign indicates income 
increasing earnings management and negative sign indicates income decreasing 
earnings management]. 
Yet in fact, managed earnings are unobservable and researchers are forced to use a proxy that 
measures ME with an error ( ). Moreover, the variable PART might not be the sole, if any, 
causal determinant of earnings management. Therefore, a correctly specified model should 
include all variables that are relevant to the measurement of the researcher’s proxy for ME. 
Symbolically, 
MEP = α + β PART +         +   + ε        (2) 
Where, 
MEP : managed earnings proxy 
Xk : (for K=1, ..., K) other relevant variables influencing ME 
But because the researcher cannot readily identify other omitted relevant variables, s/he 
represents the effects of omitted relevant variables and the measurement error by ( ). Hence, 
the model can be summarised as, 
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MEP = α + β PART +   + ε          (3) 
Where, 
  : captures the sum of the effects of, (i) the omitted relevant variables on ME and (ii) 
the measurement error in MEP 
Eventually, the researcher excludes the relevant variable ( ) from the regression and estimate 
the model of earnings management using the method of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). 
Symbolically: 
MEP =   +    PART + e          (4) 
Where, 
  : the sample estimate of the intercept    
   : the sample estimate of the slope coefficient    
e : an error that reflects the variation in MEP within a partition 
 
3.4.2. The Validity of the Testing Procedure for Earnings Management:  
An unbiased test of earnings management requires that the measurement error in MEP, ( ), to 
be uncorrelated with the partitioning variable, PART (McNichols, 2000). Therefore, the 
omission of the relevant variable ( ) should bias the estimated coefficient on the variable 
PART (  ) if both variables were correlated. This would in turn lead to erroneous inferences 
about the existence of earnings management as the model will be misspecified.  
Statistically, if the omitted variable (Xk) is correlated with the included variable (Xi), the 
slope coefficient (  i) of the included variable will be a biased estimator of the population’s 
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coefficient (βi). Therefore, the expected value of (  i) would equal (βi) plus the bias (Gujarati, 
2003). Symbolically,   
E(  i) = βi + (βk * bki)           (5) 
Clearly, the magnitude and sign of this bias equals multiplying (βk) by (bki)  
Where, 
βk : the slope coefficient in the regression of the dependent variable (Y) on the excluded 
variable (Xk), and 
 
bki : the slope coefficient in the regression of the excluded variable (Xk) on the included 
variable (Xi). 
In the earnings management context, Dechow et al. (1995, p.196) consider this statistical 
issue in their analysis as they identify two problems for statistical inference that arise from 
being (  ) a biased estimator of β when the correlation between PART and   does exist. 
Recall that the relevant variable ( ) can represent the measurement error in MEP (i.e. the 
unmanaged earnings that are not extracted by any model) and/or omitted relevant variables 
influencing ME. 
Problem 1: Incorrectly attributing earnings management to PART 
This problem manifests itself in two ways that lead to committing type I error
2
. First, if 
earnings management that is hypothesised to be caused by PART does not take place (i.e. the 
true coefficient on PART is zero) and the measurement error in MEP is correlated with 
PART, then the estimated coefficient on PART will be biased away from zero. In other 
words, although earnings management does not take place, the non-extracted unmanaged 
                                                 
2 Type I error signifies rejecting the null hypothesis of no earnings management when it is true. 
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earnings will be incorrectly considered as managed earnings caused by PART. Second, if 
earnings management does take place in response to other omitted relevant variables rather 
than PART and these omitted variables are correlated with PART, then the estimated 
coefficient on PART will be biased away from zero. That is, although earnings management 
are caused by other omitted variables, the model will correctly detect managed earnings but 
will incorrectly attribute them to PART. 
Problem 2: Unintentionally extracting earnings management caused by PART 
This problem arises when earnings management that is hypothesised to be caused by PART 
does take place (i.e. the true coefficient on PART is not zero) but the correlation between 
PART and ( ) is opposite in sign to the true coefficient on PART causing the estimated 
coefficient on PART to be biased toward zero. In other words, although earnings 
management does take place in response to PART, the model used to generate MEP will 
incorrectly consider some or all of the managed earnings as unmanaged earnings because of 
the negative correlation between MEP and its measurement error. This will increase the 
probability of committing type II error
3
. 
So far, the above two problems have been found to arise from the bias in the estimated 
coefficient on PART caused by the omission of a correlated variable. Statistically, however, 
even if the included and excluded variables are uncorrelated (i.e. the estimated coefficient on 
PART, (  ), is unbiased), the estimated variance of the coefficient on the included variable, 
var(  ), will remain a biased estimator of the true variance of the true coefficient (  ). To 
illustrate, recall equation No. (5), where in this case, the slope coefficient in the regression of 
the excluded variable (Xk) on the included variable (Xi), (bki), equals zero because there is no 
                                                 
3 Type II error signifies accepting the null hypothesis of no earnings management when it is false. 
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correlation between the omitted and included variables. Therefore, the estimated coefficient 
on PART, (  ), is unbiased. Yet because the slope coefficient in the regression of the 
dependent variable (Y) on the omitted relevant variable (Xk), (βk), does not equal zero, var(  ) 
will remain a biased estimator of the true variance of the true coefficient (  ). That is, var(  ) 
will always have a positive bias that overestimates the true variance of (  ) (Gujarati, 2006) 4. 
On this basis, Dechow et al. (1995, p.197) proceed with their analysis to cover a third 
statistical inference problem which is, 
 Problem 3: Low power test
5
 
This problem is concerned with earnings management models’ ability to detect managed 
earnings when earnings management does take place. When the relevant variable ( ) is 
uncorrelated with the included variable PART, and is omitted from the estimated model, the 
variance of the coefficient on PART, var(  ), will be overestimated. Consequently, the 
standard error of the estimated coefficient on PART, SE(  ), will be inflated causing the 
confidence interval to be wider. As the confidence interval gets wider, the researcher may 
tend to accept the null hypothesis that the true value of the coefficient is zero more frequently 
than the true situation demands (i.e. increase the probability of committing type II error). 
 
 
 
                                                 
4
 For statistical proof, consider Kmenta, J. (1986), Elements of Econometrics, 2
nd
 Ed., Macmillan, New York. 
5 Statistical power is the model's ability to reject a false null hypothesis (Gujarati, 2003). At length, since the 
probability of committing type II error (β) is about failing to detect earnings management when it genuinely 
exists, the statistical power is the opposite of not detecting earnings management (1- β). 
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3.5. Earnings Management Measurement Methods: 
Traditionally, researchers seek to isolate the abnormal levels of earnings from those which 
are reported. To do so, they impose models that predict the normal levels of earnings during 
an estimation period where no systematic earnings management is hypothesised. Then, the 
residuals of subtracting the predicted from the reported earnings are considered as proxies for 
earnings management
6
. 
Following the types categories, researchers use abnormal accruals and abnormal operational 
activities as proxies for accruals and real activities earnings management, respectively
7
. 
Accordingly, the following subsections discuss the procedures adopted by researchers to 
document earnings management through these proxies. 
 
3.5.1. The Measurement of Accruals-Based Earnings Management: 
In the majority of earnings management studies, accounting accruals are considered the 
preferable means for managements to alter earnings. Therefore, researchers have proposed 
three alternative approaches to evaluate the existence of accruals earnings management 
(Beneish, 2001). These approaches are discussed below in the following order: the approach 
of aggregate accruals, the approach of specific accruals, and the distributional approach.  
 
 
                                                 
6 Positive and negative residuals are used in income-increasing and income-decreasing hypotheses, respectively. 
Absolute values of the residuals are used in hypotheses that examine the magnitude of abnormal earning 
regardless of the direction. See the methodology chapter for a detailed discussion. 
7 Studies supportive of the argument are discussed in sections (2.6.1.1), (2.6.1.2), (2.6.1.3) and (2.6.2). 
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3.5.1.1. The Approach of Aggregate Accruals: 
The main feature of this approach is that it aggregates the net effect of numerous recognition 
and measurement decisions into a single measure. This feature makes this approach more 
appealing because, in reality, managers are more likely to use several accruals rather than a 
single accrual to manipulate earnings (Jones, 1991). Consistent with this view, researchers 
have implemented this approach in a wide range of contexts and have provided cumulative 
evidence supportive of the existence of accruals earnings management. For example, a 
number of studies provide evidence that managers exercise income-increasing accruals 
earnings management to (i) inflate share prices around Initial Public Offerings (IPO) (e.g. 
Teoh et al., 1998b; DuCharme et al., 2001) and Seasoned Equity Offerings (SEO) (e.g. Teoh 
et al., 1998a; Shivakumar, 2000), (ii) opportunistically increase their earnings-based bonuses 
(e.g. Healy, 1985; Guidry et al., 1999), and (iii) avoid the violation of debt covenant (e.g. 
DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994; Jaggi and Lee, 2002). 
In addition, evidence that documents income-decreasing accruals earnings management does 
also exist in the literature, especially for regulation and tax considerations. For instance, 
Jones (1991) document income-decreasing practices by firms that produce protected goods to 
obtain import relief such as subsidies or tax relief. Other research also records that firms 
report understated income to minimise their tax expense (e.g. Guenther, 1994; Calegari 
2000). 
Several alternative models have been developed within this approach to detect earnings 
management by estimating the non-discretionary and discretionary accruals that arise from 
managements’ use of discretion. Therefore, the following subsections discuss the 
measurement of discretionary accruals and six popular aggregate accruals models. 
  
45 
 
3.5.1.1.1. The Measurement of Discretionary Accruals: 
Based on the analysis provided by McNichols and Wilson (1988), the following discussion 
shows the methodological issues related to the measurement of discretionary accruals. They 
point out that once a managerial discretion is predicted, the researcher attempts to decompose 
total accruals into two components; discretionary accruals that are most likely to be managed, 
and non-discretionary accruals that arise from normal business transactions. The construction 
of total accruals is symbolically presented as follows: 
TA = DA + NA           (6) 
Where, 
TA : total accruals 
DA : discretionary accruals 
NA : non-discretionary accruals 
But because discretionary accruals are unobservable, researchers are forced to use a proxy 
(DAP) that measures discretionary accruals with error ( ): 
DAP = DA +             (7) 
Where   is assumed to be a white noise (i.e. it is expected to have zero mean if the test is 
well-specified). However, the specification of DAP determines the measurement error ( ). 
It is worth noting that the unobservable nature of discretionary and non-discretionary accruals 
has led researchers to identify discretionary accruals based on the relationship between total 
accruals and hypothesised explanatory factors (McNichols, 2000). This practice usually 
consists of estimating the non-discretionary component of accruals using an expectations 
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model that regresses actual total accruals on some variables on which their normal level is 
considered to depend (Jaime and Noguer, 2004). 
Accordingly, for the purpose of computing the measurement error ( ), DAP can be first 
measured as follows: 
DAP = TA – NAEST           (8) 
Where,  
NAEST is an estimate of non-discretionary accruals. 
Therefore, the error in measuring discretionary accruals ( ) reflects the non-discretionary 
accruals that are not completely extracted by the models that estimate non-discretionary 
accruals. Symbolically: 
  = NA – NAEST           (9) 
Apparently, the only remaining element in equation No. (6) is the observable total accruals. 
The literature provides two alternative approaches. First, total accruals are defined according 
to the Balance Sheet Approach as,  
The change in non-cash working capital before income taxes payable less total 
depreciation expense. The change in non-cash working capital before taxes is 
defined as the change in current assets other than cash and short-term 
investments less current liabilities other than current maturities of long-term 
liabilities and income taxes payable (Jones, 1991, p.207) 
Symbolically: 
TAit/Ait‒1= (∆CAit ‒ ∆Cashit ‒ ∆CLit + ∆STDit ‒ Depit)/Ait‒1              (10) 
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Where, 
TAit : total accruals in year t for firm i 
Ait‒1 : total assets in year t – 1 for firm i 
ΔCA : change in current assets 
ΔCL : change in current liabilities 
ΔCash : change in cash and cash equivalent 
ΔSTD : change in debt included in current liabilities 
Dep. : depreciation and amortization expense 
A : total assets 
t : current year 
i : firm i. 
It is important here to point out that both sides of equation No. (10) are divided by lagged 
total assets to reduce heteroscedasticity
8
. In her model, Jones (1991) finds the error term from 
the unscaled expectations model is highly correlated with lagged total assets. This means that 
the error terms are widely scattered similar to the heterogeneous units in the statistical 
analysis, leading to different variances of error terms (Gujarati, 2003). Hence, lagged total 
assets represent an appropriate scale factor that helps maintaining the assumption of 
homoscedasticity.  
The second approach in defining total accruals, which was not used in these six models, is the 
Statement of Cash Flow approach. According to which, total accruals are defined as the 
                                                 
8  The assumption of homoscedasticity in linear regression models states that all disturbances appearing in the 
population regression function have the same variance (i.e. the variance of each disturbance term is some 
constant equal to   ). If this assumption is not maintained, heteroscedasticity arises. In the presence of 
heteroscedasticity, ordinary least squares estimators are unbiased and consistent, but no longer efficient 
(Gujarati, 2003). As a result, the conventional tests of significance are generally inappropriate and their use can 
lead to incorrect inferences (Long and Ervin, 2000). 
48 
 
difference between income before extraordinary items and discontinued operations and cash 
from operations (Ronen and Yaari, 2008). 
 
3.5.1.1.2. Aggregate Accruals Models: 
Researchers have endeavoured to model for the relationship between total accruals and 
hypothesised explanatory variable to identify discretionary accruals. As a result, they have 
enriched the literature with several competing models. Beginning with the Healy (1985) 
model, followed by the DeAngelo (1986) model, earnings management are simply measured 
by using total accruals and the change in total accruals. Alternatively, the majority of 
aggregate accruals models impose an expectations model of the non-discretionary accruals on 
total accruals to decompose total accruals into the discretionary and non-discretionary 
components. As such, the Jones (1991) model is considered as a milestone in the field of 
earnings management because it is the first model that employs a regression-based 
expectations model to control for variations in non-discretionary accruals associated with 
changes in economic activities. Afterwards, modifications to the Jones model have been 
introduced by other authors in an attempt to produce better discretionary accruals estimates. 
Two models in particular have caught on in later research; the models suggested by Dechow, 
Sloan and Sweeny (1995) and Kothari, Leone and Wasley (2005). However, in an attempt to 
overcome the limitations associated with the Jones model and its subsequent modified 
versions, Kang and Sivaramakrishnan (1995) propose a unique model that employs a 
methodology that does not refine the Jones model. The following is a discussion of each of 
the aforementioned six models in the same order.  
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1. The Healy Model (1985): 
Healy investigates the compensation theory which is concerned with effect of earning-based 
bonus contracts on managers’ incentives towards managing earnings upwards or downwards. 
He classifies bonus contracts according to earnings-based bounds as follows: 
- Lower bound: in such contracts, bonuses will be awarded to managers if earnings 
exceed a lower bound of target earnings. 
- Upper bound: bonuses will be awarded to managers if earnings exceed an upper 
bound of target earnings. 
His usable sample comprises 94 companies with 1,527 company-year observations. He 
assigns each observation to one of three portfolios created according to a partitioning variable 
(i.e. earnings-based managerial bonus bound) where he hypothesises the direction of 
managerial manipulation in each portfolio as follows: 
- Portfolio LOW comprises observations for which bonus contract lower bound is 
binding. In this portfolio, he predicts that the manager has the incentive to select 
income-decreasing discretionary accruals (i.e. negative total accruals), because pre-
managed earnings do not exceed the lower bound even if the maximum income-
increasing choices were adopted. 
- Portfolio UPP comprises observations for which bonus contract upper limit is binding. 
In this portfolio, he predicts that the manager has the incentive to select income-
decreasing discretionary accruals (i.e. negative total accruals), because the pre-
managed earnings have exceeded the upper bound and any income-increasing choices 
will not be rewarded 
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- Portfolio MID comprises observations where neither the upper nor lower bounds are 
binding. In this portfolio, he predicts that the manager has the incentive to select 
income-increasing discretionary accruals (i.e. positive total accruals). 
Subsequently, mean total accruals, deflated by lagged total assets, is computed for each 
portfolio. His accrual tests compare the actual sign of mean total accruals for a particular 
firm-year with the predicted sign given the manager’s bonus incentive. As hypothesised, 
positive mean total accruals is found for portfolio MID indicating income-increasing 
discretionary accruals, and negative mean total accruals are found for portfolios LOW and 
UPP indicating income-decreasing discretionary accruals. 
Healy accounts for the association between accruals and bonus plan parameters through pair 
wise comparisons of mean total accruals. That is, he computes the difference between mean 
total accruals of portfolio LOW and portfolio MID, then the difference between mean total 
accruals of portfolio UPP and portfolio MID.  As a result, Healy’s model confirms the 
compensation theory as the results of his tests, which show significant differences between 
means total accruals, indicate that these results are consistent with the hypotheses. 
It is highly significant here to highlight the assumptions that underlie Healy’s model. Healy 
starts by defining total accruals (TA) as the difference between a firm’s reported earnings (E) 
and cash flow (CF). Then, he acknowledges that total accruals include both non-discretionary 
and discretionary accruals. However, he states that non-discretionary accruals are 
unobservable and predicts that systematic earnings management occurs in every period 
making discretionary accruals sum to zero over the estimation period (DA estimation = 0).  
For those reasons, he uses cash flow from operations to proxy for both cash flow and non-
discretionary accruals for most part of his research, and hence uses total accruals to proxy for 
discretionary accruals. This implicitly indicates that Healy assumes that non-discretionary 
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accruals equal zero in the event period which, in turn, leads to that any non-zero value for 
total accruals is attributable to managerial manipulation (DAevent = TAevent) (Young, 1999; 
Kaplan, 1985). 
Two main critiques apply to Healy’s model. The first critique is concerned with being total 
accruals proxy for discretionary accruals. Healy considers negative accruals as downward 
manipulation although negative total accruals could result from lower earnings or extremely 
high cash flow (Guirdy el al., 1999). In addition, total accruals normally contain material 
negative non-discretionary accruals such as depreciation expense (Kaplan, 1985). This 
indicates that even in the absence of earnings management, total accruals will contain major 
negative accruals which is non-discretionary. Therefore, a negative sign of total accruals does 
not necessarily signify managerial manipulation as assumed by Healy.  
In terms of the second critique, Young (1999, p.836) comments “This model represents the 
simplest and most naive method of estimating discretionary accruals, effectively assuming 
that expected non-discretionary accruals for the period are zero”. In this regard, Kaplan 
(1985) suggests that under this assumption, the model expects the changes in non-cash 
working capital accounts less depreciation to be zero in a year, whereas non-discretionary 
accruals are expected to fluctuate depending upon the economic circumstances of the firm. 
In spite of criticism, Healy’s model represents the foundation stone on which all accruals-
based models relied in evolving the method of estimating the discretionary accruals 
component. 
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2. The DeAngelo Model (1986): 
In her model, DeAngelo attempts to overcome the limitation underlying Healy’s model by 
developing a non-zero benchmark for non-discretionary accruals. She starts by splitting total 
accruals into non-discretionary and discretionary accruals, and then assumes that the non-
discretionary component of total accruals is approximately constant over time; non-
discretionary accruals in the event period (t) equal those in estimation period (t-1). Which 
results in, the change in non-discretionary component of accruals equals zero ( ND ≈ 0). She 
also assumes that earnings manipulation is absent in the estimation period (DA estimation = 0). 
Accordingly, for the estimation period, total accruals are all considered as non-discretionary 
(TA t-1 = NA t-1).  
That is being said, DeAngelo’s model uses total accruals from the successive period to proxy 
for expected non-discretionary accruals. Hence, the difference between these two values is 
attributable to managerial discretion (the DeAngelo model estimates discretionary accruals as 
the change in total accruals between the two periods).  
The following equations illustrate DeAngelo’s approach to account for DA calculation:  
TA = DA + NA                    (11)  
   TA = (DA1 – DA0) + (NA1 – NA0)                            (12) 
So based on the assumptions mentioned above, 
 TA = (DA1 – 0) + (0)                              (13) 
   TA = DA1                                (14) 
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After scaling non-discretionary accruals by lagged total assets, her model can be symbolically 
presented as follows: 
NAt = TAt-1/At-2                               (15) 
DAt = (TAt/At-1) – NAt                               (16) 
Where, 
NAt : estimated non-discretionary accruals in year t 
TAt-1 : total accruals in the estimation period 
At-2 : total assets in the year prior to the year of estimation 
DAt : discretionary accruals in the event period 
Since DeAngelo’s model does not incorporate the effect of growth factor on non-
discretionary accruals, the critique on Healy’s model also applies here. DeAngelo attributes 
the change in total accruals to managerial discretion whereas this change could be due to the 
effect of growth on firms operations which cause non-discretionary accruals to fluctuate over 
time. In this case, the result of the change in non-discretionary accruals would not equal zero.  
 
3. The Jones Model (1991): 
According to Jones (1991), the main feature of this model is that it relaxes the assumption in 
Healy’s and DeAngelo’s models of being nondiscretionary accruals constant over time and 
changes in total accruals are due merely to managerial discretion. The critiques suggest that 
changes in total accruals might result from changes in underlying economic conditions as 
well. Moreover, contrast to the Healy and DeAngelo models, Jones model attempts to isolate 
the non-discretionary component of accruals after controlling for changes in firms’ economic 
environment. 
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To that end, Jones (1991) introduces revenues and property, plant and equipment within her 
regression model. Revenues are used to control for changes in working capital accruals that 
result from the economic circumstances, whereas property, plant and equipment are used to 
control for non-discretionary depreciation expense, both before managers’ manipulations. 
Thereby, as elaborated below, she estimates the non-discretionary component and deems the 
residual value as discretionary accruals. 
The stimulus of earnings management identified by Jones (1991) indicates that managers do 
not manage earnings before the period of interest (DA est. = 0). This leads to the assumption 
that total accruals in the estimation period are all non-discretionary. Therefore, at the first 
stage, the Jones expectation model regresses a long time series of firms’ total accruals on 
non-discretionary accruals proxies as follows [Noting that the left side of equation No. (17) is 
the result of equation No. (10)]: 
TAit/Ait-1 = αi [1/Ait-1] + β1i [(ΔREVit/Ait-1] + β2i [PPEit/Ait-1] + εit                         (17) 
Where,  
TAit  : total accruals in year t for firm i 
Ait‒1  : total assets in year t – 1 for firm i 
ΔREVit : revenues in year t less revenues in year t-1 for firm i 
PPEit  : gross property, plant, and equipment in year t for firm i 
εit      : error term in year t for firm i 
t      : year index for the years included in the estimation period for firm i  
i      : firm index. 
The regression yields the estimates ai, b1i and b2i of the parameters αi, β1i and β2i respectively. 
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In the event period, the estimated parameters combined with the data from the event period 
for each firm, are plugged into equation No. (18) to compute the residual (i.e. discretionary) 
accruals [The prediction error (U) result from matching total accruals from equation No. (17) 
and the fitted phase of equation No. (18)].  
Uip = TAip/Aip-1 – (ai [1/Aip-1] + b1i [ΔREVip/Aip-1] + b2i [PPEip/Aip-1])                        (18) 
Where,  
P  : year index for year included in the prediction period.  
The Jones model is considered as a milestone in the field of earnings management because it 
is the first model that separates observed accruals into their non-discretionary and 
discretionary components. Since then, several alternative models have been suggested by 
other authors to produce better discretionary accruals estimates. 
 
4. The Modified Jones Model (1995): 
Dechow, Sloan and Sweeny (1995) argue that the implicit assumption underlying Jones 
model that all revenues are non-discretionary causes the omission of part of the managed 
earnings from the discretionary accruals proxy. Therefore, the modification introduced by the 
modified Jones model is the adjustment of revenues by net receivables in the event period, in 
which the authors expect earnings to be managed through discretionary revenues.  
Dechow et al. (1995) follow the first stage of the Jones model in which i) revenues are used 
to control for working capital non-discretionary accruals, and ii) property, plant and 
equipment are used to control for the depreciation non-discretionary accrual. This indicates 
that the modified Jones model corresponds to the Jones model regarding the assumption of no 
systematic earnings management in the estimation period. 
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Symbolically, the modified Jones model can be presented as follows: 
Uip = TAip/Aip-1 – (ai [1/Aip-1] + b1i [(ΔREVip ‒ ∆RECip)/Aip-1] + b2i [PPEip/Aip-1])              (19) 
Obviously, the only novelty added by the modified Jones model is the introduction of 
receivables; which aims to eliminate the conjectured tendency of the Jones model to measure 
discretionary accruals with error when discretion is exercised over revenues.  The inclusion 
of net receivables in the model replaces the proxy of changes in revenues with changes in 
cash revenue; which means that any change in the level of credit sales is due to managerial 
discretion. Dechow et al. (1995) justify this modification on the basis that it is easier to 
exercise discretion over revenue recognition on credit sales than it on cash sales (ΔREV ‒ 
∆REC). Other than that novelty, assumptions underlying both models are identical and hence, 
the criticisms to the Jones model also apply to the modified version.  
However, there is a major drawback pertaining to the models specifications. Dechow et al. 
(1995) remark that the standard and the modified Jones models suffer from model 
misspecification as estimates of discretionary accruals are correlated with firms’ performance 
(recall problem No. 1). This is because “large discretionary accruals could result not only 
from earnings management but also from exogenous influences on firms’ performance or 
from the effects of strategic operating decisions that are not motivated by the desire to 
artificially increase reported earnings” (Beneish, 1997, p.273) 
To investigate this issue, Dechow et al. (1995) design a sample to test the specification of the 
standard and the modified Jones models, along with other three models, when earnings 
management partitioning variable, PART, is correlated with firm performance. This sample 
consists of 1000 firm-years that are randomly selected from pools of firm-years experiencing 
extreme financial performance. Firm-years are selected based on two extreme performance 
measures: either extreme earnings performance or extreme cash from operations 
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performance. Consequently, a “high” and a “low” samples are formed for each performance 
measure resulting in a total of four samples each of which is divided into ten deciles. 
Dechow et al. (1995) note that since PART is measured by randomly selected firms with 
extreme financial performance, PART is constructed so that it is not itself a causal 
determinant of earnings management. Therefore, bearing in mind that in a well-specified 
model one would not expect to find additional variables with explanatory power, any 
rejections of the true null hypothesis of no earnings management in such samples would 
generate type I error. 
The results of Dechow et al. (1995) indicate that all models lead to misspecified tests for both 
extreme performance measures as follows: 
- Firm-years with extreme earnings performance: 
For the lowest decile of earnings performance, the models reject the null hypothesis of no 
earnings management in favour of the alternative that earnings are managed downwards with 
type I errors less than the specified test levels and many of the differences are statistically 
significant. In other words, the models detect significant negative discretionary accruals for 
firms with lower earnings. 
For the highest decile of earnings performance, the models reject the null hypothesis of no 
earnings management in favour of the alternative that earnings are managed upwards with 
type I errors less than the specified test levels and many of the differences are statistically 
significant. In other words, the models detect significant positive discretionary accruals for 
firms with higher earnings. 
The researchers refer this result to the positive relation between earnings and total accruals. 
That is, firm-years with high (low) earnings tend to have high (low) accruals.  
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- Firm-years with extreme cash flow from operation performance: 
Conversely, the models detect significant negative discretionary accruals for firm-years 
within the highest decile of cash flow from operations performance, and significant positive 
discretionary accruals for firm-years within the lowest decile of cash flow from operations 
performance. The researchers attribute this result to the negative correlation between cash 
flow from operations and total accruals evidenced by Dechow (1994). This evidence suggests 
that this negative correlation results from the application of the revenue recognition and 
matching principles. That is, under accrual accounting, revenues could be recognised through 
an increase in accounts receivables (i.e. accruals) regardless of the actual timing of the cash 
collection. Therefore, the cash disbursed at the early stage of a long-period project could 
easily be negative at the end of the accounting period whereas the revenues reported are 
positive. 
 
5. The Kothari, Leone and Wasley Model (2005): 
Kothari, Leone and Wasley (2005) propose a cross-sectional regression-based model that 
extends the modified Jones model by several modifications. First, they include an intercept 
because the first term in the Jones model is the reciprocal of lagged assets and hence, the 
Jones model does not have an intercept
9
. This view is supported by Peasnell et al. (2000) who 
note that the standard and modified Jones models are estimated with the true constant term 
suppressed and hence, force the regression through the origin. Second, they criticise the 
approach used by Dechow et al. (1995) where the models’ parameters are estimated from the 
first stage (i.e. pre-event period) in the Jones model then are applied to a modified sales 
                                                 
9
 Kothari et al. (2005) argue that the inclusion of an intercept reduces heteroscedasticity not alleviated by using 
lagged total assets as the deflator. 
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change variable defined as (ΔREV ‒ ∆REC). They argue that Dechow et al.’s (1995) 
approach is likely to generate large estimated discretionary accruals whenever a firm 
experience growth in the event period compared to the estimation period. Therefore, they 
follow prior research which subtracts change in accounts receivable from revenues (ΔREV ‒ 
∆REC) in the estimation period prior to estimating the model (e.g. Guidry et al., 1999; 
Kasznik, 1999). The rationale is that in a cross-sectional setting, there is no pre-event period. 
Hence, they estimate the model as if all changes in accounts receivable arise from earnings 
management. In other words, they adjust revenues for credit sales in every period. Finally, 
they add rate of return on assets (ROA) as a control for firm performance similar to prior 
research (e.g. McNichols, 2000). This is due to the evidence in Dechow et al. (1995) which 
posits that the standard and the modified Jones models estimates of discretionary accruals are 
correlated with firm performance. Therefore, the addition of (ROA) aims to control for some 
variations in accruals that result from changing business conditions and the consequent 
change in strategy and operating decisions rather than from earnings management (Healy, 
1996). To illustrate, Beneish (1997) considers the case when a firm’s sales are reduced in 
response to a drop in its economic activities leaving it with more inventory. As a result, this 
firm extends customers credit terms and consequently increases the accounts receivables as 
well as total and discretionary accruals. He comments, such decision does not necessarily 
represent a means to artificially inflate earnings. 
As mentioned above, this model extends the modified Jones model by the three 
aforementioned modifications. Apart from these modifications, the model uses the same 
drivers (i.e. revenues and gross property, plant and equipments) to estimate non-discretionary 
accruals and the consequence residuals also via two stages. In the first stage, the parameters 
are estimated as follows, 
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TAit/Ait-1 = α0 + αi [1/Ait-1] + β1i [(ΔREVit – ∆RECit)/Ait-1] + β2i [PPEit/Ait-1]        
      + β3i ROAit(or it-1) + εit                  (20) 
Where, 
α0 : Intercept 
ROA : Rate of return on assets 
The rest of the variables are similar to those in equations (17 and 19) 
Consequently, in the second stage, the measure of discretionary accruals (i.e. the residual) is 
the difference between total accruals and the fitted normal accruals. 
Finally, it seems clear that this model is an attempt to overcome the limitations of the 
standard and modified Jones models which were addressed by prior research. It has become 
popular because it yields stronger results than the Jones model (Ronen and Yaari, 2008). In 
terms of the intercept, however, a research conducted by Peasnell et al. (2005) tests an 
alternative remedy to forcing the modified Jones model through the origin.  While the Jones 
and modified Jones models suppress the constant term and treat the reciprocal of lagged total 
assets as an explanatory variable, they replace the reciprocal of lagged total assets (i.e. the 
first term on the right-hand side) with a constant. In doing so, the researchers believe that 
replacing the reciprocal of lagged total assets with a constant term is advantageous because 
this specification not only avoids forcing the model through the origin but also maintains only 
the two explanatory variables (i.e. revenues and property, plant and equipment) as originally 
proposed by Jones (1991) and Dechow et al. (1995). Their findings reveal that the test results 
of these two alternative specifications are substantially the same. Yet in the case of Kothari et 
al.’s (2005) model, the addition of new intercept maintains all of the three original 
explanatory variables.  
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6. The Kang and Sivaramakrishnan Model (1995): 
Kang and Sivaramakrishnan (1995) argue that aggregate accruals models such that attempt to 
decompose total accruals into non-discretionary and discretionary accruals, such as Jones 
(1991), suffer from three main methodological issues; errors-in-variables, omitted variables, 
or simultaneity problems. Errors-in-variables problem arises because the variables used to 
estimate non-discretionary accruals are likely to be affected by earnings management 
themselves. This problem causes the measurement error to be correlated with the explanatory 
variables, leading to inconsistent parameter estimates and biased discretionary accruals 
proxy. The second problem pertains to the bias in testing earnings management if omitted 
variables, captured by measurement error, are correlated with PART. Thirdly, simultaneity 
problem arises because both the dependent and independent variables are jointly determined 
by constraints imposed by double-entry bookkeeping. Econometrically, in simultaneous-
equations system, this problem arises when variables on the left-hand side of the model and 
on the right-hand side of the same model influence each other at the same time (i.e. 
endogenous variables). In such case, ordinary least squares estimates would yield inconsistent 
parameter estimates with incorrect standard errors, which in turn would lead to invalid 
inferences. 
Kang and Sivaramakrishnan (1995) also criticise other models that proxy for earnings 
management as the change in total accruals as a measure of discretionary accruals such as 
Healy (1985) and DeAngelo (1986). They argue that although the problems discussed above 
do not occur, such approach do not adequately control for unmanaged accruals reflecting 
economic conditions. 
In response to these methodological problems, Kang and Sivaramakrishnan (1995) propose a 
model which has three key features. First, the model is implemented in both the instrumental 
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variable (IV) method and the generalised method of moments (GMM) procedures to control 
for the problems of error-in-variables and simultaneity
10
. Second, they include cost of goods 
sold and other expenses to overcome the omitted variable problem. By doing so, they 
introduce a separate driver for expenses instead of adopting Jones’s (1991) assumption that 
change in current assets and current liabilities are both driven by changes in revenues. Third, 
the model predicts managed accruals using ending balances, rather than the change, of 
current assets and current liabilities. 
This model takes into account the behaviour of working capital accruals by matching them to 
assets and liabilities from which they originate. Symbolically, 
ABit/At-1 =  0 +  1 [( 1 REVt)/At-1] +  2 [( 2 EXPt)/At-1] +  3 [( 3 PPEt)/At-1] + εit          (21)  
Where, 
AB : unmanaged accruals balances (i.e. non-cash current assets less current liabilities and 
depreciation) 
 1 : prior period’s receivables-to-sales ratio 
 2 : prior period’s assets-to-expenses ratio 
 3 : prior period’s depreciation expense-to-gross property, plant and equipment ratio 
REV : current period sales 
EXP : current period operating expenses (i.e. cost of goods sold, selling and administrative 
expenses before depreciation) 
PPE : gross property, plant and equipment 
At-1 : lagged total assets 
ε : error term 
                                                 
10 Instrumental variables method requires an inclusion of an instrumental variable that is uncorrelated with the 
error term and correlated with the endogenous variable (Wooldridge, 2006) 
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As such, this model predicts the unmanaged working capital accruals though, 
- Predicting unmanaged current-period receivables ( 1 * REVt)  
- Predicting unmanaged current assets net of current liabilities, cash, and receivables 
( 2 * EXPt) 
- Predicting unmanaged current-period depreciation expense ( 3 PPEt) 
Kang and Sivaramakrishnan (1995) report results that confirm the superiority of their model 
to the Jones (1991); they conclude that their model is more powerful and more robust against 
type I error than the Jones (1991). However, the simultaneous equation approach has not 
caught on in later research as a method of testing for earnings management. Fields et al. 
(2001) remarks that this model has not been thoroughly tested or widely adopted by other 
researchers because of problems designing appropriate applications for the simultaneous 
equations approach. Moreover, Peasnell et al. (2000, p.313) point out that “the original time-
series formulation is not amenable to cross-sectional estimation techniques”.  
 
3.5.1.1.3. The Reliability of Aggregate Accruals Models: 
It is evident that competing models measure discretionary accruals with some error because 
they suffer from certain drawbacks. This in turn gives rise to the question as to which of these 
models produce more reliable estimates. In response, several researchers have examined the 
reliability of abovementioned models in terms of specification and power of the tests (e.g. 
Jaime and Noguer, 2004). These researchers introduce different simulations to test models’ 
ability to (i) accept a true null hypothesis of no earnings management when a random set of 
observations is compared to the remaining observations of the sample (i.e. specification), and 
(ii) reject a false null hypothesis of no earnings management when earnings management is 
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introduced either artificially to a set of observations, or through a set of observations that 
have already been identified of including some manipulations (i.e. power). 
The noticeable commonly agreed conclusion is that all six models are well-specified, 
especially the Kothari, Leone and Wasley model (2005) which due to the introduction of 
ROA. This signifies that no significant statistical difference is found between the randomly 
selected and rest of the sample’s observations. 
Although the models generate low-power test of earnings management, their ability of not 
committing type II error does vary. Two prominent studies that investigate this issue include 
Dechow et al. (1995) and Jaime and Noguer (2004). In fact, none of these studies compares 
the abovementioned six models at a time. Of the models investigated in each study, the 
following table shows only the models that are discussed in this thesis.  
Dechow et al. (1995) Jaime and Noguer (2004) 
Modified Jones Kothari, Leone and Wasley 
Jones Modified Jones 
DeAngelo Jones 
Healy Kang and Sivaramakrishnan 
 
Dechow et al. (1995) report that the modified Jones model generates the most powerful test 
of correctly detecting earnings management. Obviously, the Kothari, Leone and Wasley 
model was not proposed at that time. The results of Jaime and Noguer (2004) confirm that the 
Kothari, Leone and Wasley model produces the highest power whereas the Kang and 
Sivaramakrishnan model produces the lowest power. 
As a matter of fact, every model in the literature suffers from some methodological 
limitations. Even Kothari et al. (2005) point out that their model suffers from inflated 
standard error that leads to committing type II error more frequently. Nonetheless, in their 
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comprehensive review, Ronen and Yaari (2008) state that the Kothari, Leone and Wasley 
model has become quite popular because it yields stronger results than the Jones model. On 
this basis, along with other reasons discussed in the methodology chapter, the Kothari, Leone 
and Wasley model is adopted in this thesis as the appropriate estimation model of 
discretionary accruals. 
 
3.5.1.2. The Approach of Specific Accruals Models: 
An alternative approach to that of aggregate accruals is to estimate the relation between a 
single accrual and explanatory factors. McNichols (2000) identifies some advantages and 
disadvantages relative to the approach of aggregate accruals. The prime advantage of specific 
accrual approach is that it allows the understanding of the behaviour of a certain account 
absent earnings management based on the key factors of the generally accepted accounting 
principles. A crucial disadvantage arises when the aim of a researcher is to measure the 
magnitude of earnings management because in this case, a research would need to model for 
each specific accrual that is likely to be manipulated. This makes this approach less appealing 
because, as mentioned earlier, managers are more likely to use several accruals rather than a 
single accrual to manipulate earnings (Jones, 1991). 
Several studies document the practice of earnings management through the specific accrual 
approach. For instance, Petroni (1992) provides evidence that financially weak insurance 
companies tend to increase their income by manipulating loss reserves downwards. Another 
distinct research, conducted by Beneish (1997), also documents earnings management by 
modelling for several specific accruals such as, receivables and inventory, separately. He 
confirms that GAAP violators were more likely to report positive accruals in years prior to, 
and including, the year of being identified as GAAP violators. 
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3.5.1.3. The Distributional Approach: 
Studies within this approach investigate earnings management around certain benchmarks by 
examining the density of the distribution of firms’ earnings after management (McNichols, 
2000). The basic assumption underlying this approach is that the distributions of unmanaged 
earnings or unmanaged changes in earnings are relatively smooth (Ronen and Yaari, 2008). 
Yet if firms have incentives to meet a certain benchmark, then the distribution of managed 
earnings will have fewer (more) observations than expected for earnings amounts just below 
(above) the threshold (McNichols, 2000). Examples of studies that adopt this approach 
include Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) and Degeorge et al. (1999). Both studies conclude 
that firms overstate their earnings to avoid reporting losses, maintain previous performance 
and meet analysts’ forecasts. Dichev and Skinner (2002) find further evidence that firms 
manage their earnings upwards to avoid the violation of debt covenants. 
Nevertheless, researchers raise several criticisms against this approach. Most prominently, 
Jacob and Jorgensen (2007) attribute the distribution with fewer observations that fall below 
the threshold to the fact that firms may manage earnings downwards when they realise that 
they will not be able to meet the benchmark.  
 
3.5.2. The Measurement of Real Activities-Based Earnings Management: 
Graham et al. (2005) report managers’ use of real activities in preference to accruals to 
manage earnings. Early studies that directly document real activities earnings management 
have concentrated on investment activities. For instance, several researchers bear out 
managers reduce of spending on Research and Development Expenditure (R&D) to (i) 
enhance executives incentives toward the end of their tenure (e.g. Dechow and Sloan, 1991), 
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and (ii) finance stock repurchases (e.g. Bens et al., 2002). Other research also find evidence 
consistent with firms cutting sales prices to avoid losses and earnings decrease (e.g. Jackson 
and Wilcox, 2000), and selling assets and marketable securities to achieve target earnings 
(e.g. Bartov, 1993; Herrmann et al. 2003). 
Following Roychowdhury (2006), a growing body of literature examines the management of 
operational activities to, for example, (i) meet earnings benchmarks (e.g. Gunny, 2010), and 
(ii) Inflate share prices around seasoned equity offerings (e.g. Cohen and Zarowin, 2010). 
Hence, Roychowdhury’s model is discussed below because it is the most commonly used to 
detect the manipulation of real activities in the recent literature.  
 
3.5.2.1. The Roychowdhury Model (2006): 
Roychowdhury (2006) focuses on three significant operational activities through which 
earnings can be managed. First, managements may offer price discounts or more favourable 
credit terms to accelerate sales. Second, they could engage in overproduction activities to 
reduce cost of goods sold; as with higher levels of produced goods, fixed overhead costs per 
unit decreases leading to lower cost of goods sold and higher operating margins. Third, they 
could directly reduce discretionary expenses to increase reported earnings. 
Therefore, this model uses three regressions developed by Dechow et al. (1998) where each 
of which is assigned to estimate the normal levels of cash flow from operations, production 
costs, and discretionary expenses, respectively. Consequently, the difference between the 
actual and expected normal levels of each operational activity represents the managed 
earnings. 
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The first regression expresses normal cash flow from operations as a function of sales and 
change in sales in the current period; all deflated by lagged assets, as follows, 
CFOt /A t-1 = α + β1 (1/At-1) + β2 (St /At-1) + β3 (∆St /At-1) + εt                         (22) 
Where,  
CFOt : current cash flow from operation 
St : current sales 
∆St : change in current sales 
At-1 : lagged total assets 
The second regression pertains to estimating normal levels of production costs. The second 
regression is based on being Production Costs (PROD) equal the Change in Inventory 
(∆INV) plus Cost of Goods Sold (COGS). Hence, the regression of normal levels of 
production costs is derived from the functions of change in inventory and cost of goods sold 
as follows, 
COGSt /A t-1 = α + β1 (1/At-1) + β2 (St /At-1) + εt                           (23) 
And, 
∆INVt /A t-1 = α + β1 (1/At-1) + β2 (∆St /At-1) + β3 (∆St-1 /At-1) + εt                         (24) 
As a result of combining both regressions, 
PRODt /A t-1 = α + β1 (1/At-1) + β2 (St /At-1) + β3 (∆St /At-1) + β4 (∆St-1 /At-1) + εt               (25) 
Bearing in mind that discretionary expenses (DISEXP) comprise advertising expenses, 
research and development, and selling, general and administrative expenses, discretionary 
expenses are expressed as a function of lagged sales as follows,  
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DISEXPt /A t-1 = α + β1 (1/At-1) + β2 (St-1 /At-1) + εt                           (26) 
It is important here to highlight that the data set of Roychowdhury (2006) is based on firms 
that report earnings greater or equal to zero. In other words, his data includes firms that are 
suspect of practicing real activities manipulations to avoid losses. Hence, his hypotheses are 
constructed to solely investigate income-increasing real activities earnings management 
which in turn has lead to the use of signed residuals. Although the use of signed residuals 
allows examining managerial invectives to engage in earnings management in a particular 
direction, it does not allow for testing the general propensity to manage earnings. To do so, 
unsigned residuals (i.e. magnitudes) can be used to measure firms’ success in managing 
earnings up or down as needed (Reynolds and Francis, 2000). Consequently, studies that 
estimate signed residuals through Roychowdhury's model to investigate relationships 
between corporate governance mechanisms and earnings management reveal results that 
indicate either income-increasing or income-decreasing effects, not the effectiveness of these 
mechanisms in thwarting earnings management practices. Examples of these studies include 
Cohen and Zarowin (2010) who confirm that SEO firms engage in income-increasing real 
activities manipulation and Demers and Wang (2010) who find a negative association 
between younger managers and real activities earnings management. This indicates that such 
results provide limited implications for future research. Therefore, this study uses absolutes 
values of managed earnings (i.e. unsigned residuals) to access the effectiveness of ownership 
structure mechanisms in mitigating real activities earnings management. Moreover, the 
Roychowdhury (2006) model suffers from a key limitation associated with the proxy of sales 
manipulation activities (i.e. the first regression in Roychowdhury's model). That is, boosting 
sales by offering price discounts and more lenient credit terms will increase current period’s 
earnings but will also results in lower cash flows in the current period, and vice versa (Cohen 
and Zarowin, 2010). However, regressing cash flows on sales to generate abnormal cash flow 
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might give rise to a potential problem in interpreting the results of the current empirical 
model. There are non-sales related factors that could also affect abnormal cash flow. For 
example, while the practice of overproduction activities has a negative effect on abnormal 
cash flow, the reduction of discretionary expenses has a positive effect. As a result, the net 
effect on abnormal cash flow could be ambiguous. Hence, implications that are reliant on this 
particular dependent variable should be considered cautiously. 
Eventually, the contribution made by Roychowdhury has been widely acknowledged as his 
model has been widely used in subsequent studies. Accordingly, this model is adopted in this 
thesis as the appropriate estimation model of real activities earnings management. 
 
3.6. Summary: 
The main feature of this chapter is that it emphasises the necessity for any research to 
investigate both types of earnings management simultaneously in order to arrive at definitive 
conclusions. Therefore, the nature and consequences of accruals-based and real activities-
based earnings management are discussed throughout the chapter. First, the definition section 
sheds the light on these two types along with the managerial intent behind, and directions of 
earnings management. Second, a critical review of the methodological issues associated with 
the measurement of managed earnings is discussed. Third, this chapter discusses the models 
adopted in this thesis to estimate the amounts of earnings management. 
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Chapter Four 
Literature Review 
 
4.1. Introduction: 
At an early stage of the previous chapter, it is articulated that managerial intent lies in the 
essence of the various definitions of earnings management. Although earnings management 
bears a beneficial aspect, Jiraporn et al. (2008) suggest that scandals at Enron, WorldCom 
and elsewhere have drawn public attention towards managers’ opportunistic utilisation of 
earnings management for their own private interests at the expense of the shareholders. 
Agency theory is concerned with the latter aspect where the separation of ownership and 
control in organisations might stimulate managers to adopt self-interest behaviour (Arnold 
and Lange, 2004). To mitigate such opportunistic behaviour, corporate governance deems 
ownership structure mechanisms and external audit as essential devises in monitoring, 
disciplining and influencing managerial opportunism (Mallin, 2007). 
Accordingly, the next section builds on the previous one in terms of the theoretical 
framework of earnings management research. Section three reviews the literature on the 
relationship between accruals-based and real activities-based earnings management, and 
ownership structure monitoring mechanism including: ownership concentration, managerial 
ownership, institutional investors’ ownership and foreign investors’ ownership. In section 
four, a review of the literature is conducted in this chapter to elaborate on external auditor 
impact in two subsections. The first subsection reviews factors and empirical evidence 
concerning the association between audit quality and earnings management in both developed 
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and less developed markets. The second subsection discusses empirical evidence on the effect 
scrutiny of external audit on the substitutive relationship between accruals-based and real 
activities-based earnings management. Finally, section five presents a conclusion within 
which the research questions are addressed. 
 
4.2. Theoretical Framework: 
There are two main theoretical frameworks that can be used to explain and analyse the 
relationship between earnings management and corporate governance; Agency theory and 
stewardship theory. While agency theory offers a framework corresponding to the 
opportunistic perspective of earnings management, stewardship theory refers to the 
informational (i.e. beneficial) perspective to communicate relevant information to investors. 
Stewardship theory considers agents as good stewards. In details, stewardship theory assumes 
that directors and managers, alike, act in the best interest of the firm since not all agents seek 
personal gain (Nordberg, 2011). As such, managers may manage earnings to signal value 
relevant information about the firm’s future performance and thereby improve the ability of 
earnings to reflect underlying economic value (Gul et al., 2003; Krishnan, 2003). 
Accordingly, directors may not prevent the practice of earnings management since they 
perceive it as beneficial to shareholders (Abdul-Rahman and Ali, 2006). 
A number of studies investigate earnings management within stewardship framework where 
the beneficial perspective is hypothesised (i.e. informational or beneficial hypothesis). For 
instance, both Subramanyam (1996) and Krishnan (2003) document a significant positive 
relationship between discretionary accruals and, future profitability and share returns. 
Concerning future profitability, they find that discretionary accruals can significantly and 
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positively explain three one-year-ahead profitability measures including operating cash flow, 
non-discretionary income and net income. Concerning share returns, they find that financial 
markets price discretionary accruals. This is consistent with either markets efficiently pricing 
value relevant information, or inefficient markets pricing opportunistic discretionary accruals. 
Another study conducted by Siregar and Utama (2008) provides evidence suggestive of 
family controlled firms (i.e. corporate governance characteristic) using discretionary accruals 
to convey inside-value-relevant information. 
Nevertheless, the framework of stewardship theory cannot be used in this study for several 
reasons. First, it is implausible to associate real activities earnings management that entails a 
sacrifice in the firm’s future value with beneficial purposes. Second, the findings of 
Subramanyam (1996) and Krishnan (2003) are based on the pricing of shares by markets that 
are able to “see-through” accruals which is not applicable to the inefficient market of Amman 
Stock Exchange. Third, the findings of Siregar and Utama (2008) do not specify whether the 
practice of earnings management was intentionally tolerated by directors to signal relevant 
information, or simply because corporate governance mechanisms were not effective in 
mitigating opportunistic earnings management. 
As concerns agency theory, contrast to stewardship theory, it posits that managers’ decisions 
are motivated by self-interest and hence will not always perform in the best interests of the 
shareholders (Arnold and Lange, 2004). A large body of literature examine earnings 
management using agency theoretical framework where managements are hypothesised to 
display opportunistic behaviour (Louis and Robinson, 2005). As such, corporate governance 
mechanisms are supposed to act as deterrence devices and preserve shareholders wealth. 
Examples of studies that document managers tendency to manipulate firms’ accounts to 
maximise their interests at the expense of other stakeholders (i.e. the opportunism hypothesis) 
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include: Healy (1985), Jones (1991), Becker et al. (1998), Teoh et al. (1998), Marquardt and 
Wiedman (2004), Agrawal and Cooper (2007) and McNichols and Stubben (2008). 
As stated earlier, although earnings management could be used beneficially, managerial 
opportunistic behaviour entails harmful effects that might destroy the wealth of other 
stakeholders. Because the research questions of the current study are concerned with the 
applicability and effectiveness of mechanisms that mitigate such harmful effects, this study 
examines those mechanisms in an agency theory setting. That is, this study follows the vast 
majority of previous research as it adopts the opportunistic framework of earnings 
management. 
 
Agency Theory: 
In the context of an organisation, agency theory draws on the agency relationship where 
principals (i.e. shareholders) hire agents (i.e. managers) to make decisions that maximise 
shareholders’ wealth (Arnold and Lange, 2004). Jensen and Meckling (1976) point out that 
this separation of ownership and control in modern diffuse ownership corporation gives rise 
to the general problem of agency. That is, if both parties to the relationship seek their own 
interest, there is a good potential for conflicts of interests to take place. It naturally follows 
then that, in general, managers’ decisions are motivated by self-interest and hence will not 
always perform in the best interests of the shareholders (Arnold and Lange, 2004). Along 
with the problem of the potential opportunistic behaviour of the agent, the agency 
relationship can also impose the problem of information asymmetry. The latter problem 
indicates that the principal and the agent will have access to different levels of information 
whereby the agent will have more information (Mallin, 2007). Agency problems are 
associated with costs that both the principal and the agent can incur. Jensen and Meckling 
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(1976) define agency costs as the sum of: monitoring costs, bonding costs, and residual loss. 
Monitoring costs arise because agency problems put the principal at a disadvantage of being 
unable to control the desired actions of the agent (Mallin, 2007). The principal incurs 
monitoring costs by setting appropriate incentives for the agent and establishing monitoring 
mechanisms to limit the aberrant activities of the agent (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  
In terms of bonding costs, Arnold and Lange (2004) state that the agent can also incur 
bonding costs to avoid the problems of conflict of interests. There is an incentive for the 
agent to expend resources such as offering a bond, to ensure that s/he would not take actions 
that are harmful to the principal (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Plausibly because in absence 
of such bonding activities, the principal would price protect heavily and hence incur 
monitoring costs that reduce the agent’s compensation (Arnold and Lange, 2004). 
The third type of agency costs is the residual loss of firm value which occurs even after 
incurring monitoring and bonding costs (Subramaniam, 2006). When both the principal and 
the agent are “utility maximisers” some divergence remains between the agent’s 
opportunistic decisions and those decisions which would maximise the principal’s welfare 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
Davidson III et al. (2004) propose that earnings management may be a type of agency cost. 
They draw on the managerial opportunistic behaviour that could lead a firm to manage the 
impression it presents to the market through earnings management. If firms release financial 
reports that do not accurately reflect their actual economic performance, the ability of 
shareholders to make optimal financial decisions will be clouded. “Thus, earnings 
management is related to agency theory because the former can create or exacerbate agency 
costs” (Davidson III et al., ibid, p.268). This relation has indeed lead researchers to use 
agency theory as a framework in most of accounting research in earnings management 
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(Alexander, 2010). Examples include: Warfield et al. (1995), Lennox (1999), Yeo et al. 
(2002), Zhong et al. (2007) and Katz (2009). 
Although Jensen and Meckling (1976) emphasise the importance of the role of monitoring in 
an agency relationship, they do not examine how firms could structure their corporate 
governance to control the agency problem created by the separation of ownership and control 
(Sridharan et al., 2007). Fama and Jensen (1983) pursue this concern on the basis of “The 
Decision Process”. They distinguish decision management (i.e. initiation and implementation 
of decisions) from decision control (ratification and monitoring decisions). The reason for 
this separation system is to control for agency problems in situations where the agents who 
initiate and implement important decisions are not the major residual claimants and hence do 
not bear a major share of the wealth effects of their decisions. Therefore, delegating decision 
control systems to the board of directors helps the ratification and monitoring of important 
decisions. The board of directors is appointed by shareholders as a corporate governance 
solution to control the agency problem likely to arise with senior managers (Sridharan et al., 
2007). The role of the board of directors includes a duty to minimise conflicts of interests 
through being the link between principals and agents. Directors are supposed to act in the 
interest of the firm as a whole. Hence, it is an essential feature of good corporate governance 
that the board will be accountable to all shareholders. In addition, directors must have access 
to reliable information and then communicate them with the shareholders to ensure that, for 
example, decision-making processes are transparent (Mallin, 2007). In brief, board of 
directors is the highest internal corporate governance mechanism, particularly in monitoring 
top management (Fama and Jensen, 1983). 
Many studies investigate various characteristics of boards of directors and their effect on 
earnings management. Beginning with independent directors, Klein (2002b) and Yang and 
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Krishnan (2005) provide evidence supportive of firms with independent directors on boards 
and on audit committees are less likely to manage their earnings. Xie et al. (2003) and Bedard 
et al. (2004) report that directors with corporate of financial expertise are inversely associated 
with earnings management. Even the size of boards and audit committees is found negatively 
related to earnings management Xie et al. (2003) and Yang and Krishnan (2005). 
However, with the exception of board size, none of these directors-specific characteristics are 
investigated in this research. Instead, the effectiveness of ownership structure corporate 
governance mechanisms in monitoring, disciplining managerial behaviour and thereby 
mitigating earnings management are examined in this research. This is due to two main 
reasons. First, ownership structure influences the monitoring mechanisms used by the firm 
(Siregar and Utama, 2008). Second, data limitation - Amman Stock Exchange data base does 
not provide sufficient information about directors independence, audit committees and 
directors backgrounds. 
While agency theory posits that ownership structure mechanisms align the interests of 
managements with those of the shareholders, it views external audit as the most important, 
independent and professional mechanisms in terms of control and monitoring (Nordberg, 
2011). Further, according to agency theory, the role of external auditor also includes ensuring 
that internal controls are adequate and effective in preventing management from overriding 
control activities (Rezaee, 2005). For instance, Bedard and Graham (2011) provide evidence 
suggestive of external auditors detecting about three-fourths internal controls deficiencies 
through control testing. As such, external auditors are considered as trustworthy and 
experienced agents who will provide the principals with credible and reliable information, 
and hence, reduce the scope for information asymmetry and mitigate the latitude for 
managerial opportunistic behaviour. Consequently, an establish line of research has used the 
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agency theoretical framework to address the role of external auditors in organisations (Sarens 
and Abdolmohammadi, 2007). 
As regards earnings management, regulators and practitioners have expressed considerable 
concerns regarding the harmful effects of earnings management practices. For instance, 
Arthur Levitt, the former Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission has made 
earnings management a top priority because it distorts the quality of earnings and hence, the 
integrity of financial reporting (cited in Heninger, 2001, p.111). 
In response, actions have been taken to reduce earnings management. The International 
Accounting Standards Board have eliminated options in several standards and issued more 
detailed guidance to limit the impact of managerial discretion (Ewert and Wagenhofer, 2005). 
Another action that took place in the US is the Public Company Accounting Reform and 
Investor Protection Act of 2002 (also known as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act). This act has 
imposed a requirement that senior management must certify financial reports. As such, senior 
executives will be held responsible should an earnings management attempt is discovered. 
This act has also created an independent body called Public Company Accounting Oversight 
Board (PCAOB) that is responsible for both the issuance of audit, ethics and independence 
standards, and the monitoring of audit firms. Further, the act has also enhanced public 
companies’ internal controls such as reinforcing the requirement that each public company 
must have an audit committee that comprises independent directors (Ronen and Yaari, 2008).  
In fact, accounting standards setters and other bodies such as the PCAOB (i.e. indirect 
oversight mechanisms) rely heavily on the external audit monitoring. External audit 
monitoring role have been widely regarded as an important means to add credibility to firms’ 
accounts by detecting errors and frauds in financial statements. In this sense, Rezaee (2005) 
states that external auditors are considered as a value-added function because of their 
79 
 
responsibility to report any detected material misstatements regardless pressure from their 
clients. Therefore, scholars such as Ronen and Yaari (2008) assert that external audit is an 
essential corporate governance mechanism. They state that “Because auditors attest to 
financial reports, auditors are probably the most important gatekeeper for blocking 
pernicious earnings management” (p.263). In the end, Mallin (2007) notes that agency theory 
views corporate governance internal and external mechanisms as essential monitoring devices 
that minimise the effect of agency problems. Given these agency assumptions, promoting 
corporate governance mechanisms should have a mitigating effect on earnings management. 
Particular to the current study, ownership structure mechanisms are supposed to align the 
interests of managers with those of the shareholders and consequently, less opportunistic 
earnings management. Similarly, high audit quality is also supposed to have a mitigating 
effect on opportunistic earnings management. 
 
4.3. The Effect of Ownership Structure on Earnings Management 
Under the opportunism hypothesis, the various monitoring mechanisms are expected to have 
a mitigating effect on earnings management (Bowen et al., 2008). Corporate ownership 
structure in Jordan comprises four types of ownership: managerial ownership, ownership 
concentration, institutional investors’ ownership and foreign investors’ ownership. Although 
one might argue in favour of ownership structures as effective mechanisms (e.g. Siregar and 
Utama, 2008), the impact of ownership structures on earnings management can switch from 
positive to negative effect (Bertin et al., 2008). Therefore, this section reviews prior research 
on the effectiveness of these ownership structure mechanisms in reducing the practice of 
earnings management. 
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4.3.1. Managerial Ownership: 
The literature refers to two competing views concerning the effect of managerial ownership 
on managers’ incentives: the incentive alignment effect and the entrenchment effect (e.g. Yeo 
et al., 2002; Dechow et al., 2010). On the one hand, the traditional agency theory argues in 
favour of the incentive alignment effect. It entails that shareholdings held by managers help 
align the interests of managers and shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). That is, greater 
managerial ownership enhances corporate performance and decreases opportunistic 
managerial behaviour (Teshima and Shuto, 2008). On the other hand, Morck et al. (1988) 
argue that greater managerial ownership provides managers with deeper entrenchment and 
hence, greater latitude for opportunistic behaviour.  
A prominent study conducted by Warfield et al. (1995) investigates the relationship between 
managerial ownership and earnings management in the US market. They proxy for 
managerial ownership as the percent of equity shares held by officers, directors and principal 
owners who can exercise significant influence over corporate affairs. Besides, they proxy for 
earnings management as the absolute value of abnormal accruals estimated using DeAngelo 
model. The results support the incentive alignment effect. That is, the findings confirm the 
negative effect of managerial ownership on the magnitude of absolute abnormal accruals. 
This negative relationship holds up even when the researchers estimate absolute abnormal 
accruals using time-series Jones model. 
Evidence supportive of the incentive alignment effect in the US is also submitted by Wang 
(2006) who examines the effect of founding family ownership on earnings quality. Founding 
family firms refer to firms with substantial shares held by family members or with founding 
family members actively involved in the management or the board of directors. He estimates 
the absolute value of abnormal accruals using Dechow and Dichev (2002) model. The 
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findings suggest that family firms report statistically significant lower abnormal accruals than 
nonfamily firms. 
Nevertheless, findings of studies based on US data are not constantly consistent with the 
incentive alignment effect. For instance, Bowen et al. (2008) show no significant relationship 
between managerial ownership and earnings management in the US. The researchers use the 
percentage of shares held by top managers to proxy for managerial ownership. In terms of 
earnings management proxies, they measure accounting earnings management in three ways: 
(i) the absolute value of abnormal accruals estimated through the modified Jones model
11
, (ii) 
smoothing of earnings measured as the ratio of standard deviation of operating cash flow to 
standard deviation of earnings, and (iii) the frequency of reporting small positive earnings 
surprises. Interestingly, the results provide no evidence supportive of either incentive 
alignment or entrenchment effects in any of the three measures. 
Moreover, at the other extreme, findings contrast to those of Warfield et al. (1995) and Wang 
(2006) do also exist within the US context. That is, the results of Behn et al. (2002) are in 
favour of the entrenchment effect. To conduct their analysis, the researchers employ the 
modified Jones model to estimate the proxy for earnings management (i.e. discretionary 
accruals. Consequently, they find a positive and significant coefficient of managerial 
ownership associated with the magnitude of abnormal accruals. Thus, their results are in 
favour of the entrenchment effect. It is crucial to note that this particular study bears another 
important aspect. This study also investigates the effect of managerial ownership on real 
activity earnings management. However, the findings show no significant effect of 
managerial ownership on the absolute values of the change in Research and Development 
(R&D) and advertising expenses. 
                                                 
11
 The model controls for cash from operations as proposed by Kasznik (1999). 
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Rebai (2011) also investigates the effect of managerial ownership on R&D manipulations. He 
proxies for managerial ownership as the percentage of shares held by officers, and real 
activities earnings management as total R&D divided by total sales. He finds results 
consistent with the incentive alignment effect as the coefficient of managerial ownership is 
significantly negative. 
In fact, Behn et al. (2002) and Rebai (2011) neither use the terminology of real activities 
earnings management nor they adopt the popular model of Roychowdhury. Although the 
study of Garven (2009) does so
12
, she tackles one aspect only of real manipulations which is 
discretionary expenditures. Despite this, she resembles Roychowdhury’s (2006) research 
design in the use of signed residuals to identify firms being suspect of reducing discretionary 
expenses to avoid reporting annual losses. The final sample consists of 292 US firm-year 
observations divided equally into suspect versus non-suspect firms for comparison. Her 
research design differs from the aforementioned research in two ways: (i) the use time-series 
version of the Roychowdhury model which requires data from 10 preceding years for the 
estimation of abnormal discretionary expenses, and (ii) the measurement of managerial 
ownership as the value in millions of shares equity held by non-independent directors. 
Eventually, the results show a significant positive relationship between levels of managerial 
ownership and levels of income-increasing manipulations in suspect firms. This indicates that 
as levels of managerial ownership increases, suspects are more likely to increase their 
reported income by reducing discretionary expenditures.  
A research that that investigates the association between managerial ownership and all three 
real activities earnings management is conducted by Cohen et al. (2008). Employing 
                                                 
12
 A research conducted by Krishnan and Visvanathan (2008) includes managerial ownership as a control 
variable. However, the researchers note “we also conduct tests of real earnings management (Roychowdhury 
2006) and find that only accounting financial expertise constrains real earnings management. Those results are 
not reported for the sake of brevity”, (p.853). 
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Roychowdhury’s model, they find that levels of managerial ownership are negatively related 
to abnormal cash flow from operating activities, abnormal production costs and abnormal 
discretionary expenses. Thus, they find evidence consistent with the incentive alignment 
effect. Interestingly, the probability of the inference problem to exist seems minimal. As 
stated in Chapter Three, the net effect of overproduction and cutting discretionary expenses 
on abnormal cash flows could be ambiguous, the results show that the negative effect on 
abnormal cash flow from overproduction is not neutralised by the positive effect of the 
reduction of discretionary expenses. This is apparent in persistence of the negative effect of 
managerial ownership on all of the three real activities manipulations. 
Demers and Wang (2010) also employ Roychowdhury’s model but they exclude abnormal 
operating cash flow. Although they find evidence supportive of the incentive alignment effect 
in abnormal production costs model, their results reveal no significant relationship between 
managerial ownership and discretionary accruals. 
Obviously, the evidence concerning the nature of the relationship between managerial 
ownership and both accruals-based and real activities-based earnings management is 
somewhat mixed in the US market.  
Evidence on what effect managerial ownership has on accruals earnings management outside 
the US is no different than the US. In the UK, a research conducted by Peasnell et al. (2005) 
investigates the effect of board monitoring on constraining earnings management. The 
researchers estimate abnormal current accruals to proxy for earnings management using the 
modified Jones model excluding Property, Plant and Equipment (PP&E)
13
. Moreover, they 
proxy for managerial ownership by a dummy variable taking the value of one if the 
                                                 
13
 The explanatory variable, Property, Plant and Equipment (PP&E), aims mainly to control for depreciation and 
amortisation expenses in the original models. Therefore, it becomes obsolete for a measure of current accruals 
that excludes depreciation and amortisation expenses (Young, 1999). 
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proportion of shares held by inside directors is less than 5% (i.e. low managerial ownership) 
and zero otherwise. They find, opposite to the hypothesised sign, that the coefficient of 
managerial ownership is negative and significant which suggests that only firms with low 
managerial ownership prevent earnings management. Therefore, the findings are in favour of 
the entrenchment effect. 
Bos et al. (2011) posit that all previous research on the UK might be subject to limitation 
regarding the presumed linear relationship between earnings management and managerial 
ownership. Therefore, they hypothesise a non-linear form within which abnormal accruals 
fall with increasing managerial ownership until a turning point after which abnormal accruals 
begins to increase with increasing managerial ownership. The results provide evidence 
supportive of a non-linear relationship in the UK context. That is, consistent with Peasnell et 
al. (2005), executive directors constrain earnings management at levels of managerial 
ownership less than 5% of share capital. Yet the magnitude of abnormal accruals increases 
markedly with levels of executive ownership between 5% and 10% and begins to decreases 
when managerial ownership exceeds 15%. Hence, this study document that both the incentive 
alignment and entrenchment effects exist in a non-linear relationship between managerial 
ownership and the magnitude of abnormal accruals. 
In an attempt to overcome the limitations of Jordanian data, this research follows Peasnell et 
al. (2005) pertaining to managerial ownership proxy. As mentioned in methodology chapter, 
the information sheet concerning ownership structure of listed firms does not articulate the 
shareholdings of each officer or director except when those individuals join the list that 
contains block-holdings above 5%. In other words, it is difficult to obtain the proportion of 
shares held by each officer or director from Amman Stock Exchange database. Accordingly, 
a dummy variable is developed to capture the effect of managerial ownership on accruals 
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earnings management in Jordan for the first time. Moreover, given the dearth of research on 
managerial ownership and real activities earnings management in contexts other than the US, 
the current research fills this gap by examining the effect of managerial ownership on real 
activities-based earnings management. 
 
4.3.2. Ownership Concentration: 
While ownership in publicly traded firms in the UK and the US is highly dispersed, 
ownership in other countries such as Canada, Spain, Denmark, Singapore and Jordan is 
highly concentrated. Park and Shin (2004, p.432) state that “high ownership concentration is 
a norm rather than an exception around the world”. In such contexts, Dechow et al. (2010) 
posit that agency problem exists primarily between controlling and minority shareholders. 
The main concern is that dominant shareholders may expropriate the interest of minority 
shareholders for their own private advantage (Yunos et al., 2010; Dechow et al., 2010). Yet 
similar to managerial ownership, the overall effect of ownership concentration on earnings 
management is indeterminate. On the one hand, controlling shareholders need not to be 
concerned about reported earnings because their interests are completely protected in such 
closely held firms (Klassen, 1997). On the other hand, controlling shareholders may have 
strong incentives for earnings manipulation to appropriate wealth from the public firms they 
control at the expense of minority shareholders (Park and Shin, 2004). 
Motivated by the heavily concentrated shareholdings and controlling ownership in the Danish 
corporate ownership structure, Gabrielsen et al. (2002) test the effect of managerial 
ownership on absolute discretionary accruals in Denmark. Due to data limitation, they use a 
survey method to collect observations of 76 listed firms from 1991 - 1995. Following 
Warfield et al. (1995), managerial ownership is proxied by the proportion of shares held by 
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inside individuals who can exercise significant influence over corporate affairs. To measure 
the magnitude of earnings management, the researchers subtract expected normal accruals 
(defined as four-year firm-specific average of previous period’s accruals) from current 
period’s accruals. Afterwards, they consider the absolute residuals as absolute discretionary 
(i.e. abnormal) accruals. They conduct simple and multiple linear regressions and report an 
insignificant relationship between managerial ownership and earnings management. 
In the Far East, Teshima and Shuto (2008) investigate nonlinearities in the relationship 
between managerial ownership and directional earnings management in the developed 
economy of Japan. To that end, they use quadratic and cubic forms of managerial ownership 
which is proxied by the fraction of shares held by all directors. Further, they employ the 
modified Jones model to estimate the absolute value of income increasing and decreasing 
discretionary accruals. Accordingly, two subsamples emerge from an original sample of 
18,196 firm-year observations from 1991-2000. Interestingly, the findings document (i) the 
incentive alignment effect in firms with low and high levels of managerial ownership, and (ii) 
the entrenchment effect at intermediate levels of ownership. More specifically, the first 
subsample (i.e. Income-increasing absolute abnormal accruals) is (i) negatively related to 
managerial ownership at the levels below and above 13.6% and 38.8%, respectively, and (ii) 
positively related to managerial ownership at the range between 13.6% - 38.8%. In terms of 
the second subsample, only linear relationship is found significant. That is, the results show 
that managerial ownership is negatively related to income-decreasing absolute value of 
abnormal accruals. 
In the less developed economy of Singapore, Yeo et al. (2002) investigates a hypothesised 
nonlinear relationship between managerial ownership and earnings management. To proxy 
for managerial ownership, they refer to the percentage of shares owned by all directors. They 
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also adopt the modified Jones model to estimate abnormal accruals that are subsequently used 
either in their absolute values indicating the magnitude of earnings management, or only in 
their original positive values indicating income-increasing measure of earnings management. 
The results show that both measures of earnings management are nonlinearly related to 
managerial ownership. That is, a negative and significant relation is documented between 
earnings management (either income-increasing or magnitude) and managerial ownership at 
levels equal or below 25%, and positive and significant for levels that exceed 25%. 
Most relevantly, Al-Fayoumi et al. (2010) is the only research conducted on the Jordanian 
context to test the effect of ownership structure on earnings management. The useable sample 
comprises 195 firm-year observations covering the period between 2001 and 2005. The 
researchers employ the modified Jones model to estimate the magnitude of abnormal 
accruals. Similar to the majority of previous research, they proxy for managerial ownership 
as the percentage of shares held by officers or directors within the firm and their families. 
The results show a statistically significant positive coefficient on insider ownership 
supporting the entrenchment effect. 
However, the proxy for insider ownership used in Al-Fayoumi et al. (2010) might not capture 
the essence of managerial ownership role in constraining earnings management practices in 
Jordan. This is attributable to data limitation in Amman Stock Exchange data base. As 
mentioned earlier, it is difficult to obtain the proportion of shares held by each officer or 
director unless theses information were collected from each firm through a survey such as 
that conducted by Gabrielsen et al. (2002).  
Although research on the role of controlling shareholders is mainly motivated by 
concentrated ownership, it is evident that these studies, up to this point, seem fairly similar to 
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those on the role managerial ownership in terms of proxy definition – both proxies are 
defined as the proportion of shares equity held by inside individuals. 
Ballesta and Meca (2007) affirm the importance of considering both dimensions of ownership 
structure to account for the complexity of interests in corporations. Hence, they study the 
effect of both insider ownership and ownership concentration on accruals earnings 
management in Spain. The researchers proxy for insider ownership (i.e. managerial 
ownership) as the proportion of shares held by members of the board of directors, and for 
ownership concentration as the proportion of shares held by the largest block holder. In 
addition, they adopt the modified Jones model to estimate of the magnitudes of abnormal 
accruals. The findings provide evidence that insider ownership is nonlinearly related to the 
magnitude of abnormal accruals with a cut-off point around 40% of ownership. Hence, for 
insider ownership below 40%, any increase in insider ownership decreases the magnitude of 
abnormal accruals, supporting the incentive alignment effect. And for insider ownership 
above the cut-off point, the higher the insider ownership, the higher the magnitude of 
abnormal accruals, supporting the entrenchment effect. In terms of ownership concentration, 
however, no significant relationship is documented in the Spanish context. 
In Canada, Park and Shin (2004) note that a large number of listed Canadian firms are 
controlled by a large block holder. On this basis, the researchers refer to controlling 
shareholders by the proportion of shares held by the largest block holder (BLOCK). They 
estimate current accruals via the modified Jones model to examine the effect of board 
composition on income-increasing earnings management. The results of their analysis report 
no significant linear relationship between ownership concentration and abnormal accruals. To 
test for nonlinearity, they conduct a robustness test using a dummy variable BLOCK at 20%, 
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25% and 30% cut-off points. However, they find that even the dummy approach does not 
lead to new results. 
Also using Canadian data, Landry and Callimaci (2003) examine the effect of ownership 
concentration of shifting earnings through expensing versus capitalising R&D spending
14
. 
Their sample includes 312 firm-years observation selected from industries that have a ratio of 
R&D expenses to sales 5% or higher. They employ a logistic regression model within which 
the dependent variable equals one if any amount of capitalised R&D appears in the financial 
statements, and zero otherwise (i.e. R&D are expensed). Concerning ownership 
concentration, the researchers consider firms as owner-controlled if any individual 
shareholder or related party owns 10% or more of voting shares. As such, they use a dummy 
variable that equals one for ownership levels above 10%, and zero otherwise. The findings 
show that decisions to capitalise R&D spending are negatively associated with firms with 
concentrated ownership suggesting that these firms are less concerned about earning 
management. 
One recent research is found investigating the effect of ownership concentration on abnormal 
production costs and abnormal discretionary expenses measured by Roychowdhury’s model. 
Using a sample of listed Chinese firms that report losses for three consecutive years, Cheng et 
al. (2010) find that no significant relationship between ownership concentration and abnormal 
production costs and abnormal discretionary expenses, indicating that ownership 
concentration is ineffective in constraining real activities earnings management. Similar 
evidence is reported by Garven (2009). 
                                                 
14
 This is not real activities earnings management because R&D expenditures are already spent. It is rather 
whether to recognise those expenses or to capitalise them. 
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Following the aforementioned research, this study uses the proportion of shares held by the 
largest block holder to proxy for ownership concentration, and thereby extends previous 
research by investigating the effect of ownership concentration on both types of earnings 
management, especially because of the estimation of the magnitude (i.e. absolute values) of 
real activities earnings management through Roychowdhury’s model (2006). 
 
4.3.3. Institutional Ownership: 
Institutional investors are often regarded as sophisticated investors who are better able to 
acquire and process information than individual investors (Bartov et al., 2000). According to 
Mallin (2007), managements are not likely to ignore such power associated with institutional 
investors. Companies usually arrange meetings with their large institutional investors on a 
one-to-one basis to discuss issues including firms’ performance and quality of managements.  
Taking this advantage into consideration, institutional investors can potentially monitor 
earnings manipulations exercised by managers (Bowen et al., 2008). Yet this is not the whole 
extent to institutions involvement in corporate governance. In the past, institutions would use 
exit strategy by simply selling their shares in mismanaged companies (Rajgopal and 
Venkatachlam, 1997). However, because selling large blocks of shares entails substantial 
discounts, most institutional investors now actively exercise a voting strategy on all issues 
raised at their investee companies’ annual general meetings (Nordberg, 2011).  
Rajgopal et al. (1999) investigate the monitoring capability of institutional investors in the 
US market. They employ the modified Jones model to examine the association between 
institutional ownership and the absolute value of discretionary accruals. They also measure 
institutional investors by the proportion of shareholdings owned by institutions. The results 
show that the percentage of institutional ownership is negatively related to the absolute value 
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of discretionary accruals. Hence, the results confirm the institutional investors are more 
sophisticated and less likely, compared to individual investors, to be misled by earnings 
management that is reflected in accruals. 
Similar evidence is also documented by Cornett et al. (2008). The results exhibit significant 
negative relationship between discretionary accruals and the fraction of shares owned by 
institutional investors. 
Chung et al. (2002) hypothesise that institutional investors will deter managers from using 
discretionary accruals to opportunistically manipulate earnings upwards or downwards. 
Therefore, they use singed discretionary accruals estimated via the modified Jones model. 
The findings provide evidence supportive of the view that institutional investors play an 
important role in monitoring managerial opportunism as it relates to accounting discretion. 
Charitou et al. (2007) examine the effect of institutional ownership on earnings management 
of distressed US firms during the period 1986-2004. Their sample comprises 859 firms that 
filed for bankruptcy then matched with the same number of healthy firms on the basis of 
year, industry and ROA. The assumption underlying the hypothesis is that distressed firms 
manage earnings downwards using discretionary accruals. Therefore, a cross-sectional 
version of the modified Jones model is used to estimate singed discretionary accruals. Similar 
to previous research, they find that high levels of institutional ownership are associated with 
higher monitoring and lower income-decreasing earnings management. 
In a less direct way, Yu (2008) include institutional investors as a control variable in their 
investigation of the role served by analyst coverage as an external monitor to managerial 
opportunism. Discretionary accruals are estimated through the modified Jones model and are 
used as the main proxy for earnings management. Institutional ownership is measured by the 
percentage of common shares owned by institutional investors. The results show a significant 
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negative association between institutional ownership and earnings management, which is 
consistent with the view that institutional investors serve as a monitoring mechanism to 
managerial opportunism. 
It is important to note that Rajgopal et al. (1999) emphasise controlling for institutional 
ownership in studies that mainly investigate managerial ownership as in Peasnell et al. (2005) 
and Al-Fayoumi et al. (2010), and vice versa as in Rebai (2011)
15
. Consistent with this view, 
Peasnell et al. (2005) and Al-Fayoumi et al. (2010) include institutional investors in their 
analysis of the effect of managerial ownership on earnings management. However, the results 
of both studies report no significant relationship between the percentage of shares owned by 
institutional investors and discretionary accruals.  
In fact, the institutional structure in the UK seems largely different from it in Jordan. While 
institutional investors in UK comprise mainly pension funds, insurance companies and unit 
trusts (Mallin, 2007), institutional investors in Jordan comprise mainly the institution of 
social security and financial firms (Al-Fayoumi et al., 2010). Therefore, although the results 
of Peasnell et al. (2005) and Al-Fayoumi et al. (2010) similarly differ from those in the US, 
the interpretations of the results should be different. Regarding the former study, Mallin 
(2007, p.81) posit a plausible justification for the difference between the monitoring roles of 
the UK and US institutional investors as she states that “the US institutional investors tend to 
be more proactive in corporate governance and this stance has started to influence the 
behaviour of both UK institutional investors and UK companies”. However, the findings of 
the latter study should be consistent with that institutional investors have greater monitoring 
role only if the company’s ownership structure is widely dispersed as in the UK and US 
(Siregar and Utama, 2008). 
                                                 
15
 Those three studies have been discussed in details in section 4.3.1. Therefore, only the results of those studies 
are discussed in this section. 
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In terms of real activity earnings management, the study conducted by Rebai (2011) mainly 
examines the monitoring role of three different types of institutions (i.e. Pension Funds, 
Investment Funds and Banks) in relation to R&D expenditures. Rebai (2011) reports no 
significant relationship between institutional investors and R&D expenditures manipulations, 
except for investment funds which effectively serve as a monitoring mechanism. 
To a wider extent, Roychowdhury (2006) investigates the effect of the monitoring role of 
institutional investors on a variety of real activities manipulations. His sample comprises US 
firms that are suspect of manipulating earnings to report earnings greater than or equal to zero 
(i.e. avoid losses). Therefore, his hypotheses are constructed to solely investigate income-
increasing real activities earnings management. In other words, he hypothesises that earnings 
manipulations through real activities would result in abnormally low cash flow from 
operation, abnormally high production costs and abnormally low discretionary expenses. This 
in turn has lead to the use of signed residuals estimated through the model developed in this 
research. Suspect-firm is a dummy variable that is set equal to one if firm-years belong to the 
earnings category just above zero, and zero otherwise. To proxy for institutional ownership, 
he develops a dummy variable takes the value of one if institutional share ownership for the 
firm is higher than the cross-sectional median in the year, and zero otherwise. To examine the 
effect of institutional investors among suspect firms, a new variable is developed by 
multiplying the two variables together. The results show that suspect firm-years with high 
institutional ownership exhibit abnormal production costs (abnormal discretionary expenses) 
that are lower (higher) than other suspect firms. This is consistent with institutional 
ownership mitigating income-increasing manipulations through overproduction and 
discretionary expenses reduction. In terms of cash flow from operation manipulation, 
however, the results indicate no variation among suspect firms corresponding to variation in 
levels of institutional ownership. Unlike the case with managerial ownership, the inference 
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problem seems to exist in relation to the effect of institutional ownership on abnormal 
operating cash flow. The opposite effects of abnormal production costs and abnormal 
discretionary expenses might have had a neutralising effect on abnormal cash flow from 
operating activities. Hence, the interpretation of the effectiveness of institutional ownership 
in mitigating abnormal operating cash flow should be considered tentatively. 
Li (2010) controls for institutional investors in examining market pricing of two types of real 
activities earnings management: abnormal cash flow from operation and abnormal production 
costs. Also, Li classifies the usable sample into two groups: firms that are likely to practice 
income-increasing earnings management and firms that are less likely to do so. The results 
show that the effect of institutional ownership on firms in both groups is the same. It is found 
that high levels of institutional ownership are significantly associated with low levels of 
abnormal cash flow from operations and high levels of abnormal production costs. Because 
low levels of abnormal cash flow from operations and high levels of abnormal production 
costs represent income-increasing earnings management, these findings indicate that 
institutional investors pressure managers to deliver higher earnings. 
Having reviewed evidence supportive of the effectiveness of institutional investors as a 
corporate governance mechanism, it is worth mentioning that some researchers distinguish 
between the roles of transient (i.e. short-term) and long-term institutional shareholders (e.g. 
Bushee, 1998; Koh, 2003, Cheng and Reitenga, 2009). They find evidence that only long-
term institutional investors with large shareholdings are interested in the long-term value of 
investee firms and hence, are likely to invest time and resources in monitoring to a greater 
extent than other investors. Transient institutional investors, in contrast, are myopic and are 
overly focused on current earnings and hence, pressure managers to meet earnings goals of 
these investors. For instance, the findings of Bushee (1998) reveal that the presence of high 
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levels of transient institutional shareholders encourages managers to cut R&D expenses to 
reserve an earnings decline and vice versa. 
Nevertheless, Ronen and Yaari (2008) assert in their comprehensive survey of the literature, 
that the empirical evidence is in favour of institutional ownership as a corporate governance 
mechanism that prevents earnings management. They also emphasise that this negative 
relationship is explained by a sampling design that aggregates both types of institutional 
ownership, which is attributable to the dominance of long-term institutional shareholders of 
samples when both types are examined together.  
Therefore, consistent with the empirical evidence demonstrated above and following the view 
proposed by Ronen and Yaari (2008), institutional ownership in the sampling design of this 
research is measured by the percentage of aggregate institutional share ownership. 
Furthermore, bearing in mind the overwhelming body of literature on the role of institutional 
investors and accruals earnings management, it seems there is still a lack of research that 
explores the relationship between institutional investors and the various types of real 
activities earnings management. Even prior research such as Roychowdhury (2006), show 
that real activities earnings management is prevalent in poorly performing firms. Hence, this 
research contributes to the knowledge by investigating the effect of institutional investors on 
both types of earnings management using a population of firms that are relatively stable. 
 
4.3.4. Foreign Ownership: 
Foreign investment involves the transfer of financial capital and a set of skills including 
managerial and accounting. Foreign investment beneficially influences economies in which 
there is high unemployment and capital shortage – as is typically the case in developing 
countries (Moosa, 2002). Yet, there are firm-specific motivations for foreign investors. 
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Several researchers assert that foreign investors seek to invest in firms with good corporate 
governance (e.g. Aggarwal et al., 2005; Li, 2005). Foreign investors are well equipped for 
choosing a firm with good corporate governance as they are often more sophisticated than 
domestic investors in terms of their investment criteria and its finances (Lieberman and 
Kirkness, 1998). Given these characteristics, Dahlquist and Robertson (2001) consider 
foreign ownership as an effective mechanism that could complement current governance 
structure because its role resembles that of institutional investors. Further, Leuz et al. (2009) 
find that foreign investors prefer to invest in good governed firms, which indicate that firms 
seeking additional financing will enhance their corporate governance to attract the desired 
investment for foreigners. 
Consistent with this view, Ali et al. (2008) examine the association between foreign 
ownership and earnings management in Malaysian listed firms. They estimate current 
discretionary accruals through the modified Jones model as a measure for earnings 
management. Ownership by foreign investor is measured as the proportion of shares owned 
by foreign investors to all outstanding shares. However, foreign investors are found 
ineffective in mitigating the practice of earnings management. 
Similar evidence is found by Sarkar et al. (2006) who investigates the effect of foreign 
ownership on earnings management employing Indian data. They measure foreign ownership 
as the percentage of common shares held by foreign institutional investors. Further, they use 
absolute value of discretionary accruals, estimated via the modified Jones model, as a proxy 
for earnings management. The results also show no significant relationship between foreign 
investors’ ownership and discretionary accruals. 
The investigation of the association between foreign ownership and earnings management 
seems less straightforward in China than it in countries such as the aforementioned. While 
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foreign ownership is considered as a monitoring mechanism in the above research, foreign 
investment could be seen as a motivation for earnings management practices in China. An 
elaboration is proposed by Haw et al. (2005). They note that earnings management behaviour 
might be different in China that it in western countries. In China, where the state owns 
significant portions of listed firms, managers rarely receive compensation based on firm 
performance and they are frequently appointed by the state. Further, Chinese firms are 
usually unable to raise capital by issuing corporate bonds or offer seasoned shares due to 
regulatory constraints. Hence, rights issue and initial public offerings (IPO) constitute the 
primary source of capital to Chinese firms. Accordingly, Haw et al. (2005) argue that 
managers might be motivated by these events to engage in earnings management practices.  
Within this context, Aharony et al. (2000) examines whether ownership by foreign investors 
would provide firms with strong incentive to manage their earnings around IPOs of Chinese 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs). In particular, they investigate whether Chinese SOEs 
manage their earnings prior to the issuance of B-Shares and H-Shares that are restricted to 
foreign investors on Chinese domestic stock exchange and Hong Kong exchange, 
respectively. They use earnings performance, measured as Return on Assets (ROA), 
surrounding the IPO year as a proxy for earnings management. The results show a significant 
post-issue earnings decline which is consistent with Chinese SOEs practicing earnings 
management to report high profits in the IPO year. This evidence is supportive of being 
foreign ownership a motivation for earnings management in China. 
Up to date, surprisingly little research on foreign investor and earnings management has 
surfaced in the literature. This highlights the importance of further examination of the role 
that foreign investor play in either constraining or motivating the practice of earnings 
management. In Jordan, foreign investors are provided with an attractive climate and 
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incentive package. The country adopts an open economic policy where both Arab and Non-
Arab foreign investors are openly permitted to invest in most companies listed on Amman 
Stock Exchange (ASE) (Naser et al., 2007). Both Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and 
Portfolio Investment (PI) constitute a dynamic source of capital in the Jordanian market
16
. 
For example, total foreign investment amounted to 20 percent of total trading volume of 
shares in March 2002, divided almost equally between Arab and Non-Arab investors (ASE 
annual report, 2002). This makes Jordan a suitable case for further investigation of the subject 
matter, especially by examining the effect of foreign investors on accruals-based and real 
activities-based earnings management.  
 
4.3.5. Summary: 
The literature has long recognised the importance of role that corporate ownership structures 
play in mitigating the practice of earnings management. According to agency assumptions, 
ownership structure mechanisms align the interests of managers with those of the 
shareholders. As such, high levels of managerial ownership, ownership concentration, 
institutional ownership and foreign ownership are expected to negatively affect earnings 
management. In this chapter, the findings of prior research have been reviewed. It shows that 
evidence concerning ownership structures and earnings management vary and may therefore 
be regarded as inconclusive. Moreover, it highlights the dearth of research relating ownership 
structures and real activities earnings management. Accordingly, the purpose of this research 
is to further examine relationships between those mechanisms and both accruals-based and 
real activities-based earnings management. 
                                                 
16
 The United Nations 1999 World Investment Report defines FDI as “an investment involving a long-term 
relationship and reflecting a lasting interest and control of a resident entity in one economy other than that of the 
foreign direct investor” (Cited in Moosa, 2002, p.1). Moosa comments that the term “control” represents the 
most important feature that distinguishes FDI from PI. 
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4.4. The Effect of External Audit on Earnings Management 
Given the information asymmetry and conflicts of interests between managers and outside 
users of financial statements, the audit of financial reports can enhance the quality of 
financial information reported by managements (Johnson et al., 2002). However, although the 
effective scrutiny of external auditors may reduce accruals earnings management, it may also 
tempt managers to substitute the reduction of accrual earnings management with real activity 
earnings management that is typically beyond the control of external auditors. 
 
4.4.1 Audit quality and Accruals-Based Earnings Management: 
Despite the importance of audit monitoring role, audit is imperfect and audit failures such as 
Enron and WorldCom do occur due to low audit quality (Healy and Wahlen, 1999; Francis, 
2004). This highlights differences in audit quality offered by different auditors. Audit quality 
refers to “the probability financial statements contain no material omissions or 
misstatements” (Palmrose, 1988, p.56). Hence “audit quality is inversely related to audit 
failures: the higher the failure rate, the lower the quality of auditing” (Francis, 2004, p.346). 
This implies that audit quality is inherently unobservable because (i) the occurrence of 
outright audit failure cases is infrequent, and (ii) it is difficult to assess audit quality ex ante 
since the majority of audit reports are standard clean opinions (Francis, 2004). 
Because auditor quality is inherently unobservable, there seems no single auditor 
characteristic that can be used to proxy for it (Balsam et al. 2003). Consequently, a variety of 
auditor characteristics has been used as proxies for audit quality including, auditor industry 
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expertise, auditor litigation, auditor tenure, audit fee and auditor size (i.e. brand name)
17
. The 
following is a review of prior studies that use these auditor characteristics to examine the 
association between audit quality and earnings management. 
Heninger (2001) argues that auditors are likely to confront the risk of litigation by 
stakeholders when the latter perceive a failure in financial reporting. To address this concern, 
he examines the relationship between auditor litigation and positive discretionary accruals. 
Hence, a dummy variable is used to proxy for litigation and is set equal to one if the client 
firm’s auditor is named in a lawsuit and zero otherwise. The results reveal that the probability 
that the auditor will be sued increases with more income-increasing abnormal accruals. 
Balsam et al. (2003) propose that industry specialists produce higher quality audits than non-
industry specialists. Therefore, they investigate the association between auditor industry 
specialisation and absolute discretionary accruals. Because industry specialisation is 
unobservable, they create five variables to proxy for it; LEADER refers to auditors who are 
the largest, second- and third-largest supplier of audit services in each industry. 
DOMINANCE refers to auditors who are the largest suppliers with a market share of at least 
10 percent greater than that of the second-largest. SHARE is measured in clients’ sales. 
MOSTCL refers to auditors with the most clients in the industry. SHARECL is the market 
share measured in the number of clients. The results show a statistically negative relationship 
between the absolute value of discretionary accruals and all of the five variables. This is 
consistent with specialist auditors mitigating earnings management. 
In response to various calls for mandatory audit firm rotation to enhance audit quality, 
Johnson et al. (2002) examine whether audit-firm tenure, measured by the length of the 
                                                 
17 Currently, there are 4 big audit firms. However, it is common to find articles investigating big 8, 6, or 5 audit 
firms that existed until 1989, 1998, and 2002, respectively (Ronen and Yaari, 2008). 
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relationship between a firm and its auditor, is associated with the absolute value of 
discretionary accruals. To do so, they create two dummy variables; SHORT (LONG) equals 
one if when the length of the auditor-client relationship is two or three years (nine years or 
longer), and zero otherwise. The findings reveal that long audit tenure is not associated with 
audit quality. Yet at the early years of auditor-client relationship, they find that firms report 
high levels of absolute discretionary accruals indicating a low audit quality. 
Gul et al. (2003) argue that auditors require high fees when their clients’ accounts report high 
accruals. This is because accruals that are considered unlikely to be realised can be expected 
to increase inherent risk, which in turn would result in additional audit work and associated 
audit fees. Therefore, they predict a positive relation between audit fees and discretionary 
accruals. The results confirm their hypothesis which is consistent with requiring high audit 
quality (measured by high audit fees) due to the inherent uncertainty of discretionary accruals 
realisation. 
However, none of the aforementioned audit quality proxies are applicable to the case of 
Jordan. As for auditor industry expertise, the number of firms per industry can be quite small 
(i.e. as little as 2 and 3 firms in more than five industries), which does not allow for variance 
measurement. In terms of audit tenure, although the Company Law (2003) forces listed 
companies to appoint external auditors for one year renewable, the law does not determine if 
the one year period is renewable once or more and for how long. As a result, Jordanian 
companies rarely change their auditors which also does not allow for variance measurement. 
Finally, data concerning auditor litigation and audit fee are not available on ASE database. 
Hence, the remaining auditor characteristic (i.e. auditor size) is chosen in this study as a 
proxy for audit quality not only because the inapplicability of other auditor characteristics in 
the Jordanian environment, but also because of its proven validity as demonstrated below. 
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4.4.1.1. Auditor Size and Accruals Earnings Management in Developed Economies: 
Several researchers state that most previous research has mainly used auditor size as a proxy 
for audit quality (e.g. Balsam et al., 2003; Francis, 2004; Ronen and Yaari, 2008). This 
auditor-differentiation is based on the argument of DeAngelo (1981) who proposes that audit 
firm size is an appropriate proxy for audit quality because no single client is important to 
large auditors as they have greater reputation to lose should they behave opportunistically. 
This positive relation between auditor size and audit quality certainly affects the credibility of 
financial report. Markets perception of high audit quality provided by big four auditors plays 
an important factor in companies financing decisions. Using this reasoning, Chang et al. 
(2009) investigate whether clients of big 6 receive favourable market conditions as opposed 
to clients of non-big 6. They find that clients of big 6 auditors are likely to make equity 
issuances instead of debt and in larger volumes than clients of non-big 6 auditors. These 
results are consistent with equity markets attaching high audit quality to big-size audit firms. 
A vast body of literature concerning earnings management and auditor size supports a well-
known convention that big 4 auditors constrain earnings management practices more than 
non-big 4 auditors. A prominent study conducted by Becker et al. (1998) examines the 
relation between audit quality and earnings management. In particular, they measure the 
effect of auditor size on income-increasing discretionary accruals. Employing US data, they 
use a dichotomous proxy for audit quality that takes the value of one if a firm is being audited 
by big 6 auditors and zero otherwise. They conclude that clients of non-big 6 auditors do 
report higher income-increasing discretionary accruals than those reported by clients of big 6 
auditors. 
Interestingly, Becker et al. (1998) mention a caveat that audit quality is better tested when it 
is based on pre-audited accounting data to determine the proportion of abnormal accruals 
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actually detected and prevented by each group of auditors. In pursuit of this issue, Hsieh and 
Tsai (2004) carried out a research investigating the associations between auditor size and pre-
audited accruals. Their findings pose that big-4 adjust larger amount of errors than those 
adjusted by non-big-4. 
Another leading research that employs US data is conducted by Francis et al. (1999). It 
explores whether firms with propensity to generate accruals are ever increasingly prone to 
hire one of the big six auditors so that such firms can provide assurance concerning the 
credibility of their reported earnings. Hence, this research investigates whether the choice of 
a big 6 auditor serves as a monitor and thus reduces the uncertainty about reported earnings 
for these firms. Further, they investigate the ability of big 6 auditors to mitigate earnings 
management behaviour by constraining aggressive and potentially opportunistic reporting of 
discretionary accruals. As predicted, the results are found robust concerning the increasing 
likelihood of hiring a big 6 auditor in firms with endogenous propensity to generate accruals. 
Moreover, even though clients of big 6 auditors have higher levels of total accruals, it is 
found that they have lower amounts of discretionary accruals. 
Krishnan (2003) investigates how US capital markets recognise the role of auditing in pricing 
of accounting information communicated through accruals. The underlying assumption is that 
big 6 auditors are likely to detect and prevent questionable discretionary accruals. Therefore, 
they hypothesise that the association between discretionary accruals and stock returns is 
greater for firms audited by big 6 auditors than for firms audited by non-big 6 auditors. The 
results confirm the hypothesis which indicates that capital markets perceive financial reports 
audited by big 6 auditors as credible and hence, attach greater weight to discretionary 
accruals reported by their clients than those reported by clients of non-big 6 auditors. 
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Behn et al. (2008) hypothesise that analyst forecast accuracy of future earnings is positively 
related to the financial reports audited by big 5 auditors. That is, reported accruals of clients 
of big 5 auditors are more likely to be realisable in the future that those of clients of non-big 
5, and accordingly, analysts can make more accurate forecasts of future earnings. The results 
are supportive of the hypothesis as they document higher analysts’ earnings forecast accuracy 
for big 5 auditees that it for non-big 5 auditees. 
In fact, even in the studies discussed in section (4.4.1) where auditor size is not the primary 
focus (i.e. Heninger, 2001; Balsam et al., 2003; Johnson et al., 2002; Gul et al., 2003), auditor 
size was included as an additional proxy for audit quality. They all provide confirmatory 
evidence that big auditors provide higher audit quality, by mitigating earnings management, 
than non-big auditors. 
Similar evidence is also found in UK setting by Gore et al. (2001). They investigate whether 
auditors’ fee for non-audit services will impair audit quality provided by big 5 and non-big 5 
auditors. The findings show that big 5 auditors constrain the practice of earnings management 
through accruals more than non-big 5 auditors when high levels of auditors’ fee for non-audit 
services is received. 
Nevertheless, studies that undermine the inclusiveness of the positive relation involving audit 
quality (i.e. the ability to constrain earnings management) and auditor size does also exist in 
the literature. For example, Kim et al. (2003) contend that although the consensus of big 6 
auditors constraining income-increasing accruals is supported by their results, non-big-6 
auditors are found more effective than big-6 auditors when both managers and auditors have 
incentives to adopt income-decreasing accruals choice. 
More important, although the majority of empirical evidence based on US and UK firms 
seems supportive of the notion that big auditing firms are more likely to constrain accruals 
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earnings management than small auditing firms, Maijoor and Vanstraelen (2006) find 
contrasting evidence in other developed markets. They investigate the effect of audit quality, 
proxied by auditor size, on the magnitude of abnormal accruals in three European countries. 
They chose UK, France and Germany because they are the originating countries of three 
distinct legal traditions of French code law, German code law and English common law, 
respectively. Their results indicate that only in the UK  clients of big 4 auditors significantly 
constrain earnings management. However, unlike the UK, audit quality in France and 
Germany does not vary among big-4 and non-big-4 auditors. 
In a more comprehensive study, Francis and Wang (2008) document that big 4 audit quality 
is greater only in common law countries where investor protection is strong. They find that 
earnings of clients of big 4 auditors are of higher quality relative to those of clients of non-big 
4 auditors as legal regimes become stronger. However, the results show no significant 
differences in the quality of clients’ earnings of big 4 and non-big 4 auditors in weak legal 
regimes. 
Francis (2004) posits another plausible justification for the influence of context on audit 
quality. He notes that the market share of big 4 auditors now exceed 90% of publicly listed 
companies in the US which means there is low power in research designs of studies 
comparing big versus non-big auditors. This is mainly because there is low variance in the 
experimental variable.  
It is now apparent that most of empirical evidence in the US and UK markets is supportive of 
big auditors being more likely to prevent earnings management and thereby, are of higher 
audit quality than non-big auditors. Yet this notion does not necessarily hold outside these 
markets (e.g. France and Germany), which prompts for investigation of this notion in Jordan 
especially because the market is still developing, the corporate legal framework has its 
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origins in French civil law, and the demand for high audit quality might be different than it in 
developing countries.  
 
4.4.1.2. Auditor Size and Accruals Earnings Management in Developing Economies: 
Even though Maijoor and Vanstraelen (2006) note that the majority of studies are conducted 
within Anglo-Saxon countries, a considerable number of studies investigate the effect audit 
quality by different auditor size on accruals earnings management in developing markets. To 
begin to Singapore, Chia et al. (2007) argue that listed service firms in Singapore engage in 
income-decreasing earnings management during the Asian crisis period. Accordingly, they 
investigate whether big 6 auditors would be more effective than non-big 6 auditors in 
constraining income-decreasing earnings management. The results confirm the income-
decreasing behaviour and they find evidence supportive of big 6 auditors preventing their 
client from reporting income-decreasing abnormal accruals.  
Similar evidence is found by Gerayli et al. (2011) using a sample of Iranian listed firms. That 
is, they find negative association between auditor size and abnormal accruals. 
However, using Malaysian data, both Abdulla and Nasir (2004) and Abdul-Rahman and Ali 
(2006) include auditor size as a control variable to proxy for audit quality. They both find no 
significant relationship between auditor size and abnormal accruals. That is, they conclude 
that there is no difference between audit qualities provided by big versus non-big auditors in 
Malaysia. 
Kabir et al. (2011) also report that audit quality does not vary among big and non-big 4 in 
Bangladesh. They attribute their findings to the small size of Bangladesh market and to poor 
demand for high audit quality. 
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Due to the inconclusive results in less developed countries, it is reasonable to question 
whether big size audit quality holds in Jordan where big 4 auditors do not audit the majority 
of listed firms. However, although a number of big international audit firms have entered the 
Jordanian audit market either on their own or as an affiliation to local audit firms (Naser et 
al., 2007), those big international auditors do not occupy a great share of manufacturing 
companies listed on ASE. For example, PricewaterhouseCoopers and KPMG (i.e. two of the 
big four audit firms) have one client each in the manufacturing sector during the period of 
this research. This could be a cause for concern as an opposite effect to that in Anglo-Saxon 
countries might exist (i.e. most observations are audited by non-big 4). To overcome this 
issue, the current study follows the classification of Faraj (2005) and Balhaj (2006)
18
 who 
conclude that big 5 auditors in Jordan include Ernst and Young, Deloitte and Touche, Grant 
Thornton, Ibrahim Al-Abbasi, and Talal Abu Ghazalah. By doing so, this study contribute to 
the literature by examining the real effect of auditor size on accruals earnings management in 
Jordan. Such research bears particular importance as the results will contribute to the process 
of improving audit profession in Jordan and thereby, increase the competitive among audit 
firms and consequently audit quality. 
 
4.4.2. Audit Quality and the Substitutive Relation between Accruals and 
Real Activities Earnings Management: 
Having emphasised the role of external audit in deterring earnings management, it is of 
crucial importance to highlight that real activity earnings management is typically beyond 
auditors’ control (Gunny, 2010). In other words, external audit cannot challenge real 
                                                 
18 Both studies evaluate auditor quality based on (i) auditees’ compliance with financial disclosures 
requirements in Jordan, and (ii) the presence of international branches.  
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economic actions that are taken in the ordinary course of business (Graham et al., 2005). 
Accordingly, enhancing the scrutiny of external auditors may drive managers to substitute the 
reduction of accrual earnings management with real activity earnings management. Actually, 
the contrasting findings of Nelson et al. (2002) and Graham et al. (2005) provide empirical 
evidence supportive of managers increased use of real activity earnings management when 
the scrutiny mitigates the use of accruals earnings management. On the one hand, Nelson et 
al. (2002) conclude, based on surveying 253 auditors, that accruals management represent the 
majority of earnings management practices. On the other hand, Graham et al (2005) report, 
based on surveying and interviewing more than 400 executives, that the majority of managed 
earnings figures are achieved through managing real activities rather than managing accruals. 
The findings of Cohen et al. (2008) justify the contradiction between the different 
conclusions pertaining to which tool is more used to manage earnings. They propose that 
accruals-based management has declined and real activity-based management has increased 
subsequent to the enhanced scrutiny of auditors and regulators. 
Cohen and Zarowin (2010) directly investigate the tendency for Seasoned Equity Offering 
(SOE) firms to use real activity earnings management as a result of the increased scrutiny of 
big 8 auditors over accruals earnings management. Consistent with the substitutive 
hypothesis, the results reveal that clients of big 8 auditors have higher tendency to use real 
activities earnings management around SOE than those of non-big 8 auditors. 
However, the results of Cohen et al. (2008) contradict those of Cohen and Zarowin (2010). 
They find that big 4 auditors do prevent accruals earnings management but are not associated 
with levels of real activities earnings management. This contradiction might suggest that 
there is a high correlation between Sarbanes-Oxley act and big 4 auditors, which in turn has 
lead to the positive relationship between big 4 and real activities earnings management. 
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Garven (2009) examines the effect of auditor size only on the real manipulation of 
discretionary expenses. She finds no significant statistical association between auditor size 
and firms being suspect reducing discretionary expenses to avoid reporting annual losses. She 
concludes that the manipulation of discretionary expenses by suspect firms is not a result of a 
superior scrutiny by big 4 auditors over discretionary accruals.  
Zang (2012) finds evidence supportive, in one part, to the findings of Cohen and Zarowin 
(2010), and to the findings of Graven (2009) in another part. First, the results show a 
significant positive relationship between big 8 auditors and abnormal production costs. This 
is consistent with big auditors reducing accruals earnings management which in turn leads 
firms to substitute the reduction in the use of discretionary accruals with an increase in the 
use of the real manipulation of production costs. Second, she finds no significant relationship 
between auditor size and the use of discretionary expenses manipulation, which indicates that 
managers do not resort to discretionary expenses manipulation due to the scrutiny of big 8 
auditors.  
Up to date, research on the effect of external scrutiny by regulators and external audit on 
substitutive relationship between accruals and real activity earnings management is still 
young. This highlights the importance for further research, especially in countries where there 
are no regulatory committees such as the PCAOB in the US and the Committee on the 
Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance (CFACG) in UK, that function as a specialised 
oversight mechanism over firms compliance with corporate governance codes. In addition, 
none of the little existing research on this issue examines the substitutive effect using 
earnings management proxies in absolute terms.  
In Jordan, there is no specialised oversight regulatory committee such as those in the UK and 
US, and as such, external audit remains the main oversight mechanism. This calls for a 
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concern and makes Jordan a well suited case for research as managers might increasingly use 
the more costly real activity earnings management should external audit reduce the use of 
discretionary accruals. Hence, regulatory bodies should be aware of this harmful effect and 
impose acts to protect the interests of other stakeholders. 
Therefore, this research contributes to existing research by investigating the impact of the 
enhanced scrutiny of external auditors on the substitutive relationship between both types of 
earnings management in absolute terms in the developing market of Jordan. 
 
4.4.3. Summary: 
The scrutiny of external auditors is twofold. Overall, empirical evidence shows that audit 
quality can significantly reduce earnings management through accruals. However, auditors 
have no effect on uncovering real manipulations, which in turn raises a concern about the 
probability of managers increasing the use of, the more costly, real activities earnings 
management. So in brief, it is argued that the better audit quality is in constraining 
discretionary accruals, the higher the probability of increasing the use of real earnings 
manipulations. While a large body of literature documents the effect of audit quality on 
discretionary accruals in the Anglo-Saxon countries, the literature also acknowledges the 
difference in data setting between those countries and the rest of the world. As concerns real 
earnings manipulation, it seems that there is little evidence, even in the Anglo-Saxon 
countries, pertaining to the substitutive effect audit quality has on accruals and real activities 
earnings management. 
Accordingly, this study investigates the effect of audit quality on accruals earnings 
management and its substitutive effect in the Jordanian environment. Finally, this study uses 
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auditor size as a proxy for audit quality because of the unobservable nature of audit quality. 
Auditor size is particularly favoured compared to other proxies such as auditor expertise, 
litigation, tenure and fees due to its appropriateness and applicability to the Jordanian data. 
 
4.5. Conclusion: 
Agency theory regards ownership structures as mechanisms that align the interests of 
managements with those of the shareholders. It also views external audit as the most 
important, independent and professional mechanism in terms of control and monitoring. As 
such, these corporate governance mechanisms are supposed to act as deterrence devices of 
the opportunistic practice of earnings management.  
Accordingly, this chapter has reviewed the literature on the effect of ownership structure and 
external audit monitoring mechanisms on both accruals and real activities earnings 
management. In line with the research questions, the following discussion addresses the key 
findings of previous research and highlights the gaps in existing literature. 
Bearing in mind that ownership is dispersed in the UK and the US, high ownership 
concentration is the norm around the world. Therefore, existing research on the effect 
ownership concentration on accruals earnings management is mainly conducted outside the 
UK and the US. Since the first research question relates to the effectiveness of ownership 
structure mechanisms on accruals earnings management, a range of relevant studies have 
been reviewed in this chapter.  
The results of the majority of included studies reveal no relationship between ownership 
concentration and accruals earnings management in several contexts such as Denmark 
(Gabrielsen et al., 2002), Spain (Ballesta and Meca, 2007) and Canada (Park and Shin, 2004). 
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Other studies provide conflicting evidence: Yeo et al. (2002) find a non-linear relationship in 
Singapore; Landry and Callimaci (2003) report evidence supportive of the incentive 
alignment effect in Canada. These conflicting results give rise to the importance of 
investigating the effect of ownership concentration on accruals earnings management in 
Jordan where institutional settings greatly differ from those previously studied. 
In an attempt to examine the effect of managerial ownership on accruals earnings 
management in Jordan, Al-Fayoumi et al. (2010) define managerial ownership as ownership 
concentration because data concerning shareholdings of directors and officers are not 
available on the database of ASE. Nevertheless, Dechow et al. (2010) emphasise that agency 
problem, in contexts where ownership is highly concentrated, occurs primarily between 
controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. Apparently, Al-Fayoumi et al.’s (2010) 
approach does not capture the control aspect as many block holders in Jordan are not 
effectively in charge of their firms’ affairs. To distinguish managerial ownership from 
ownership concentration, a new proxy is developed in this research (i.e. controlling 
shareholders). That is, following Landry and Callimaci (2003) and Peasnell et al. (2005), 
managerial ownership takes the value of one if the largest shareholder is effectively in control 
of the firm (i.e. occupies the position of either the chairman of the board or chief executive 
officer), and zero otherwise. Therefore, this proxy allows the investigation of the effect of 
managerial ownership to take place in Jordan for the first time. 
As regards institutional ownership, Rajgopal et al. (1999) emphasise the importance of 
controlling for institutional ownership in studies that mainly investigate managerial 
ownership. Moreover, while the results reviewed in this chapter show that institutional 
ownership is inversely related to accruals earnings management in the US (e.g. Rajgopal et 
al., 1999; Chung et al., 2002; Charitou et al., 2007; Cornett et al., 2008; Yu, 2008), no 
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significant relationship is documented in the UK (e.g. Peasnell et al., 2005) and in Jordan 
(e.g. Al-Fayoumi et al., 2010). Therefore, institutional ownership is included in this research 
not only because it is important to control for it, but also because this issue is worth of further 
investigation using different accruals model (i.e. Kothari et al., 2005). 
The final ownership structure mechanism is foreign ownership. Foreign ownership is 
considered as an effective mechanism that could complement current governance structure 
(Dahlquist and Robertson, 2001). Alternatively, firms seeking additional financing enhance 
their corporate governance to attract investment from foreigners (Leuz et al., 2009). After an 
extensive search, however, only two studies have been found examining the effect of foreign 
ownership on accruals earnings management: Sarkar et al. (2006) and Ali et al. (2008). This 
low number of studies definitely provides limited evidence concerning the effectiveness of 
foreign ownership as a deterrence mechanism, especially because they both find no 
significant relationship. 
The aim of the second research question is to assess the effectiveness of the aforementioned 
ownership structure mechanisms in preventing real activities earnings management. As has 
been demonstrated in this chapter, real activities earnings management studies are still US-
based. This indicates that the effect of ownership concentration has rarely been investigated 
in the US because of the dispersed ownership (e.g. Garven, 2009). Even in Garven (2009), 
the effect of ownership concentration is examined only on abnormal discretionary expenses. 
Outside the US, a research conducted by Cheng et al. (2010) reveals no relationship between 
ownership concentration and abnormal production costs and abnormal discretionary expenses 
in China. This shows the dearth of research on this matter up to date. 
By incorporating the discussion on managerial ownership proxy in Jordan and the lack of 
research on the effect of managerial ownership on real activities earnings management 
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outside the US, this research is the first to examine the incentive alignment effect reported in 
US-based studies (e.g. Cohen et al., 2008; Demers and Wang, 2010). 
Similar to managerial ownership and ownership concentration, studies that assess the effect 
of institutional ownership on real activities earnings management has been US-based (e.g. 
Roychowdhury, 2006; Li, 2010). Moreover, the results revealed in those studies  range from 
negative relationship to positive relationship thus providing limited implication concerning 
the effectiveness of the monitoring role of institutions even in the US. This also highlights the 
need for more studies outside the US. 
As for foreign ownership, there seems to be a gap in literature as no study is found examining 
the effect of foreign ownership on real activities earnings management. Therefore, this study 
is the first to evaluate the role of foreign investors in the governance of their corporate 
holdings. 
The third research question relates to the difference in the quality of accruals reported by 
clients of big 5 auditors and clients of non-big 5 auditors in Jordan. Although this relationship 
has been widely investigated in developed and developing economies (e.g. Becker et al., 
1998; Francis et al., 1999), the results of previous studies provide limited evidence outside 
the US and the UK. For instance, Maijoor and Vanstraelen (2006) find that audit quality in 
France and Germany does not vary among big-4 and non-big-4 auditors. In another instance, 
Francis and Wang (2008) report no significant differences in the quality of clients’ accruals 
of big 4 and non-big 4 in weak legal regimes. Along with the limited evidence, the number of 
clients of big 4 auditors in Jordan is too low which might impose the problem of low variance 
in the experimental variable. Therefore, big auditors in this research are the biggest five 
auditors in Jordan regardless of their international classification. 
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The final research question is conditional upon the significance of the relationship between 
auditor size and accruals earnings management. This is due to the indirect relationship 
between auditor size and real activities earnings management. That is, if the results show a 
significant negative relationship between big 5 auditors accruals earnings management, it is 
hypothesised that managers will be induced to increase the manipulation through real 
activities that are beyond the control of external auditors. Like other research involving real 
activities earnings management (e.g. Cohen et al., 2008; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010), there is 
little research investigating this hypothesis and it has merely been US-based. Therefore, this 
research extends existing research by further examining this hypothesis in the emerging 
market of Jordan. 
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Chapter  Five  
Research Methodology 
 
5.1. Introduction: 
This chapter aims at demonstrating the overall approach to the research process, from the 
research philosophy (i.e. paradigm) to the collection and analysis of the data. Due to the great 
influence of research paradigm over the choice of the research methodology, the next section 
depicts the characteristics of the main two paradigms in order to justify the choice of the 
suitable paradigm for this research. The selection of methods is discussed in section three. 
Section four shows the measurement of the dependent and independent variables and the 
development of research hypotheses. Afterwards, the research empirical models are 
symbolically presented in section five; two empirical models aim to provide causal 
explanations of the impact of ownership structure and external audit deterrence mechanisms 
on earnings management. Section six demonstrates population selection procedures and the 
method used to process and collect secondary data used for the estimation of earnings 
management proxies and to test the research hypotheses. Finally, section seven shows the 
statistical techniques used for secondary data analysis. 
 
5.2. Research Paradigms: 
The term paradigm refers to a set of basic beliefs that “defines, for its holder, the nature of 
the world, the individual’s place in it and the range of possible relationships to that world 
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and its parts” (Guba and Lincoln, 1994, p.107). Thus, a researcher’s basic beliefs will be 
reflected in the way his/her research is designed, how data is collected and analysed and even 
the way in which his/her thesis is written (Collis and Hussey, 2003).  
Collis and Hussey (2003) identify two main paradigms and note that it is best to regard them 
as the two extremes of a continuum. These two paradigms are the Positivist and Interpretivist 
paradigms. Guba (1990) state that the basic beliefs which define research paradigms can be 
characterised by the response (i.e. assumptions) of proponents of each paradigm to three 
basic questions. These questions are: 
- Ontological: what is the nature of reality? 
Positivists believe that apprehendable reality exists out there, apart from the researcher, and is 
driven by immutable natural laws (Guba, 1990). At the other extreme of the continuum, 
interpretivists consider reality socially constructed and is only understood by examining the 
perceptions of participant in a study (Collis and Hussey, 2003). 
- Epistemological: what is the nature of the relationship between the researcher and the 
researched? 
On the one hand, positivists are objectivists. They assume that the researcher observes the 
phenomenon in a dispassionate and objective manner (Mertens, 2010). In other words, the 
researcher and the researched are assumed to be independent entities and the researcher to be 
capable of studying the object without influencing it or being influenced by it (Guba and 
Lincoln, 1994).  
Positivism is founded on the belief that social sciences can be studied in the same way as 
natural sciences (Collis and Hussey, 2003), because positivists assume that scientific 
knowledge is absolutely objective and that only scientific knowledge is valid, certain and 
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accurate (Crotty, 1998). Their goal is to discover general laws to describe constant 
relationships between variables (Mertens, 2010). 
On the other hand, interpretivists are subjectivists. They argue that the distance between the 
researcher and what is being studied should be minimised because insights into the complex 
human behaviour are lost if this complexity is reduced to a series of law-like generalisations 
(Saunders, et al., 2009). Therefore, the interpretivist assumes that reality is subjective as 
observers are actually part of what is being observed (Patton, 1990).   
- Methodological: how should the researcher go about finding out knowledge? 
The overall approach to the research process of positivism is deductive. The positivistic 
approach seeks a method for studying social science that is value-free, and that explanations 
of a causal nature can be provided (Metrens, 2010). That is, causal laws provide the basis of 
explanation through establishing causal relationships between variables and linking them to a 
deductive or integrated theory. Hence, the positivistic paradigm tends to produce quantitative 
data using large samples (Collis and hussy, 2003). Positivists manipulate questions and/or 
hypotheses in propositional form and subject them to empirical tests to verify them (Guba 
and Lincoln, 1994). 
As a reaction to positivism, interpretivists argue that the social world is far too complex to be 
theorised by definite laws in the same way as the natural sciences (Saunders et al., 2009). 
They stress the subjective status of individuals by focusing on the meaning rather than the 
measurement of social phenomena. Therefore, the overall approach to the research process of 
interpretivism is inductive. Interpretivists tend to use qualitative methods that are particularly 
oriented toward explanation, discovery and inductive logic (Patton, 1990). They tend to use 
small samples and produce qualitative data that are subjected to an in-depth analysis. Unlike 
positivism, interpretivism is concerned with generating theories from observations as the 
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researcher looks for patterns to make sense of the situation without imposing pre-existing 
expectations on the phenomenon under study (Collis and Hussy, 2003; Patton, 1990). 
In the end, there is no paradigm that can be proven better than the other, they are just better at 
doing different things (Saunders et al., 2009). According to Ryan et al. (2002, p.35), “the 
assumptions which the researcher holds regarding the nature of the phenomenon’s reality 
(ontology), will affect the way in which knowledge can be gained about that phenomenon 
(epistemology), and this in turn affects the process through which research can be conducted 
(methodology)”.  
For the purpose of this research, agency theory researchers assume that individuals are 
rational and act on their own interest (Zahirul Hoque, 2006). Positive accounting researchers 
perceive the agent as driven by axioms of economically rational behaviour to maximise 
expected utility. As such, the agent’s behaviour is predictable and determined by the laws of 
rational choice (Ryan et al., 2002).  
However, many psychologists address the positivists’ failure to acknowledge the meaningful 
human behaviour that is not observable but still important, and question the ability of 
researchers to establish certain and generalisable laws as they applied to human behaviour 
(Mertens, 2010). Patton (2002) argues that judgement in social science is unavoidable and 
proving causality with certainty in explaining social phenomena is problematic. On this basis, 
post-positivism move from the naive realist posture to the one often termed critical-realism 
(Guba, 1990). Post-positivists still believe that a reality driven by natural causes exists out 
there, but only imperfectly apprehendable and within probability (not certainty) due to flawed 
human intellectual mechanisms (Guba and Lincoln, 1994; Guba, 1990). Although post-
positivists also still hold beliefs concerning the objectivity and generalisability, dualism is 
largely abandoned as they posit that it is impossible for a human inquirer (i.e. researcher) to 
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step outside the pale of humanness while conducting inquiry (Mertens, 2010; Guba, 1990). 
Finally, the methodological approach of post-positivism is primarily quantitative although 
qualitative methods could be used should they fit the subject matter (Saunders et al., 2009; 
Mertens, 2010). 
Accordingly, the post-positivism paradigm is adopted in the current research because of its 
relevance to the positive accounting research – The researcher manipulates questions and/or 
hypotheses in an objective, scientific and dispassionate manner, and subjects them to 
empirical tests to verify them. Moreover, and following Patton (2002), it overcomes the 
weaknesses of the rigidity of positivism, and it currently informs much contemporary social 
science research. 
 
5.3. Selection of Methods: 
Two regression-based expectations models are chosen from the literature to estimate the 
amounts of managed earnings. The model of Kothari et al. (2005) is used to calculate 
abnormal accruals, and the model of Roychowdhury (2006) is used to calculate abnormal 
cash flow from operating activities, abnormal production costs and abnormal discretionary 
expenses. As such, the residuals obtained from these models represent proxies for managed 
earnings.  
Afterwards, pooled cross-sectional regressions are constructed to test the proposed 
relationships between earnings management proxies (i.e. dependent variables) and ownership 
structure and external audit mechanisms (i.e. independent variables)
19
. 
                                                 
19
 Further detailed discussion related to empirical models is provided in section 5.7.3.2. 
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It is worth mentioning that such archival research suffers from the measurement error 
problem discussed in Chapter Three. That is, first, all estimation models available in the 
literature of accruals earnings management suffer from the limitation of measurement error in 
the estimation of earnings management proxies. As demonstrated in Chapter Three, however, 
the model of Kothari et al. (2005) produces the highest power amongst accruals models. 
Thus, this model has become quite popular because it yields stronger results than other 
models. As for real activities earnings management models, the model of Roychowdhury 
(2006) is currently the only notable model that provides proxies for managed earnings 
through operating activities. As a result, this model has been widely used in subsequent 
studies. Second, measurement errors in explanatory variables (i.e. PART) could lead to 
misleading results. 
Nevertheless, archival research is the typical strategy that allows for testing the predictions of 
a theory (Graham et al., 2005). In addition, other popular strategies such as questionnaire 
survey and interviews measure the opinions and beliefs of the participants thus imposing 
several potential limitations. According to Graham et al. (2005) and Denscombe (2007), these 
limitations include, 
- Participants are not representative of the underlying population.  
- Survey questions are misunderstood especially due to the use of academic terms. 
- The truthfulness of participants’ answers could not be easily checked. 
- Relating to earnings management studies in particular, participants such as executives 
might not be willing to admit to undesirable or opportunistic behaviour. 
In the end, although there are limitations associated with the regression-based models, other 
methods also suffer limitations that could lead to misleading inferences. Hence, it became 
apparent that regression-based methods are the most suitable to achieve the objectives of the 
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current study. This is especially because regression-based methods allows for the 
measurement of relationship between variables using the whole population of the 
manufacturing sector in Jordan without resorting to a third-party perceptions nor suffering 
from the weaknesses of the survey strategy. 
 
5.4. Hypotheses Development: 
From an agency theory perspective, ownership structure mechanisms should have a 
constraining effect on both types of earnings management. External audit should also have a 
similar effect on accruals and an ambiguous, if any, on real activity earnings management. To 
examine these relationships, five main hypotheses are developed for each type of 
manipulation which results in twenty sub-hypotheses are and formulated in correspondence 
with the number of dependent and independent variables. That is, the relationship between 
ownership concentration, managerial ownership, institutional ownership, foreign ownership 
and auditor size is examined with each of, abnormal accruals, abnormal cash flow from 
operating activities, abnormal production costs and abnormal discretionary expenses. 
Accordingly, this section first starts by demonstrating the process for the estimation of 
earnings management proxies (i.e. dependent variables) in subsection (5.4.1.). Subsection 
(5.4.2) shows the development of the first sixteen sub-hypotheses which examine the 
relationship between ownership structure and both accruals real activities earnings 
management. In addition, it shows the development of the remaining four sub-hypotheses 
which investigate the effect of external auditor on the trade-off between the two types of 
earnings management. 
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5.4.1. Measurement of Dependent Variables: 
In this research, four measures in total are developed as proxies for earnings management. 
Typically, managed earnings are measured as the residuals from an expectation model. 
Afterwards, each measure of earnings management becomes a dependent variable when 
research hypotheses are formulated and tested. In detail, the first measure is abnormal 
accruals. This measure is the estimated residual from the Kothari et al. (2005) model that 
solely proxies for accruals earnings management. The second, third and forth measures are 
estimated using the Roychowdhury (2006) model to proxy for real activities earnings 
management. These measures are: abnormal cash flow from operating activities, abnormal 
production costs and abnormal discretionary expenses, respectively.  
 
5.4.1.1. Estimation of Accruals Earnings Management: 
It has been indicated in Chapter Three that aggregate accruals models have been widely 
implemented in previous research to decompose total accruals into two components; 
discretionary accruals that are most likely to be managed, and non-discretionary accruals that 
arise from normal business transactions. It has also been stated in Chapter Three that the 
Kothari et al. (2005) model is adopted in this research as the appropriate measure of 
discretionary accruals. This model is regarded as an extension to the widely used Modified 
Jones model as it maintains  all of the three original explanatory variables as follows, 
TAit/Ait-1 = α0 + αi [1/Ait-1] + β1i [(ΔREVit – ∆RECit)/Ait-1] + β2i [PPEit/Ait-1]        
      + β3i ROAit(or it-1) + εit                    (1) 
Where, 
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TAit  : total accruals in year t for firm i 
Ait‒1  : total assets in year t – 1 for firm i 
α0  : Intercept 
ΔREV      : revenues in year t less revenues in year t-1 for firm i 
ΔREC      : revenues in year t less revenues in year t-1 for firm i 
PPE      : net property, plant, and equipment in year t for firm i 
ROA  : Rate of return on assets 
εit      : error term in year t for firm i 
Apparently, a definition for total accruals is considered as a prerequisite to this regression. 
That is, accurate accruals data must be collected in order to accurately calculate total 
accruals. The literature offers two alternative approaches according to which total accruals 
can be defined; the Balance Sheet approach (BA) and the Statement of Cash Flow approach 
(CA). According to BA, total accruals are defined as the change in non-cash current assets, 
less the change in current liabilities (exclusive of short-term debt and taxes payable), less 
depreciation expense. Examples of studies employing BA  include: Heninger (2001), Balsam 
et al. (2002) and Gul et al. (2003). Whereas according to CA total accruals are defined as the 
difference between income before extraordinary items and discontinued operations and cash 
from operations. Examples of studies employing CA  include: Bedard et al. (2004), Nagy 
(2005) and Cahan and Zhang (2006). 
Hribar and Collins (2002) argue in favour of the statement of CA despite that the majority of 
discretionary accruals studies use the indirect BA to calculate total accruals. They assess the 
measurement error introduced by both approaches using a sample of 14,558 firm-years over 
the period 1988 – 1997. They identify three non-operating events that cause the presumed 
articulation between changes in balance sheet working capital accounts and accrued revenues 
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and expenses on the income statement to break down when present. According to the events, 
they divide the sample into three subsamples plus a non-event sample; the “merger” 
subsample contains 2,991 observations, the “discontinued operations” subsample contains 
1,277 observations, the “foreign currency translation” subsample contains 2,812 
observations, and the “non-event” subsample contains 8,203 observations. The findings show 
that the BA yields higher measurement error than CA whenever an event is present. 
Consequently, they emphasise their preference for the use of CA in accruals-based research 
as the appropriate measure. Further, they urge for re-evaluating prior studies that use BA in 
light of the potential impact of mismeasured accruals. 
Researchers also have two main competing perspectives as to what constitutes an appropriate 
measure of discretionary accruals. On the one hand, a number of researchers use current 
accruals (i.e. non-cash working capital accruals), instead of total accruals, as the dependent 
variable in an estimation model (e.g. Peasnell et al., 2000; Ashbaugh et al., 2003; Mitra and 
Cready, 2005). As such, long-term accruals such as depreciation and amortisation expenses 
are treated as non-discretionary in character. Bearing in mind that the explanatory variable 
“Property, Plant and Equipment (PP&E)” in the original models aims mainly to control for 
depreciation and amortisation expenses, it becomes obsolete for a working capital measure of 
accruals (Young, 1999). The rationale for the use of current accruals is the finding of Sloan 
(1996) which shows that most of the variation in total accruals results from the variation in 
current accruals. Further, according to Beneish (1998), it is less transparent and more 
beneficial for managers to manipulate current accruals relative to depreciation expense. On 
the other hand, the majority of researchers use total accruals as the dependent variable and 
include PP&E as an explanatory variable in estimation models (e.g. Jones, 1991; Gaver et al., 
1995; Krishnan, 2003; Cheng and Warfield, 2005; Bowen et al., 2008). Jiambalvo (1996) 
states several common manipulation methods relating to depreciation and amortisation 
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expenses such as, change in useful life of fixed assets, change in estimate of residual value of 
fixed assets and change in policy regarding capitalising or expensing repairs. It is of crucial 
importance to control for such manipulations because managers may utilise them to shift 
earnings between periods as desired. The accounting scandal of the Toronto entertainment 
company “Livent” depicts an example of boosting current period’s earnings through 
amortisation. The company was able to amortise its live-show preproduction costs by 
transferring them to fixed assets accounts. Because fixed assets carry much longer useful 
lives than preproduction costs, the company then had postponed these costs, which included 
soft expenditure such as wages, to future periods (Mulford and Comiskey, 2002).  
Based on the discussions above, discretionary total accruals are considered the appropriate 
measure of accruals earnings management in this research and are defined according to AC as 
the difference between income before extraordinary items and discontinued operations and 
cash from operations. 
The Kothari et al. (2005) model is adopted in this research because it has several advantages, 
apparent in the regression, over other models. Firstly, it relaxes the assumption of forcing the 
model through the origin by adding the intercept. Secondly, this model controls for firms 
performance by adding (ROA) as an explanatory variable. Therefore, the model predicts non-
discretionary accruals and deems the regression residuals as discretionary or abnormal 
accruals. 
Following Kothari et al. (2005), the residuals are obtained by employing cross-sectional 
regression to overcome estimation issues inherent in the standard and the Modified Jones 
time-series setting. The specification of the original time-series models requires long series of 
observations in order to estimate firm-specific parameter estimates prior to the event period. 
In essence, cross-sectional models are similar to their time-series counterparts except that the 
127 
 
former versions use cross-sectional data for every industry and year instead of the time-series 
data for each individual firm (Jaime and Noguer, 2004). Therefore, cross-sectional 
parameters estimates a, b1 and b2 are industry and year specific rather than firm-specific as in 
time-series.  
Many researchers criticise the validity of the explicit and implicit time-series assumptions 
that have to be maintained in order to arrive at those parameter estimates. Examples of 
studies employing cross-sectional models of Jones, modified Jones of Dechow et al. (1995) 
and the Kothari et al. (2005) include DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994), Subramanyam (1996), 
Becker et al. (1998), Guidry et al. (1999), Tucker and Zarowin (2006) Cohen and Zarowin 
(2010). Below, therefore, is a discussion on the limitations of time-series assumptions and the 
remedies offered by the cross-sectional approach: 
- The basic assumption behind the time-series setting is that the coefficients are time 
invariant (i.e. stationary over time). However, while the estimation of firm-specific 
parameters requires a long series of observations, data stationarity is at odds with 
survival in the long run (Ronen and Yaari, 2008; McNichols, 2000). That is, the data 
are more likely to be non-stationary as firms tend to change their business plans and 
operating strategies on the long run in order to survive
20
. 
- In addition, the requirement of a long series of observations in the time-series setting 
reduces sample size due to data requirements. Hence, this assumption creates sample 
bias. For example, the usable sample in the study conducted by DeFond and 
Jiambalvo (1994) includes 94 violation firms in the cross-sectional setting against 65 
violation firms in the time-series setting. Similarly, Subramanyam (1996) reports that 
                                                 
20
 Econometrically, Gujarati (2003) states that if a time series data is non-stationary, the behaviour of data could 
be studied only for the time period under consideration. Consequently, for the purpose of forecasting, non-
stationary time series may be of little practical value because it is not possible to generalise the findings to other 
time periods. 
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against 21,135 valid observations in cross-sectional setting, only 7,345 firm-years 
satisfy the sample selection criteria in time-series setting. 
- The latter assumption also introduces a survivorship bias. That is, the reduced sample 
includes only firms that have successfully survived for at least 11 years. This 
restriction bias the sample toward larger and more successful firms (Jeter and 
Shivakumar, 1999). Therefore, Bartov et al. (2001) report that results obtained from 
the use of cross-sectional models have better implications for future research than 
those from time-series models. 
- Finally, earnings management design in the time-series setting requires a benchmark 
of no systematic earnings management in the estimation period. This assumption is 
unlikely to hold for all firms. On the contrary, cross-sectional models make no such 
assumption but rather assume that the model parameters are the same across firms in 
the industry during the estimation sample (i.e. the homogeneity across firms in an 
industry that have the same operating technology, yields the same normal accruals for 
a given level of performance) (Jeter and Shivakumar, 1999). 
Nonetheless, the cross-sectional approach has its own drawbacks as well. It raises 
problematic issues that do not exist in the time-series approach. As noted above, cross-
sectional models assume that non-discretionary accruals are homogenous across firms in the 
same industry, and hence, consider the industry’s level of expected non-discretionary 
accruals as a benchmark. This assumption poses a threefold problematic issue. 
- The first issue concerns which benchmark would represent an industry’s normal level 
of accruals (Ronen and Yaari, 2008). The literature proposes several approaches. For 
instance, DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) consider normal accruals of all firms in the 
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same industry and year as a benchmark; Kang (1999) match firms with similar levels 
of normal accruals. 
- The second issue concerns the reliability of the industry benchmark when an industry-
wide earnings management is practiced (Peasnell et al., 2000). As in the study 
conducted by Jones (1991), firms during the import relief investigation exercise 
income-decreasing earnings management to obtain support from the US government. 
This implies that the observations used to estimate the coefficients of non-
discretionary accruals include some managed accruals themselves. Consequently, 
cross-sectional models are unlikely to capture all the negative discretionary accruals 
exercised by the industry. 
- Third, Bernard and Skinner (1996) criticise the validity of the homogenous 
assumption. They posit that each industry group may aggregate firms that have little 
in common as they vary in their operating cycles and technologies. Hence, these firms 
differ in their normal accruals which result in unreliable benchmark. 
Eventually, it is worth noting that regardless of these potential disadvantages, cross-sectional 
models remain the dominant trend in current research of earnings management (Jaime and 
Noguer, 2004). The findings of Subramanyam (1996) and Bartov et al. (2001) justify the 
aforementioned claim. The former report that the parameter estimates are better specified for 
cross-sectional models than time-series counterparts as the standard errors of the coefficients 
are lower in cross-sectional versions than in time-series versions. The latter study aims 
primarily at evaluating the ability of cross-sectional versions of the standard and modified 
Jones models to detect earnings management in comparison to their time-series counterparts. 
The evaluation involves regressing audit opinion on discretionary accruals. Hence, an 
association between discretionary accruals generated by a model and an audit qualification 
submits evidence on the ability of the model to detect earnings management. The findings 
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indicate that only the cross-sectional versions are able to consistently detect earnings 
management as proxied by qualified opinion. Consequently, the Kothari et al. (2005) model 
overcomes the limitations associated with time-series settings since the residuals are obtained 
by employing cross-sectional regression in this research. 
As indicated above, the residuals of an accrual expectation model are regarded as 
discretionary accruals. Some studies use signed discretionary accruals to test for income 
increasing or income decreasing earnings management (e.g. DeFond and Subramanyam, 
1998; Teoh et al., 1998a; Kasznik, 1999; Kim et al., 2003). Such studies specify particular 
direction for managerial incentives for earnings management in a specific time period (Hribar 
and Nichols, 2007). Other studies use the absolute value (i.e. unsigned) discretionary accruals 
to test for the magnitude of, and general propensity to manage earnings (e.g. Klein, 2002; 
Becker et al., 1998; Haw et al., 2004; Doyle et al., 2007). The assumption underlying the use 
of unsigned discretionary accruals is that a set of firms is more likely to be managing 
earnings (Hribar and Nichols, 2007). The magnitude of absolute discretionary accruals 
measures firms’ success in managing earnings up or down as needed (Reynolds and Francis, 
2000).  
Therefore, absolute value of discretionary accruals is used in this research as the first 
dependent variable for two main reasons. First, following prior research mentioned above. 
Second, because absolute value of discretionary accruals is the best measure of the extent to 
which firms use accruals to manage earnings in the absence of a particular direction 
(Reynolds and Francis, 2000).  
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5.4.1.2. Estimation of Real Activities Earnings Management: 
The Roychowdhury (2006) model is used in this research to estimate the second, third and 
forth measures of real activities earnings management. These measures are: abnormal cash 
flow from operating activities, abnormal production costs and abnormal discretionary 
expenses. Each measure is obtained by employing a separate cross-sectional regression as 
follows, 
CFOt /A t-1 = α0 + α1 (1/At-1) + β1 (St /At-1) + β2 (∆St /At-1) + εt                           (2) 
PRODt /A t-1 = α0 + α1 (1/At-1) + β1 (St /At-1) + β2 (∆St /At-1) + β3 (∆St-1 /At-1) + εt                 (3) 
DISEXPt /A t-1 = α0 + α1 (1/At-1) + β1 (St-1 /At-1) + εt                             (4) 
Where,  
CFOt  : current cash flow from operation 
PRODt  : production costs 
DISEXPt : discretionary expenses 
St  : current sales 
∆St  : change in current sales 
St-1  : lagged sales 
∆St-1  : change in lagged sales 
At-1  : lagged total assets 
Accordingly, each amount of managed earnings is measured as the residuals from the 
expectation model. It is important here to highlight that the data set of Roychowdhury (2006) 
is based on firms that report earnings greater or equal to zero. In other words, his data 
includes firms that are suspect of practicing real activities manipulations to avoid losses. 
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Hence, his hypotheses are constructed to solely investigate income-increasing real activities 
earnings management which in turn has lead to the use of signed residuals. 
The first hypothesis relates to managements offering price discounts or more favourable 
credit terms to accelerate sales. By doing so, the cash inflow per sale, net of discounts, is 
lower as margins decline for these additional sales. Therefore, total earnings in the current 
period increase as the additional sales are booked. The net effect would be a lower CFO for 
the current period. Thus, the first regression predicts the normal levels of CFO and deems the 
regression residuals as abnormal cash flow from operating activities. 
The second hypothesis relates to managing earnings upwards by producing goods more than 
necessary to meet expected demand. That is, managers could engage in overproduction 
activities to reduce cost of goods sold. As with higher levels of produced goods, fixed 
overhead costs spread over a large number of units. Therefore, fixed costs per unit decreases 
leading to lower cost of goods sold and higher operating margins. However, the incremental 
marginal costs incurred in producing additional goods leads to higher annual production costs 
relative to sales. Thus, the second regression estimates the normal levels of PROD and 
considers the regression residuals as abnormal production costs. 
The third hypothesis pertains to simply reducing discretionary expenses such as Research and 
Development (R&D), advertising (ADV) and, Selling, General and Administrative (SG&A) 
expenses to increase reported earnings. Therefore, the third regression estimates the normal 
levels of DISEXP and considers the regression residuals as abnormal discretionary expenses. 
The original hypotheses are not applicable to this research because no specific event is going 
to be investigated. That is, similar to discretionary accruals, the focus of this research is to 
test for the magnitude of, and general propensity to manage earnings through real activities. 
Therefore, the absolute values of abnormal cash flow from operating activities, abnormal 
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production costs and abnormal discretionary expenses are used to proxy for real activities 
earnings management. To the best of the researcher’s knowledge, absolute values of 
abnormal levels of operating activities have not been used before as proxies for real activities 
earnings management. However, there is no basis as to why firms cannot manage earnings up 
or down (i.e. as needed) through real activities manipulation. In fact, while Roychowdhury 
(2006) and Cohen and Zarowin (2010) find evidence of income-increasing real activities 
manipulation, the findings of Demers and Wang (2010) and Duong (2010) confirm that 
managers also practice real activities earnings management for income-decreasing purposes 
such as, career concerns and correcting the value of highly valued companies, respectively. 
Therefore, absolute values of abnormal levels of operating activities are used as proxies for 
real activities earnings management because the data set in this research differs from it in 
previous studies. Moreover, these absolute values are obtained by employing cross-sectional 
regressions following the original model of Roychowdhury (2006) and subsequent research 
such as Cohen and Zarowin (2010). 
 
5.4.2. Measurement of Independent Variables: 
The purpose of this subsection is to utilise the findings of previous studies in the development 
of the research hypotheses. While the previous subsection shows the measurement of the 
dependent variables, this subsection provides detailed discussion concerning the 
measurement of independent variables of the current study. Independent variables are 
classified into two categories; ownership structure variables including ownership 
concentration, managerial ownership, institutional ownership and foreign ownership, and 
external audit quality that relates to the substitutive relation between the two types of 
earnings management. 
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5.4.2.1. Ownership Structure Hypotheses: 
This research differs from the majority of previous research in terms of the expected effect of 
ownership structure mechanisms on earnings management. This is mainly due to the fact that, 
unlike accruals earnings management, real activities earnings management entails a reduction 
in a firm’s value as it has a direct effect on future cash flows. Further, even within real 
activities earnings management, the effectiveness of ownership structure mechanisms might 
differ among each operating activity. Therefore, sub-hypotheses are developed in accordance 
with each type of manipulation. 
As discussed in Chapter Four, ownership structure variables consist of managerial ownership, 
ownership concentration, institutional ownership and foreign ownership. Under the 
managerial opportunism hypothesis, ownership structure mechanisms are considered as 
monitoring corporate governance devices. The measurement of each independent variable 
pertaining to ownership structure mechanisms is discussed below. 
 
Ownership Concentration and Managerial Ownership: 
In contexts where corporate ownership structure is characterised with high concentrated 
ownership, the agency problem exists primarily between controlling and minority 
shareholders. The main concern is that dominant shareholders may expropriate the interest of 
minority shareholders for their own private advantage (Yunos et al., 2010; Dechow et al., 
2010). To portray the effect of managerial ownership, some researchers use the percentage of 
shares equity held by inside individuals (i.e. officers and directors) who can influence internal 
corporate affairs (e.g. Gabrielsen et al., 2002; Teshima and Shuto, 2008). Other researchers 
are more contended with ownership concentration as a proxy for controlling shareholders for 
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which they use the percentage of shares equity held by the largest block holder (e.g. Park and 
Shin, 2004). 
Bearing in mind that concentrated ownership does not necessarily denote inside ownership, 
the use of the largest block holder as a proxy for ownership concentration seems to examine 
the relationship between earnings management and ownership concentration without 
capturing the control (i.e. managerial) aspect of controlling shareholders. Therefore, in 
contexts such as the Jordanian, where it is difficult to obtain the percentage of insider 
ownership and the largest shareholder does not necessarily be the controlling shareholder, the 
need for a variable that captures the control aspects emerges. To that end, two inseparable 
variables are developed in this research to investigate the effect of managerial ownership on 
magnitudes of earnings management. 
Following prior research, the first variable refers to ownership concentration and is measured 
by the proportion of shares equity held by the largest shareholder and his/her relatives (e.g. 
Park and Shin, 2004; Ballesta and Meca, 2007). In terms of the second variable, the 
measurement of managerial ownership is totally reliant on the first variable. That is, through 
utilising the dummy variable approach suggested by Peasnell et al. (2005) and Landry and 
Callimaci (2003), managerial ownership takes the value of one if the largest shareholder is 
effectively in control of the firm (i.e. occupies the position of either the chairman of the board 
or chief executive officer), and zero otherwise. As such, managerial ownership becomes 
clearly distinguishable and hence, data limitations are overcome. Accordingly, the following 
hypotheses start by ownership concentration then managerial ownership, each with relation to 
both types of earnings management. 
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1. The effect of Ownership Concentration on Earnings Management in Jordan: 
Because real activities earnings management has economic consequences, the predicted 
effect of ownership concentration might differ among different types of earnings 
management. Regarding accruals earnings management, except for Landry and Callimaci 
(2003), prior research finds statistically insignificant relationship between ownership 
concentration and abnormal accruals (e.g. Park and Shin, 2004; Ballesta and Meca, 2007; Al-
Fayoumi et al., 2010). This could be due to the presence of outside block holders in the proxy 
which measures ownership concentration as the proportion of shares held by the largest block 
holders. Those studies do not distinguish between inside and outside block holders based on 
an implicit assumption that the potential impact of large outside shareholders can have the 
same impact as insiders, but only to the extent that large outsiders behave in the same ways as 
large insiders (Black, 1992). Zhong et al. (2007) posit two competing views regarding the 
effect of outside block holders on earnings management. On the one hand, because selling a 
large block of shares decreases share prices, block holders have high incentive to monitor 
managers’ behaviour which leads to mitigating accruals earnings management. One the other 
hand, block holders may create pressure on managers to engage in income-increasing 
accruals earnings management to report favourable financial performance.  
Because both views are sound, there should be a significant association between ownership 
concentration and earnings management. However, no prediction for the coefficient sign of 
ownership concentration can be made. Consequently, following prior research, the following 
sub-hypothesis of this research proposes: 
H1a: There is significant relationship between ownership concentration and abnormal 
accruals in Jordan. 
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In contrast to accruals earnings management, real activities earnings management entails a 
sacrifice in firms’ value. On this basis, block holders, who usually adopt long-term strategy, 
are expected to have strong incentive to monitor managers to maintain their wealth. However, 
this does not eliminate the possibility for the largest shareholder to exercise pressure on 
managers to manipulate sales either upwards or downwards. This case is expected to exist in 
Jordan because in such small market, large shareholders are less financially sophisticated 
than those in the US or UK. Hence, the monitoring role of largest shareholders may be driven 
primarily by maintaining their wealth regardless of the consequences of sales manipulation. 
To illustrate, if volumes of sales were low, such shareholder would put pressure on managers 
to increase sales. And if bad debt expenses were high, this large shareholder may exercise 
pressure that leads managers to decrease sales. Consequently, the following sub-hypothesis 
proposes, 
H2a: There is a positive relationship between levels of ownership concentration and 
abnormal cash flow from operations Jordan. 
Regarding the second operating activity, the only research found is that of Cheng et al. (2010) 
who find no relationship between abnormal production costs and ownership concentration. 
However, the same motivation that underlies the previous sub-hypothesis leads to the 
expectation of being ownership concentration an effective mitigating mechanism of 
production manipulation. Although inventory has an intrinsic value, large shareholders are 
expected to avoid storing goods and finished products for too long and undertake the risk of 
ending up with obsolete inventory (Roychowdhury, 2006). Thus, the largest shareholder is 
expected to prevent managements from increasing or decreasing levels of inventory without 
justification of dramatic change in those levels. Consequently, the following sub-hypothesis 
proposes, 
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H3a: There is a negative relationship between levels of ownership concentration and 
abnormal production costs in Jordan. 
Although Garven (2009) and Cheng et al. (2010) find no evidence relating ownership 
concentration to abnormal discretionary expenses, large shareholders are expected to be an 
effective corporate governance mechanism in mitigating the manipulation of discretionary 
expenses. At the long run, discretionary expenses such as R&D and advertising expenditures 
are essential for future development of industrial firms in spite of the decrease in current 
period’s income. However, it might seem more appealing to large shareholders to mitigate 
such expenditures because of a suspicion that managements might be using income-
decreasing practices to cover their channelling of wealth from the firm to their own benefits 
(Wang, 2006). Accordingly, the following sub-hypothesis states, 
H4a: There is a negative relationship between levels of ownership concentration and 
abnormal discretionary expenses in Jordan. 
 
2. The effect of Managerial Ownership on Earnings Management in Jordan: 
The focus of the above discussion does not account for the control factor of ownership 
concentration which when added to the largest shareholders, agency problem between 
controlling and minority shareholders takes place. 
Although incentives, consequences and hence interpretations of earnings management 
practices slightly differ between the effects of management ownership and controlling 
shareholders, prior research proxy for both mechanisms by the percentage of shares owned by 
insiders. However, few exceptions are found in the literature and are discussed in Chapter 
Four. Peasnell et al. (2005) and Landry and Callimaci (2003) use a dummy variable approach 
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to proxy for managerial ownership and controlling shareholders. Their approach seems the 
most relevant for the current research because shareholdings of insiders are not available in 
Amman Stock Exchange data base. Therefore, the dummy variable in this research takes the 
value of one to denote the presence of managerial ownership (i.e. controlling shareholder) 
and zero otherwise. In other words, if the largest shareholder occupies the position of either 
chairman of the board or chief executive officer, s/he will be considered as the controlling 
shareholder. 
The literature refers to two competing theories concerning the effect of managerial ownership 
on managers’ incentives: the incentive alignment effect and the entrenchment effect (Dechow 
et al., 2010). In terms of accruals earnings management, evidence from research pertaining to 
the effect of managerial ownership on earnings management in developed economies is 
inconclusive. Warfield et al. (1995), Agrawal and Knoeber (1996), Donnelly and Lynch 
(2002) and Wang (2006) report a negative relationship between managerial ownership and 
discretionary accruals supporting of incentive alignment. Other research including Behn et al. 
(2002) and Peasnell et al. (2005) find a positive relationship suggestive of the entrenchment 
effect However, Gabrielsen et al. (2002) and Bowen et al. (2008) find no significant 
relationship. 
In contexts other than the US market and occasionally the UK market, a nonlinear 
relationship between managerial ownership (and controlling shareholders) and earnings 
management seems to be the dominant trend. This nonlinear relationship is documented in 
the UK by Bos et al. (2011), in Japan by Teshima and Shuto (2008), in Singapore by Yeo et 
al. (2002) and in Spain by Ballesta and Meca (2007). Nevertheless, the limited data in Jordan 
that imposes the use of a dummy variable for managerial ownership prevents the inspection 
of possible nonlinearities. 
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Cohen et al. (2008) find evidence suggestive of a mitigating effect of managerial ownership 
on abnormal cash flow from operating activities and abnormal production costs. Similar 
evidence concerning abnormal production costs is revealed in Demers and Wang (2010). 
Apparently, evidence found on the relationship between real activity earnings management 
and managerial ownership focuses mainly on discretionary expenses. Similar to accruals 
earnings management, the evidence is inconclusive as well. While Garven (2009) provides 
evidence that managerial ownership is positively related to discretionary expenses which is in 
favour of the incentive alignment effect, Rebai (2011) documents an opposite relationship 
suggestive of the entrenchment effect. However, Behn et al. (2002) and Demers and Wang 
(2010) find no significant relationship between R&D expenditures and levels of managerial 
ownership. 
Due to the inconclusiveness of evidence and data limitation, the predicted relationship 
between the controlling shareholder (i.e. managerial ownership) and earnings management in 
Jordan will be drawn from the theoretical perspective of the agency theory and the from 
empirical evidence that support the incentive alignment effect. Therefore, the following sub-
hypotheses posit, 
H1b: There is a negative relationship between managerial ownership and abnormal accruals 
in Jordan. 
H2b: There is a negative relationship between managerial ownership and abnormal cash 
flow from operations in Jordan. 
H3b: There is a negative relationship between managerial ownership and abnormal 
production costs in Jordan. 
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H4b: There is a negative relationship between managerial ownership and abnormal 
discretionary expenses in Jordan. 
 
Institutional Ownership: 
Institutional investors are often regarded as sophisticated investors who have the resources, 
power and incentives to acquire and process information better than individual investors 
(Bartov et al., 2000). Such characteristics promote institutional investors’ ability to monitor 
abuse of accounting discretion and influence managerial decisions (Bowen et al., 2008). 
Although some researchers find that transient institutional investors exert pressure of 
managers to deliver higher earnings even through the abuse of accounting discretion (e.g. 
Bushee, 1998; Koh, 2003), Ronen and Yaari (2008) report that the majority of empirical 
evidence supports the view that aggregate institutional investors perform effectively in 
deterring accruals earnings management.  
A negative relationship between levels of institutional ownership and levels of discretionary 
accruals has been documented by several researchers including, Rajgopal et al. (1999), 
Cornett et al. (2008), Chung et al. (2002), Charitou et al. (2007) and Yu (2008). This finding 
bears out the view that institutional investors serve as an effective corporate governance 
mechanism. However, the results of Al-Fayoumi et al. (2010) reveal no relationship between 
levels of institutional ownership and discretionary accruals in Jordan. Because this research 
differs from Al-Fayoumi et al.’s (2010) in terms of the period of study and discretionary 
accruals estimation model, it is expected to find negative relationship between discretionary 
accruals and institutional investors in Jordan. Bearing in mind that institutional investors are 
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defined as the percentage of shares owned by institutions, the following sub-hypothesis 
states, 
H1c: There is a negative relationship between institutional ownership and abnormal accruals 
in Jordan. 
The evidence on the relationship between real activities earnings management and 
institutional investors is modest and somewhat mixed. While Li (2010) documents that 
institutional investors pressure managers to meet their desired earnings even through sales 
manipulation (which is reflected in abnormal cash flow from operations), Roychowdhury 
(2006) reports no significant relationship exists. In terms of abnormal production costs, Li 
(2010) also documents the same myopic behaviour by institutional investors, whereas 
Roychowdhury (2006) provides evidence consistent with being institutional investors an 
effective corporate governance monitoring mechanism. The only resemblance exists in the 
results concerning the association between abnormal discretionary expenses and institutional 
investors. That is, the findings of Bushee (1998), Roychowdhury (2006) and Rebai (2011) are 
in favour of effectiveness of institutional investors in preventing earnings manipulations 
through discretionary expenses. 
Unlike Roychowdhury (2006) who mainly examines suspect firms, Li (2010) finds that 
institutional investors in all sample firms are short-term oriented. Accordingly, the following 
two sub-hypotheses posit, 
H2c: There is a positive relationship between institutional ownership and abnormal cash 
flow from operations in Jordan. 
H3c: There is a positive relationship between institutional ownership and abnormal 
production costs in Jordan. 
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However, the evidence concerning abnormal discretionary accruals seems consistent as the 
results of Bushee (1998) and Roychowdhury (2006) portray institutional investors as an 
effective corporate governance mechanism. Therefore, the following sub-hypothesis 
proposes, 
H4c: There is a negative relationship between institutional ownership and abnormal 
discretionary expenses in Jordan. 
 
Foreign Ownership: 
Theoretically, on the one hand, a number of researchers argue in favour of being ownership 
by foreign investors an effective corporate structure mechanism that complements other 
structure mechanism in deterring earnings management (e.g. Dahlquist and Robertson, 2001; 
Aggarwal et al., 2005; Li, 2005). On the other hand, other researchers propose that managers 
are tempted to manage earnings in order to raise capital or meet regulatory benchmark (e.g. 
Chen and Yuan, 2004; Haw et al., 2005). Due to the lack of empirical evidence concerning 
the subject matter, none of these views are conclusively supported. For instance, both Sarkar 
et al. (2006) and Ali et al. (2008) found no significant association between earnings 
management and foreign ownership. Only Aharony et al. (2000) document a positive and 
significant relationship around Chinese state-owned enterprises’ IPO. However, even if 
foreign investors were not able to see through the earnings figure and price the shares fairly, 
the results do not show whether foreign investors were active in constraining earnings 
management after acquiring the voting rights or not. 
Because the findings of abovementioned studies provide limited indications, both views are 
still sound and there should be a significant association between foreign ownership and 
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earnings management. However, no prediction for the coefficient sign of foreign investors 
can be made. Accordingly, the following sub-hypotheses propose, 
H1d: There is a significant relationship between foreign ownership and abnormal accruals in 
Jordan. 
H2d: There is a significant relationship between foreign ownership and abnormal cash flow 
from operations in Jordan. 
H3d: There is a significant relationship between foreign ownership and abnormal production 
costs in Jordan. 
H4d: There is a significant relationship between foreign ownership and abnormal 
discretionary expenses in Jordan. 
 
5.4.2.2. External Audit Hypotheses: 
As noted in Chapter Four, the effect of audit quality on earnings management is twofold; the 
effect on accruals earnings management and the effect on real activities earnings management 
and correspondingly, two main hypotheses emerge. In both hypotheses, auditor size is used to 
proxy for audit quality in Jordan although the literature offers other prominent proxies 
including auditor industry expertise, auditor litigation, audit tenure and audit fee.  
There are two main reasons for this choice. First, the validity of the use of auditor size to 
proxy for audit quality has been proven by prior research (e.g. Becker et al., 1998; Francis et 
al., 1999). However, the classification of Faraj (2005) and Balhaj (2006) of the big 5 auditors 
in Jordan is followed instead the international big 4 audit firms. This is due to the extremely 
145 
 
small market share that PricewaterhouseCoopers and KPMG occupy in Jordan (i.e. they have 
one client each in the manufacturing sector during the period of study of this research). 
Second, the Jordanian data setting limits the use of audit quality proxy except for auditor size. 
That is, as for auditor industry expertise, the number of observations per industry can be quite 
small in Jordan which does not allow for variance measurement. In terms of audit tenure, 
Jordanian companies rarely change their auditors which also does not allow for variance 
measurement. Finally, data concerning auditor litigation and audit fee are not available on 
ASE database. 
Accordingly, regarding the first hypothesis, there is strong evidence about big audit firms 
providing higher audit quality than non-big audit firms (e.g. Becker et al., 1998; Francis et 
al., 1999; Heninger, 2001, Johnson et al., 2002; Krishnan, 2003; Balsam et al., 2003; Gul et 
al., 2003; Hsieh and Tsai, 2004). The findings of these studies provide confirmatory evidence 
supportive of big audit firms constraining discretionary accruals more than non-big audit 
firms. In other words, the results reveal that clients of big auditors report lower levels of 
discretionary accruals than those of non-big auditors. Hence, following previous research, the 
following sub-hypothesis states, 
H1e: There is a negative relationship between abnormal accruals and the biggest 5 audit 
firms in Jordan.  
The second sub-hypothesis relates to the effect of auditor size on the substitutive relation 
between accruals and real activities earnings management. Typically, real earnings 
manipulation is beyond auditors’ responsibility (Graham et al., 2005). However, researchers 
such as Cohen et al. (2008) and Gunny (2010) argue that although the enhanced scrutiny by 
external auditors may results in a reduction of accruals earnings management, it could also 
tempt managers to substitute such reduction with  an increase in real activities manipulation. 
146 
 
Up to date, the literature offers little yet informative empirical evidence about this issue. For 
example, Cohen and Zarowin (2010) document a significant positive relationship between big 
8 auditors and aggregate real earnings management which indicates that clients of big 8 
auditors resort to real earnings manipulation as a result of an enhanced scrutiny over 
discretionary accruals. Similar evidence concerning abnormal production costs is found by 
Zang (2007). However, no statistically significant relationship between big 4 and abnormal 
discretionary expenses is found by Zang (2007) and Garven (2009). Accordingly, the 
following sub-hypotheses propose, 
H2e: There is a positive relationship between abnormal cash flow from operation and the 
biggest 5 audit firms in Jordan.  
H3e: There is a positive relationship between abnormal production costs and the biggest 5 
audit firms in Jordan.  
H4e: There is no relationship between abnormal discretionary expenses and the biggest 5 
audit firms in Jordan. 
 
5.4.2.3. Control Variables: 
Although the primary focus of this research is to examine how ownership structures and 
external audit affects earnings management, other firm characteristics can also affect the 
quality of financial reports. That is, firm characteristics including board size, firm size, firm 
growth and firm leverage can potentially drive differences in the quality of financial reports. 
Therefore, four variables that control for those firm characteristics are included in this 
research to distinguish their effects on earnings management. Below is a review of the 
literature on the effect and measurement of each control variable. 
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- Firm Size 
Almost all studies conducted on earnings management control for firm size. Johnson et al. 
(2002) posit that the sophistication of the financial reporting system is likely to differ with the 
size of the company as larger firms are more mature and diversified than smaller firms. 
Bushmen et al. (2003) highlight the importance of firm size in corporate ownership structure. 
They suggest that the information asymmetry between managers and shareholders being 
higher in large firms than it in small firms due to the complexity and dispersed ownership 
structure of larger firms. As such, they argue that the demand for systematic corporate 
governance is expected to be higher in large-sized firms relative to small-sized firms. 
However, the effect of firm size is somewhat controversial. On the one hand, Dechow and 
Dichev (2002) find a positive relation between accruals quality and firm size. This indicates 
that large firms report more stable accruals that are likely to be realised in the future (i.e. less 
discretionary accruals). Lee and Choi (2002) find consistent evidence with smaller firms have 
higher tendency to manage earnings to avoid reporting losses than larger firms. On the other 
hand, Lobo and Zhou (2006) argue that larger firms may have more opportunities to manage 
their earnings than smaller firms due to the difficulty for external users to detect earnings 
management practices in such complex financial reporting systems. Consistent with this 
view, Moses (1987) documents larger firms smoothing earnings more than larger firms. 
Similar evidence is reported by Michaelson et al. (1995). 
Because of the importance of firm size and the likelihood of it affecting ownership structure 
mechanism and earnings management, this study include firm size as a control variable. 
Following prior studies, firm size is measured as the natural logarithm of total assets (e.g. 
Becker et al., 1998; Myers et al., 2003, Ashbaugh et al., 2003; Nagy, 2005; Abbott et al., 
2006). Nevertheless, no prediction is made concerning the direction of the association 
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between firm size and earnings management because of the conflicting arguments on the 
subject matter. 
 
- Firm Growth 
The findings of several studies contend that managers engage in earnings management 
practices to avoid negative growth trends (e.g. Bartov, 1993; Wild, 1996). The results of 
Nagar (2002) confirm that managers avoid negative growth trends because their bonuses are 
usually conditional on achieving certain performance targets. However, Abdul Rahman and 
Ali (2006) and Bowen et al. (2008) suggest otherwise. Their results reveal that growth rates 
are negatively related to discretionary accruals. Further, Gunny (2010) finds firms with high 
growth rates are less inclined to manipulate earnings through real activities earnings 
management. Accordingly, the sign on the variable of firm growth is left unpredicted. 
Following prior research, firm growth is measured as the change in total assets scaled by 
lagged total assets (e.g. Beatty et al., 2002; Johnson et al., 2002; Nagy, 2005, Yu, 2008; 
McNichols and Stubben, 2008). 
 
- Firm Leverage 
Bartov (1993) and DeFond and Park (1994) find a positive relation between levels of firm 
leverage and earnings management. They report that firms in financial distress or near debt 
covenant violation may be more motivated to engage in earnings management practices.  
In contrast, Becker et al. (1998) and Balsam et al. (2005) report a negative association 
between levels of firm leverage and earnings management. This indicates that firms do not 
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wish to manipulate their earnings because of financial lenders awareness of the information 
content of accruals. 
Hence, no prediction is made concerning the coefficient on this control variable. Following 
prior studies, firm leverage is measured as total liabilities scaled by total assets (e.g. Balsam 
et al, 2003; Nagy, 2005; Carey and Simnett, 2006; Abbott et al., 2006; Cohen and Zarowin, 
2010). 
 
- Board Size 
Unlike the other three control variables, board size can be considered as board of directors-
specific control variable (Carcello and Nagy 2004). The number of board members should be 
appropriately determined to ensure that there are enough members to monitor managements’ 
actions and discharge responsibilities.  
Peasnell et al. (2005) find a negative relationship between board size and discretionary 
accruals, which they interpret as board size serving as a measure of board effectiveness. Xie 
et al. (2003) report similar evidence that they favour to interpret as larger boards bring greater 
number of experienced directors who seem to play a role in mitigating discretionary accruals. 
Klein (2002b) argues that larger boards allows for more independent directors sitting in audit 
committees which improves monitoring and consequently, less discretionary accrual. Her 
results confirm this argument. 
Yet the literature offers conclusions that contradict the findings of the aforementioned. 
Beasley (1996) documents a positive association between board size and earnings 
management. Similarly, Abdul Rahman and Ali (2006) conclude that the larger the board 
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size, the less effective it becomes in monitoring because levels of discretionary accruals 
increase with larger boards.  
In sum, while too many members of directors can lead to ineffective monitoring due to 
conflicting views and difficulty of coordination, too few members of directors results in 
fewer number of experienced and/or independent directors, and imposes the difficulty of 
distributing committee work and thus, less effective monitoring. Accordingly, no directional 
expectation between board size and earnings management is offered in this study. Moreover, 
based on previous research, board size in this study is measured as total number of directors 
on the board (Xie et al., 2003; Carcello and Nagy, 2004; Peasnell et al., 2005; Abdul Rahman 
and Ali, 2006; Garven, 2009). 
 
5.5. Research Empirical Models: 
Two models are applied in the current research to test the research hypotheses. The first 
model measures the effect of ownership structure mechanisms and auditor size on mitigating 
accruals-based earnings management
21
. The second model examines the mitigating effect of 
ownership structure mechanisms, and the substitutive effect of auditor size, on real activities-
based earnings management. Yet unlike the first mode, the second model entails the use of 
separate three regressions. That is, the effect of ownership structure mechanisms is measured 
on each of, abnormal levels of cash flow from operating activities, production costs and 
discretionary expenses. External audit is also included in this model to investigate the trade-
off between accruals and real activity earnings management following Cohen and Zarowin 
                                                 
21  It is found that the addition of external auditor variable makes no difference concerning the significance and 
the signs of ownership structure variables. However, the addition of external audit improves the goodness of fit 
of the model and hence, this model includes the auditor variable in the chapter of data analysis. 
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(2010). That is, managers who are prevented from managing accruals by external auditors 
might wish to arrive at target level of earnings through manipulating real activities that is 
beyond the scrutiny of external auditor. Therefore, the empirical models of research can be 
symbolically presented as follows, 
The first model: 
ABACi = α + β1 CONC + β2 CNRTL + β3 INST + β4 FRGN + β5 BIG5 + β6 BRDS + β7 SIZE
 + β8 GRWTH + β9 LEV + β10-12 YR         (5) 
The second model: 
ABCFO = α + β1 CONC + β2 CNTL + β3 INST + β4 FRGN + β5 BIG5 + β6 BRDS + β7 SIZE
 + β8 GRWTH + β9 LEV + β10-12 YR         (6) 
ABPRD = α + β1 CONC + β2 CNTRL + β3 INST + β4 FRGN + β5 BIG5 + β6 BRDS  
 + β7 SIZE + β8 GRWTH + β9 LEV + β10-12 YR      (7) 
ABDISX = α + β1 CONC + β2 CNTRL + β3 INST + β4 FRGN + β5 BIG5 + β6 BRDS  
 + β7 SIZE + β8 GRWTH + β9 LEV + β10-12 YR      (8) 
Where, 
ABAC : absolute value of discretionary accruals estimated using the Kothari et al. 
(2005) model. 
ABCFO : absolute value of abnormal cash flow from operating activities estimated 
using the Roychowdhury (2006) model. 
ABPRD : absolute value of abnormal production costs estimated using the 
Roychowdhury (2006) model. 
ABDISX : absolute value of abnormal discretionary expenses estimated using the 
Roychowdhury (2006) model. 
CONC : ownership concentration equals the proportion of common shares held by the 
largest shareholder and his/her relatives. 
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CNTRL : a dummy variable that take the value of 1 if the largest shareholder and 
his/her relatives are in control of the firm, and 0 otherwise. 
INST : institutional ownership equals the proportion of common shares held by the 
institutions. 
FRGN : foreign ownership equals the proportion of common shares held by the 
foreign investors. 
BIG5 : a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm is being audited by one 
of the big-5 auditors in Jordan, and 0 otherwise. 
BRDS  : board size equals total number of directors on the board. 
SIZE  : natural logarithm of total assets. 
GRWTH : growth rate equals the change in total assets scaled by lagged total assets. 
LEV  : leverage equals total liabilities scaled by total assets. 
YR  : three dummy variables based on the study period which cover four years. 
 
5.6. Population Selection and Data Collection Method: 
Secondary data are used for the estimation of earnings management proxies and to test the 
research hypotheses. To this end, this section demonstrates population selection procedures 
and the method used to process and collect secondary data.  
 
5.6.1. Population Selection: 
The data set of the current study comprises manufacturing firms listed on Amman Stock 
exchange (ASE) for four consecutive years of reporting periods from 2005 to 2008. The 
study period is restricted to those four years in particular due to the layout of data in ASE 
data base. The data base comprises excel sheets, one for each listed firm, that contain all 
financial information from the date on which the ASE data base has been established. In 
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2005, however, the layout of balance sheet, income statement and statement of cash flow 
items has been improved (i.e. slightly changed) by the administrators of ASE. This has 
resulted in the production of new separate excel sheets starting from 2005. Accordingly, the 
period study starts from the year 2005 to avoid mistakes that might arise from  collecting and 
matching  financial data from two excel sheets with different layouts. Moreover, starting 
from the year 2005 makes this study viable since the effort and time are utilised in manually 
collecting non-financial data. At the other end of the period study, the year 2008 is chosen 
because the new sheets did not include the financial information concerning the year 2009 
until November, 2010. Besides, the non-financial data for the year 2009 are still unavailable.  
The manufacturing sector is chosen for several reasons. First, the International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS) offer more flexibility to managements of manufacturing firms to 
choose among a number of treatment alternatives for the same accounting transaction (e.g. 
several measurement options). Second, manufacturing firms have several different accounts 
compared to service and financial firms, which in turn reduces the comparability between 
companies. Third, the manufacturing sector in Jordan is considered as a cornerstone for the 
local economy.  
Two initial populations are drawn from the manufacturing sector corresponding to the two 
types of earnings management. To avoid survivorship bias, newly listed and delisted firms 
are included in the years they have gone public and off the market, respectively. 
 
154 
 
A slight difference in the number of included firms arises due to data requirements of the type 
of earnings management
22
. Afterwards, (21) firms are excluded from each population in each 
year as follows, (14) firms that belong to mining industry and (7) firms with missing values. 
Table 5.1 summarises the selection procedures of the final populations sizes. 
Table 5.1. Selection Procedures and Sizes of Final Populations 
Description 2008 2007 2006 2005 Pooled 
Initial populations for:      
The first model 75 72 72 71 290 
The second model 72 72 67 69 280 
Excluded firms from all 
populations 
(21) (21) (21) (21) (84) 
Preliminary populations for:      
The first model 54 51 51 50 206 
The second model 51 51 46 48 196 
Outliers:      
The first model      
Accruals 2 4 2 1 9 
The second model      
CFO 3 3 6 7 19 
PROD 2 1 1 1 5 
DISEXP 6 5 3 3 17 
Final populations for:      
The first model      
Accruals 51 49 50 50 197 
The second model      
CFO 48 48 40 41 177 
PROD 49 50 45 47 191 
DISEXP 45 46 43 45 179 
 
 
                                                 
22 That is, while accruals model (i.e. the first sample) requires financial data from one previous period, real 
activities models (i.e. the second and third samples) require financial data from two previous periods. This in 
turn reduces the number of firms in the second and third samples due to newly listed companies. In details, two 
firms have gone public in 2004 and hence have been included only in the first sample of the year 2005. 
Although these two firms have been excluded from the other two samples in 2005 (obviously because they did 
not have sufficient data for the calculation of the “change in lagged sales”), they have qualified for inclusion in 
the second and third samples in 2006. Moreover, five firms have gone public and four firms have been delisted 
in 2005. As a net effect in year 2006, the first sample shows an increase by one firm (i.e. 5 – 4), yet the second 
and third samples show a decrease only by two firms because of the other two firms that have gone public in 
2004 (i.e. 4 – 2). With no change in 2006 the five firms that have gone public in 2005 appear in the second and 
third samples of the year 2007. Finally, three firms have been listed in 2007 and hence they appear as an 
increase only in the first samples of 2008.  
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5.6.2. Data Collection Method: 
As mentioned earlier, the present study investigates the phenomenon of earnings management 
and its deterrence mechanisms in Jordan. Therefore, secondary data of manufacturing listed 
firms are manually collected from annual reports that are publically available in ASE data 
base. The period study covers four consecutive reporting periods from 2005 to 2008. 
ASE produces two files for each listed company. The first file (i.e. excel sheet) contains 
financial data including balance sheets, income statements, statements of cash flow and few 
financial ratios. Therefore, financial data for dependent variables and three control variables 
are manually processed then collected from the excel sheets. 
The second file (i.e. PDF) contains non-financial data that are limited to, 
- Percentages of shareholdings held by each category of investors (e.g. individuals, 
institutions and foreign investors). 
- The names of directors, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer (CEO),  
- The names and percentages of block-holders who own 5% or more of firm’s equity 
share capital, and  
- The names of external auditors. 
Therefore, non-financial data for the variables of ownership structure, external auditor and 
the remaining control variable (i.e. board size) are manually processed then collected from 
the PDF files. 
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5.7. Statistical Analysis of Data: 
5.7.1. Type of Data: 
According to Gujarati (2003), there are three types of data that may be available for empirical 
analysis: time series, cross-section and pooled. Time series data is a set of observations on the 
values that a variable takes at different times. Cross-section data are data on one or more 
variables collated at the same point in time. So far, it is clear that while time is the main focus 
of time series data, time differences is completely ignored in cross-sectional data. The third 
type of data (i.e. pooled), data include elements of both time series and cross-section data. 
As previously mentioned, the data set of this study comprises manufacturing companies listed 
on Amman Stock Exchange over four successive years from 2005 to 2008. This indicates that 
the data set in this research have both time series and cross-sectional dimensions. To analyse 
the data, pooled cross-sectional data analysis is conducted to reflect different distributions on 
different time periods (Wooldridge, 2003).  
 
5.7.2. Descriptive Statistics: 
Before testing the research hypotheses through inferential statistics, descriptive statistics of 
the data set is presented in terms of central tendency and dispersion. That is, the analysis 
describes the mean, median and standard deviation of each variable. 
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5.7.3. Inferential Statistics: 
This sub-section is concerned with hypotheses testing regarding the relationship between 
earnings management proxies and independent variables using both univariate and multiple 
regression statistical analyses. 
 
5.7.3.1. Univariate Analysis: 
In general, methods of statistical analysis are classified into two categories: parametric and 
non-parametric tests. The nature and distribution of data are the main characteristics based on 
which the statistical method can be determined. Parametric tests are considered more 
powerful than non-parametric tests when the assumptions of parametric analysis are satisfied. 
However, non-parametric tests offer alternative statistical techniques to parametric tests 
should the assumptions underlying the latter be violated. That is, non-parametric tests make 
fewer assumptions about the data such as data distribution and level of data measurement. As 
per section (5.5) above, there are four continuous dependent variables, and seven (two) 
continuous (dichotomous) independent variables in this study. Accordingly, both parametric 
and non-parametric tests are conducted in this research to measure the relationship between 
continuous dependent and independent variables, and only non-parametric tests are 
conducted to measure the relationship between continuous dependent variables and 
dichotomous independent variables. The rationale for using both parametric and non-
parametric tests is demonstrated in the discussion below which is based on two criteria; data 
distribution (i.e. normality) and level of data measurement (measurement scale) as follows, 
1- Normality: according to this assumption, data must be drawn from normally 
distributed population. Although the population distribution is not accessible (Field, 
2009), Central Limit Theorem (CLT) offers justification for the assumption of 
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normally distributed samples. That is, “If there is a large number of independent and 
identically distributed random variables, then, with few exceptions, the distribution of 
their sum tends to be a normal distribution” (Gujarati and Porter, 2010, p.63). Due to 
the fact that the continuous dependent variables are taken in absolute terms (i.e. the 
earnings management proxies of ABAC, ABCFO, ABPROD and ABDISX), the 
effect of normal fluctuations is expected to be reduced in all of the four variables. 
Therefore, Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) test of normality is performed for all of the 
dependent variables. 
2- Interval Data: this assumption signifies that variables must be measured at least at an 
interval scale. The implication of this assumption entails the use of Point-Biserial 
Correlations (i.e. non-parametric test) in examining the relationship between earnings 
management proxies and two dichotomous independent variables (Field, 2009). Since 
the remaining independent variables are continuous variables, both Pearson 
Correlation (i.e. parametric test) and Kendall’s tau (i.e. non-parametric test) are 
conducted to examine the relationship between earnings management proxies and the 
remaining continuous variables. 
Finally, Pearson Correlation (i.e. parametric test), Kendall’s tau and Point-Biserial 
Correlations (i.e. non-parametric tests) are performed using SPSS 17.0. 
 
5.7.3.2. Multiple Regression Analysis: 
A pooled cross-sectional regression is estimated to account for different distributions on 
different time periods. The estimation process is much like a standard cross-sectional 
regression. Pooled regression estimation differs only in terms of the inclusion of dummy 
variables for all time periods, except for one period to avoid perfect collinearity (Brooks, 
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2008). Examples of studies that used pooled-cross sectional regressions in the field of 
earnings management include, Warfield et al. (1995), Guay et al. (1996), Becker et al. (1998), 
Kasnik (1999), Young (1999), Yeo et al. (2002), Hribar and Nichols (2007), Osma (2008), 
Cohen and Zarowin (2010) and Dechow et al. (2010). 
To test the research hypotheses, Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) method is used to estimate the 
empirical models. However, certain assumptions must be met in order to make valid 
statistical inferences: normally distributed errors (i.e. normality), linearity, homoscedasticity, 
no autocorrelation, and no multicollinearity (Gujarati, 2003).  
Yet before conducting a diagnosis for the empirical models, initial multiple regressions are 
carried out to identify outliers. According to Gujarati (2003, p.390), an outlier “is an 
observation that is much different (either very small or very large) in relation to the 
observations in the sample”. By definition, an outlier has a large residual in comparison with 
other residuals. As such, outliers can bias the model because they affect the values of the 
estimated regression coefficients. Moreover, outliers impose difficulties in satisfying the 
assumptions of normality, linearity and homoscedasticity. To detect an outlier, Field (2009) 
suggests that a case of standardised or studentised absolute residuals greater than 2 is a cause 
for concern and hence, excluded from the data. 
After the exclusion of outliers, the empirical models are conducted to check whether these 
models satisfy the assumptions underlying the method of ordinary least squares. Below is a 
discussion of each assumption, how to detect a violation in an assumption, and what 
remedies, if any, are applicable. 
1- Normally distributed errors (Normality): the residuals in the model are random and 
normally distributed with a zero mean. Put simply, the differences between the model 
and the observed data are zero or very close to zero (Fields, 2009). To check this 
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assumption, Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) test of normality is performed. The 
assumption is satisfied if the null hypothesis of normal distribution is not rejected. 
2- Linearity: this assumption necessitates that the regression model is correctly specified. 
The relationship should be linear and there is no specification bias or specification 
error (Field, 2009; Gujarati and Porter, 2010). As mentioned in Chapter Three, tests 
for earnings management can be fashioned in a linear framework around partitioning 
variable(s) (Dechow et al., 1995). To detect model misspecifications such as omitting 
relevant variable or the appropriateness of using a linear functional form, Regression 
Error Specification Test (RESET) is used. The assumption is satisfied if the null 
hypothesis of linearity is not rejected (Brooks, 2008). 
3- Homoscedasticity: this assumption states that the variance of each residual should be 
constant.  Otherwise, there would be what is called heteroscedasticity or unequal 
variance (Brooks, 2008). Gujarati and Porter (2010, p.281) state “In the presence of 
heteroscedasticity, the usual hypothesis-testing routine is not reliable, raising the 
possibility of drawing misleading conclusions”. This is because heteroscedasticity 
bias the variances of OLS estimators and consequently, the estimators are no longer 
efficient. White’s General Heteroscedasticity test is used to test the null hypothesis of 
homoscedasticity. Should it be rejected, White’s estimators will be used to correct for 
heteroscedasticity. 
4- No Autocorrelation: the residual terms should be uncorrelated (i.e. independent) for 
any two observations. This simply means that no systematic effect among residual 
should exist because otherwise, the dependent variable may depend not only on the 
predictors but also on other residuals terms such as lagged residuals in time series 
analysis. Durbin-Watson test can be used to test for autocorrelation (i.e. serial 
correlation). Gujarati (2003) and Field (2009) suggest the value of 2 as an indicator 
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for the absence of first-order autocorrelation. Field (2009) adds, values less than 1 and 
greater than 3 are cause for concern.  
5- No Multicollinearity: there are no perfect linear relationships between explanatory 
variables. Put differently, explanatory variables should not correlate too highly 
because if so, the estimated parameter become untrustworthy and the predictors 
become less important (Field, 2009). Therefore, it is important to identify whether 
high collinearity exists among predictors. One way to do so is to scan a correlation 
matrix of all explanatory variables and whether they highly correlate. As a rule of a 
thumb, Brooks (2008) and Field (2009) state that correlation above 0.8 is a cause for 
concern. To that end, correlation matrix is constructed on the basis of both Pearson 
and Kendall’s tau Correlation Coefficients. Another way to diagnose multicollinearity 
is the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF). Statisticians suggest that a value of VIF greater 
than 10 signifies the existence of multicollinearity in the model (Myers, 1990, Field, 
2009). 
Finally, SPSS is also is used to perform Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) test of normality for 
standardised residuals, Durbin-Watson test of autocorrelation, correlation matrices and 
variance inflation factor, and because the remaining tests are not available in SPSS, EViews 
6.0 statistical software package is used instead to perform RESET test of linearity and 
White’s test of heteroscedasticity which if existed, White’s heteroscedasticity-consistent 
estimator is performed. 
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5.8. Summary: 
The methodology and research design tend to be highly structured within the post-positivist 
paradigm (Patton, 2000). Consistent with this view, this chapter is constructed to accurately 
demonstrate the process of variables measurement, hypotheses development, empirical 
models construction, population selection procedures and the preparation for the statistical 
analysis of data. 
In brief, this research employs data of manufacturing firms listed on Amman Stock Exchange 
to investigate the relationship between earnings management and corporate governance 
mechanisms. This chapter describes the measurement of four proxies for earnings 
management (i.e. abnormal accruals, abnormal cash flow from operating activities, abnormal 
production costs and abnormal discretionary expenses). Afterwards, hypotheses are 
developed based on the predicted relationship between each type of earnings manipulation 
and five of corporate governance deterrence mechanisms (i.e. ownership concentration, 
managerial ownership, institutional ownership and foreign ownership). Accordingly, four 
empirical models are developed to examine these relationships and the appropriate statistical 
analysis techniques are introduced. 
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Chapter Six 
Data Analysis and Results 
 
6.1. Introduction: 
The purpose of this chapter is to test the research hypotheses concerning the effect of 
ownership structure and external audit corporate governance mechanisms through performing 
statistical tests on a population of manufacturing firms listed on Amman Stock Exchange 
(ASE). Due to the fact that managers may use several methods to manipulate earnings, four 
proxies for earnings management are measured separately so that each proxy becomes a 
dependent variable following previous research. As a result, the statistical analysis in this 
chapter comprises four empirical models corresponding to each dependent variable, which 
are: abnormal accruals model, abnormal cash flow from operating activities model, abnormal 
production costs model, and abnormal discretionary expenses model.  
Two analyses are conducted based on the measurement of earnings management proxies. 
While earnings management proxies are considered in absolute terms in the main analysis, 
theses proxies are considered with their actual signs. Within each analysis, descriptive 
statistics are discussed and univariate analyses are conducted and discussed. Afterwards, 
multiple regression analyses are conducted to test the research hypotheses. The results 
obtained are then presented and interpretations are drawn. Finally, theoretical and practical 
implications for the association between earnings management practices and ownership 
structure and external audit mechanisms are demonstrated. 
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6.2. Main Analysis: 
6.2.1. Measurement of Earnings Management Proxies: 
The current research differentiates between methods of earnings management. Each type of 
earnings manipulation is measured separately using models discussed in Chapter Three – The 
Kothari et al. (2005) for abnormal accruals calculation, and The Roychowdhury (2006) for 
the calculation of abnormal cash flow from operating activities model, abnormal production 
costs model, and abnormal discretionary expenses model. These models predict normal 
earnings which are then subtracted from actual reported earnings to find out the amounts of 
managed earnings (i.e. residuals). Afterwards, absolute values of residuals are computed to 
obtain absolute values of earnings management proxies. 
Chapter Five shows that, in this research, models’ parameters are estimated on a cross-
sectional basis, which means that those parameters are industry and year specific. However, 
the Jordanian data impose a limitation that prevents the estimation of residuals on industry 
basis. That is, ASE classifies listed manufacturing firms into twelve industries. Within which, 
there are too few companies in more than six industries (sometimes 2, 3 or 5 companies). 
Apparently, this does not satisfy the regression estimation requirement of a minimum of 10 
observations each. Hence, models’ parameters are estimated only on a year-by-year basis23. 
Table 6.1 presents descriptive statistics obtained from sixteen regressions for the estimated 
coefficients, adjusted R
2
, P-values and regression employed for each earnings management 
proxy over the period 2005 and 2008. 
                                                 
23 I have consulted with Professor M. McNichols, Stanford University, about the year-by-year coefficient 
estimation approach. She said that this approach is “very reasonable”.  
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Table 6.1. The Estimated Coefficients of Earnings Management Models 
Parameter 
Abnormal Accruals Abnormal Cash Flow from 
Operating Activities 
Abnormal Production Costs  Abnormal Discretionary 
Expenses  
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
α -0.021 -0.019 0.011 0.017 -0.040 -0.019 0.038 0.034 
β1 0.016 0.000 -0.097 -0.115 0.022 0.038 0.093 0.094 
β2 0.151 0.106 0.052 0.069 0.939 0.912 0.031 0.036 
β3 0.034 0.000 -0.170 -0.174 -0.110 -0.107 - - 
β4 0.427 0.416 - - 0.017 0.009 - - 
Mean Adj. 
R
2
 
16.2% 11.5% 87.1% 12.8% 
Mean P-
value 
0.045 0.043 0.000 0.038 
The Kothari et al. Model (2005)  
TAt /At-1 = α + β1 [1/Ait-1] + β2 [(ΔREVt – ∆RECt)/At-1] + β3 [PPEt/At-1] + β4 ROAt-1 + εit  
Where, TA = total accruals; A = lagged total assets; ΔREV = change in revenues; PPE = net property, plant, and equipment; ε = error term; t = year index for the years included 
in the estimation period. 
The Roychowdhury Model (2006) 
CFOt /A t-1 = α + β1 (1/At-1) + β2 (St /At-1) + β3 (∆St /At-1) + εt 
PRODt /A t-1 = α + β1 (1/At-1) + β2 (St /At-1) + β3 (∆St /At-1) + β4 (∆St-1 /At-1) + εt 
DISXt /A t-1 = α + β1 (1/At-1) + β2 (St-1 /At-1) + εt       
Where, CFOt = current cash flow from operation; PROD = current production costs; DISX = current discretionary expenses including: advertising, selling, general, 
administrative, and research and development; St = current sales; ∆St  = change in current sales; A = lagged total assets; ε = error term; t = year index for the years included in 
the estimation period. 
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As for abnormal accruals, the average estimated coefficient for cash revenues (i.e. ΔREVt – 
∆RECt) is positive (0.151) which consistent with income-increasing changes in some 
working capital accounts or income-decreasing changes in others (Jones, 1991). The average 
estimated coefficient for property, plant and equipment (PP&E) is positive (0.0340), although 
the typical sign on this coefficient should be negative because depreciation expense is an 
income-decreasing accrual
24
. The reason for sign difference is that Kothari et al. (2005) 
introduce PP&E in net values in their model, rather than in gross values (along with Kothari 
et al. (2005), examples of studies that use net PP&E include Guidry et al. (1999), Butler et al. 
(2004) and Michas (2011)). However, unlike gross PP&E, net PP&E can be affected by 
managed depreciation expenses (Kang, 1999). Accordingly, the direction of the correlation 
can be ambiguous. This limitation is difficult to avoid and net PP&E values are used in this 
research not only to follow Kothari et al. (2005), but also because ASE data base presents 
PP&E only in net values. Finally, the average estimated coefficient for Return on Assets 
(ROA) is positive (0.427) as expected. This indicates that part of accruals do increase 
(decrease) as firms performance improve (weaken). 
The estimated coefficients in the regression of abnormal cash flow from operating activities 
are as expected. The average estimated coefficient for St /At-1 is positive (0.052) and for ∆St 
/At-1 is negative (-0.170). This indicates that proceeds from contemporaneous (previous) sales 
are less (more) likely to be collected in the current period (Dechow et al., 1998; 
Roychowdhury, 2006). 
To interpret the regression’s coefficients of abnormal production costs, the coefficients 
should be classified into two categories according to what they represent. The first category 
                                                 
24 PP&E are originally introduced to expectation models of non-discretionary accruals to control for the 
depreciation expense. Because accruals decline by depreciation expense and depreciation expense increases 
when PP&E increases, accruals generally decline as gross PP&E increases. This inverse relationship causes the 
sign on the coefficient to be negative. 
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includes the average estimated coefficient of St /At-1 that represents Cost of Goods Sold 
(COGS). The mean coefficient is positive (0.939) as expected. As such, COGS is directly 
determined as fraction of contemporaneous sales (Roychowdhury, 2006). The second 
category relates to normal inventory growth. According to Dechow et al. (1998), change in 
inventory is a linear function of change in sales. The reasoning is that firms usually forecast 
next period’s sales for which they maintain target inventory. Therefore, Dechow et al. (1998) 
and Roychowdhury (2006) find positive coefficient for ∆St /At-1 and negative coefficient for 
∆St-1 /At-1. However, table 6.1 shows contrasting signs to those found in the aforementioned 
research – the sign on the estimated coefficient’s mean ∆St /At-1 is negative (-0.110) and on 
the estimated coefficient’s mean ∆St-1 /At-1 is positive (0.017). This indicates that, unlike the 
US, manufacturing firms in Jordan set their inventory targets based on prior year’s change in 
sales
25
. 
In terms of abnormal discretionary expenses, the mean estimated coefficient for St-1 /At-1 
positive as expected (0.031). This indicates that, similar to COGS, discretionary expenses 
including advertising, selling, general, administrative, and research and development are 
determined as a fraction of contemporaneous sales (Roychowdhury, 2006). 
Finally, the explanatory power (adjusted R
2
) of all regressions lies within a range that is 
similar to those produced by Jones (1991) and Roychowdhury (2006). In addition, although 
the significance of the models varies, the P-values for all regressions are less than the 0.05 
significance.  
 
 
                                                 
25 I have consulted with Dr. K. Gunny, University of Colorado, about the interpretation of these results. She said 
that this interpretation “sounds correct”. 
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6.2.2. Descriptive Statistics: 
Table 6.2 presents descriptive statistics for all variables included in the empirical models. 
That is, this section explores means, medians, standard deviation, minimum, maximum, 
Skewness and Kurtosis for four earnings management proxies, five independent variables and 
a set of control variables. 
Means of earnings management proxies are equal to zero indicating a good fit for a linear 
model because “The best fitting regression line is the one that makes the mean residual equal 
to 0” (Hayes, 2005, p.282). Zero mean earnings management is consistent with prior 
research. For instance, Kothari et al. (2005) report mean abnormal accruals close to zero and 
Gunny (2010) reports zero mean of abnormal production costs and abnormal discretionary 
expenses. 
Median of abnormal accruals (AAC) in Jordan is -0.7% and falls between -32.9% and 40.4% 
of total assets. This implies that accruals earnings management is as severe in Jordan as it is 
in the US based on Xie et al. (2003) who find that abnormal accruals in the US fall between -
27% and 67% of total assets. Median of abnormal production costs (APROD) in Jordan is -
0.5% of total assets which is similar to that found in the US by Gunny (2010) (i.e. -0.6%). 
Median of abnormal discretionary expenses (ADISX) in Jordan is 1% of total assets, which is 
also similar to that found in the US by Cohen et al. (2008). The impact of abnormal operating 
cash flow in Jordan might be less that is in the US. That is, Median abnormal operating cash 
flow (ACFO) in Jordan is 0.3% of total assets which is less than the 1% reported by Cohen et 
al. (2008) in the US. 
In terms of independent variables, mean ownership concentration (CONC) implies that 
34.1% of manufacturing listed firms in Jordan are owned by a large block holder. This is 
higher than 26.3% found in Canada by Park and Shin (2004) and lower than 53.4% found in 
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Spain by Ballesta and Meca (2007). Although ownership concentration could be as little as 
6% and as high as 98.4%, mean ownership concentration in Jordan still lies in the middle of 
ownership concentration levels found in developed countries. Managerial ownership or 
controlling shareholder is proxied by a dummy variable (CNTRL) that equals 1 if the largest 
block holder is either the chairman or chief executive officer and 0 otherwise. Therefore, the 
mean CNTRL of 44.2% indicates that less than half of the largest block holders are also in 
charge of firms affairs. Institutional ownership (INST), measured by the proportion held by 
institutions, shows a mean and median of 44.2% and 45.1%, respectively. These figures are 
unexpectedly higher than 24% and 41% found in the UK by Peasnell et al. (2005) and the US 
by Yu (2008), respectively. Foreign ownership (FRGN) show mean, median, minimum and 
maximum of 18.1%, 8%, 0% and 999%. The mean indicates that just less than one fifth of 
listed manufacturing firms are owned by foreign investors, which is higher than 5.4% foreign 
investment in Malaysian firms. Yet when the low percentages of median and minimum and 
the high percentage of maximum are considered, the overall impression might be that 
foreigners invest heavily in particular firms that are of interest to them rather than low 
investment in a big number of firms. Auditor size (BIG_5) is proxied by a dummy variable 
that is set to 1 if the firm is audited by one of the biggest 5 auditors in Jordan and 0 otherwise. 
Mean BIG_5 in Jordan is 55.3% which less that the 90% found in other countries such as the 
US (Francis, 2004) and Singapore (Chia et al., 2007). 
As regards control variables, board size (BRDS) shows a mean of 8 directors in the boards of 
manufacturing listed firms. It is worth noting that the Jordanian Companies Law, 2002, 
article No. 132 limits the minimum and maximum number of directors to 3 and 13, 
respectively, which is similar to the exhibited results. While average number of directors is 
similar to that in the UK (Peasnell et al., 2005), average number of directors appears to be 
larger in the US (i.e. 11 directors) as per Bhagat and Black (2002). Average firms’ leverage 
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(LEV) is around 35% of total assets indicating that risk levels of Jordanian manufacturing 
firms are not as high as those in developed countries such as 49% found in Australian 
companies by Chen et al. (2005). Finally, mean growth (GRWTH) shows that total assets of 
listed manufacturing firms increase by 11% on average. 
 
Table 6.2. Descriptive Statistics for the Full Population 
 Variable Mean Median 
Std. 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum Skewness Kurtosis 
AAC 0.000 -0.007 0.121 -0.329 0.404 0.391 1.067 
ACFO 0.000 0.003 0.105 -0.408 0.271 -0.601 1.480 
APROD 0.000 -0.005 0.151 -0.379 0.429 -0.021 1.758 
ADISX 0.000 -0.010 0.039 -0.052 0.161 1.859 4.142 
CONC 0.341 0.297 0.216 0.060 0.984 1.040 0.592 
CNTRL 0.442 0.000 0.498 0.000 1.000 0.236 -1.963 
INST 0.447 0.451 0.256 0.000 0.999 0.299 -0.470 
FRGN 0.181 0.080 0.236 0.000 0.999 1.916 3.395 
BIG_5 0.553 1.000 0.498 0.000 1.000 -0.216 -1.972 
BRDS 8.034 8.000 2.158 3.000 13.000 0.023 -0.384 
LEV 0.356 0.315 0.252 0.015 2.465 3.183 22.909 
GRWTH 0.110 0.049 0.504 -0.416 6.521 10.254 128.624 
SIZE 7.148 7.111 0.464 6.006 8.629 0.318 0.818 
AAC = abnormal accruals; ACFO = abnormal cash flow from operating activities; APROD = abnormal 
production costs; ADISX = abnormal discretionary expenses; CONC = the proportion of common shares held 
by the largest shareholder and his/her relatives; CNTRL = a dummy variable that equals 1 if the largest 
shareholder and his/her relatives are in control of the firm, and 0 otherwise; INST = the proportion of common 
shares held by the institutions; FRGN = the proportion of common shares held by the foreign investors; BIG_5 
= a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is being audited by one of the big-5 auditors in Jordan, and 0 
otherwise; BRDS = number of directors on the board; LEV = total liabilities scaled by total assets; GRWTH = 
the change in total assets scaled by lagged total assets; SIZE = natural logarithm of total assets. 
 
 
6.2.3. Research Hypotheses: 
This section is merely devoted to reclassify research hypotheses according to types of 
earnings management (i.e. dependent variables) instead of the classification mentioned in the 
methodology chapter, which is based on ownership structure and external audit corporate 
governance deterrence mechanisms (i.e. independent variables). The reason is that, in the 
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methodology chapter, hypotheses development is based on the measurement and the effect of 
each independent variable on earnings management. Yet in this chapter, the analysis is 
conducted and statistical inferences are concluded based on the structure of this chapter that 
discusses results of relationships between each type of earnings management and these 
corporate governance mechanisms. Therefore, the new classification of the previously 
developed hypotheses is as follows,  
Abnormal Accruals Model: 
H1a: There is significant relationship between ownership concentration and abnormal 
accruals in Jordan. 
H1b: There is a negative relationship between managerial ownership and abnormal accruals 
in Jordan. 
H1c: There is a negative relationship between institutional ownership and abnormal accruals 
in Jordan. 
H1d: There is a significant relationship between foreign ownership and abnormal accruals in 
Jordan. 
H1e: There is a negative relationship between abnormal accruals and the biggest 5 audit 
firms in Jordan. 
 
Abnormal Operating Cash Flow Model: 
H2a: There is a positive relationship between levels of ownership concentration and 
abnormal cash flow from operations Jordan. 
H2b: There is a negative relationship between managerial ownership and abnormal cash 
flow from operations in Jordan. 
H2c: There is a positive relationship between institutional ownership and abnormal cash 
flow from operations in Jordan. 
H2d: There is a significant relationship between foreign ownership and abnormal cash flow 
from operations in Jordan. 
H2e: There is a positive relationship between abnormal cash flow from operation and the 
biggest 5 audit firms in Jordan. 
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Abnormal Production Costs Model: 
H3a: There is a negative relationship between levels of ownership concentration and 
abnormal production costs in Jordan. 
H3b: There is a negative relationship between managerial ownership and abnormal 
production costs in Jordan. 
H3c: There is a positive relationship between institutional ownership and abnormal 
production costs in Jordan. 
H3d: There is a significant relationship between foreign ownership and abnormal production 
costs in Jordan. 
H3e: There is a positive relationship between abnormal production costs and the biggest 5 
audit firms in Jordan.  
 
Abnormal Discretionary Expenses Model: 
H4a: There is a negative relationship between levels of ownership concentration and 
abnormal discretionary expenses in Jordan. 
H4b: There is a negative relationship between managerial ownership and abnormal 
discretionary expenses in Jordan. 
H4c: There is a negative relationship between institutional ownership and abnormal 
discretionary expenses in Jordan. 
H4d: There is a significant relationship between foreign ownership and abnormal 
discretionary expenses in Jordan. 
H4e: There is no relationship between abnormal discretionary expenses and the biggest 5 
audit firms in Jordan. 
 
6.2.4. Data Transformation: 
Skewness and Kurtosis of dependent and independent variables show that some variables 
might not be normally distributed, which prompts for transforming such variables. Since 
regression models usually have no assumptions for the distribution of independent variables, 
a transformation of dependent variables is often applied to meet the assumption that the 
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residuals be normally distributed with constant variance (Vermeylen, 2002). Consistent with 
this, Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) test of normality is performed for dependent variables only. 
Table 6.3 presents normality statistics for the dependent variables: absolute abnormal 
accruals (ABAC), absolute abnormal operating cash flow (ABCFO), absolute abnormal 
production costs (ABPROD) and abnormal discretionary expenses (ABDISX). The results 
are significant at 0.05 levels. This indicates that the null hypothesis of normally distributed 
variables is rejected (i.e. variables are not normally distributed). The table also shows that 
when the dependent variables violate normality, data transformations steps are undertaken. 
This is performed by normalising the dependent variables using square root transformation. 
Such transformation might also help normalise the residuals. The normality statistics for 
transformed dependent variables are insignificant indicating normality. Hence, from this 
point onwards, statistical analysis is conducted based on the transformed dependent variables. 
Table 6.3. (K – S) Normality Statistic for Dependent Continuous Variables 
 Untransformed Square Root Transformation 
ABAC 0.132
**
 0.059 
ABCFO 0.127
**
 0.052 
ABPROD 0.131
**
 0.059 
ABDISX 0.119
**
 0.049 
**
 Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed) 
ABCA = absolute abnormal accruals; ABCFO = absolute abnormal cash flow from operating activities; 
ABPROD = absolute abnormal production costs; ABDISX = absolute abnormal discretionary expenses. 
 
 
6.2.5. Univariate Analysis: 
To test the relationships between ownership structure and auditor size corporate governance 
mechanisms and earnings management proxies are examined and discussed separately. 
Further, as mentioned in the methodology chapter, both Pearson correlation (i.e. parametric 
test) and Kendall’s tau correlation (i.e. non-parametric test) are performed to measure the 
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relationship between continuous dependent and independent variables, and only Point-
Biserial Correlation (i.e. non-parametric test) is conducted to measure the relationship 
between continuous dependent variables and dichotomous independent variables. The reason 
for this adopting this triangulation approach is to increase robustness of results. While all 
dependent variables are continuous, continuous independent variables include ownership 
concentration (CONC), institutional ownership (INST), foreign ownership (FRGN) and a set 
of control variables including board size (BRDS), leverage (LEV), growth (GRWTH) and 
firm size (SIZE). The remaining two independent variables are dichotomous variables. These 
are: managerial ownership proxies by controlling shareholders (CNTRL) and auditor size 
proxies by big 5 audit firms in Jordan (BIG_5). Finally, since there are four earnings 
management dependent variables (i.e. proxies), each type of manipulation is referred to as 
“model” from this point onwards. 
 
6.2.5.1. Abnormal Accruals Model: 
In order to measure potential associations between the continuous independent variables of 
ownership structure and abnormal accruals, both Pearson correlation and Kendall’s tau are 
conducted. Table 6.4 presents the hypothesised signs for correlations coefficients and 
significance of these relationships. The correlation coefficients of Pearson Correlation and 
Kendall’s tau are the same in terms of signs according to which independent and control 
variables are associated with abnormal accruals. Further, both tests produce similar levels of 
significance for the coefficients. 
The correlation coefficients for CONC are positive and statistically significant and as such, 
supporting H1a. However, the results do not support the hypotheses concerning the effect of 
INST and FRGN. Both parametric and non-parametric results are not statistically significant. 
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As for control variables, the correlation coefficients for BRDS are negative and significant at 
0.01 levels. To a lesser extent, SIZE is also a negative correlation coefficient but only 
significant at 0.10 levels. The correlation coefficients for remaining control variables, LEV 
and GRWTH are not significant in either of parametric or non-parametric tests. 
Table 6.4. Results of Pearson Correlation and Kendall’s tau for Continuous Variables 
Dependent Variable = S_ABAC 
 Variable Predicted Direction Pearson Correlation Kendall's tau 
CONC ? 0.126
**
 0.105
**
 
INST –  -0.066 -0.022 
FRGN ? 0.023 -0.009 
BRDS 
 
-0.193
***
 -0.136
***
 
LEV 
 
0.094 0.046 
GRWTH 
 
0.090 0.023 
SIZE 
 
-0.102
*
 -0.069
*
 
*** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed) 
**
 Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed) 
*
 Correlation is significant at the 0.10 level (1-tailed) 
S_ABAC = Square root of the absolute value of abnormal accruals; CONC = the proportion of common shares 
held by the largest shareholder and his/her relatives; INST = the proportion of common shares held by the 
institutions; FRGN = the proportion of common shares held by the foreign investors; BRDS = number of 
directors on the board; LEV = total liabilities scaled by total assets; GRWTH = the change in total assets scaled 
by lagged total assets; SIZE = natural logarithm of total assets. 
 
As for relationships between abnormal accruals and dichotomous independent variables, table 
6.5 show the results of Point-Biserial correlation that is supportive of hypothesis H1b. That 
is, CNTRL negatively affects abnormal accruals with a P-value below the 0.05 level of 
significance. Unexpectedly, BIG_5 the correlation coefficient is positive and statistically 
significant. This shows that non-big 5 auditor who in fact mitigates abnormal accruals in 
Jordan not big 5. 
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Table 6.5. Results of Point-Biserial Correlation for Dichotomous Variables 
Dependent Variable = S_ABAC 
  Predicted Direction Point-Biserial Correlation 
CNTRL – -0.120** 
BIG_5 – 0.134** 
**
 Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed) 
S_ABAC = Square root of the absolute value of abnormal accruals; CNTRL = a dummy variable that equals 1 if 
the largest shareholder and his/her relatives are in control of the firm, and 0 otherwise; BIG_5 = a dummy 
variable that equals 1 if the firm is being audited by one of the big-5 auditors in Jordan, and 0 otherwise. 
 
In summary, of the five hypotheses, only H1a and H1b are supported by the results. Although 
the correlation coefficient for BIG_5 is statistically significant, the results show a contrasting 
sign to that predicted in H1e.  
 
6.2.5.2. Cash Flow from Operating Activities Model: 
H2a, H2c and H2d relate to the possible relationships between abnormal operating cash flow 
and the continuous independent variables of CONC, INST and FRGN, respectively. As per 
table 6.6, Pearson a Kendall’s tau correlation coefficients for CONC and FRGN are positive 
and significant, with a slight difference in the level of significance between Pearson and 
Kendall’s tau correlation coefficients for FRGN. Hence, the results support H2a and H2d. 
However, although the coefficients for INST are positive, neither Pearson correlation nor 
Kendall’s tau coefficients are statistically significant, which means that H2c fails to account 
for the association between INST and abnormal operating cash flow. 
The coefficients for the control variable BRDS are negative and significant with slight 
difference in levels of significance between parametric and non-parametric tests. Coefficients 
for LEV bear positive signs also with slight difference in levels of significance. The results 
show that both Pearson and Kendall’s tau correlation coefficients for SIZE are negative but 
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only significant at 0.1 levels. The correlation coefficients for GRWTH are not significant in 
either of parametric or non-parametric tests. 
Table 6.6. Results of Pearson Correlation and Kendall’s tau for Continuous Variables 
Dependent Variable = S_ABCFO 
  Predicted Direction Pearson Correlation Kendall's tau 
CONC + 0.204
***
 0.158
***
 
INST + 0.027 0.022 
FRGN ? 0.185
***
 0.085
**
 
BRDS 
 
-0.181
***
 -0.119
**
 
LEV 
 
0.153
**
 0.071
*
 
GRWTH 
 
0.087 0.059 
SIZE 
 
-0.099
*
 -0.072
*
 
*** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed) 
**
 Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed) 
*
 Correlation is significant at the 0.10 level (1-tailed) 
S_ABCFO = Square root of absolute value of abnormal cash flow from operating activities; CONC = the 
proportion of common shares held by the largest shareholder and his/her relatives; INST = the proportion of 
common shares held by the institutions; FRGN = the proportion of common shares held by the foreign 
investors; BRDS = number of directors on the board; LEV = total liabilities scaled by total assets; GRWTH = 
the change in total assets scaled by lagged total assets; SIZE = natural logarithm of total assets. 
 
Table 6.7 presents results of Point-Biserial correlation between abnormal operating cash flow 
and the dichotomous variables CNTRL and BIG_5. The correlation coefficients for CNRTL 
and BIG_5 are not statistically significant indicating that the relationships predicted in H2b 
and H2e do not exist. 
Table 6.7. Results of Point-Biserial Correlation for Dichotomous Variables 
Dependent Variable = S_ABCFO 
  Predicted Direction Point-Biserial Correlation 
CNTRL – -0.079 
BIG_5 + -0.082 
*
 Correlation is significant at the 0.10 level (1-tailed) 
S_ABCFO = Square root of absolute value of abnormal cash flow from operating activities; CNTRL = a dummy 
variable that equals 1 if the largest shareholder and his/her relatives are in control of the firm, and 0 otherwise; 
BIG_5 = a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is being audited by one of the big-5 auditors in Jordan, and 
0 otherwise. 
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To sum up, the two hypotheses of H2a and H2d hold as the results confirm them at the 
conventional levels of significance. Regarding H2b, H2c and H2e, these hypotheses do not 
hold as the correlation coefficients for INST, CNTRL and BIG_5 are not statistically 
significant.  
 
6.2.5.3. Abnormal Production Costs Model: 
The results exhibited in table 6.8 relate to possible relationships between abnormal 
production costs and three continuous ownership structure mechanisms: CONC, INST and 
FRGN, and four continuous control variables: BRDS, LEV, GRWTH and SIZE. The results 
have three main features; first, the correlation coefficients of Pearson Correlation and 
Kendall’s tau for the independent and control variables are the same in terms of signs and 
levels of significance. Second, the results do not support any of the three hypotheses 
regarding the association between CONC, INST and FRGN, and abnormal production costs 
(H3a, H3c and H3d). Third, of all four control variables, only the positive correlation 
coefficient for GRWTH is significant at 0.01 levels. 
Table 6.8. Results of Pearson Correlation and Kendall’s tau for Continuous Variables 
Dependent Variable = S_ABPROD 
  Predicted Direction Pearson Correlation Kendall's tau 
CONC – -0.022 -0.013 
INST + 0.008 0.022 
FRGN ? -0.059 -0.040 
BRDS 
 
-0.069 -0.047 
LEV 
 
0.028 0.033 
GRWTH 
 
0.176
***
 0.135
***
 
SIZE 
 
-0.002 0.001 
*** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed) 
S_ABPROD = Square root of absolute value of abnormal production costs; CONC = the proportion of common 
shares held by the largest shareholder and his/her relatives; INST = the proportion of common shares held by the 
institutions; FRGN = the proportion of common shares held by the foreign investors; BRDS = number of 
directors on the board; LEV = total liabilities scaled by total assets; GRWTH = the change in total assets scaled 
by lagged total assets; SIZE = natural logarithm of total assets. 
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The Point-Biserial correlation coefficient for dichotomous independent variables show that 
CNRTL is, as predicted in H3b, is negative and statistically significant at 0.05 levels. On the 
contrary, BIG_5 is not significantly associated with abnormal production costs indicating that 
the results do not support H3e. 
Table 6.9. Results of Point-Biserial Correlation for Dichotomous Variables 
Dependent Variable = S_ABPROD 
  Predicted Direction Point-Biserial Correlation 
CNTRL – -0.146** 
BIG_5 + -0.004 
**
 Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed) 
S_ABPROD = Square root of absolute value of abnormal production costs; CNTRL = a dummy variable that 
equals 1 if the largest shareholder and his/her relatives are in control of the firm, and 0 otherwise; BIG_5 = a 
dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is being audited by one of the big-5 auditors in Jordan, and 0 otherwise. 
 
To conclude, with the exception of H3b, the results do not confirm H3a, H3c, H3d and H3e. 
As such CNRTL is the only corporate governance mechanism that is negatively associated 
with abnormal production costs.  
 
6.2.5.4. Abnormal Discretionary Expenses Model: 
According to the results exhibited in table 6.10, the association between ownership structure 
mechanisms and abnormal discretionary expenses model seems different from those 
discussed in the previous models. To begin with H4a, H4c and H4d, Pearson and Kendall’s 
tau correlation coefficients for the continuous independent variables CONC and FRGN are 
not statistically significant. The continuous variable INST, for the first time, has a negative 
and statistically significant Pearson correlation coefficient at 0.01 levels and a Kendall’s tau 
correlation coefficient only at a lower rate of significance, namely at 0.1 levels. Of all control 
variable, only SIZE show positive and significant correlation coefficients at 0.01 levels in 
both tests. 
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 Table 6.10. Results of Pearson Correlation and Kendall’s tau for Continuous Variables 
Dependent Variable = S_ABDISX 
  Predicted Direction Pearson Correlation Kendall's tau 
CONC  –  0.034 0.002 
INST – -0.175*** -0.082* 
FRGN ? -0.017 0.028 
BRDS 
 
-0.066 -0.048 
LEV 
 
-0.065 -0.021 
GRWTH 
 
0.078 0.045 
SIZE 
 
0.196
***
 0.142
***
 
*** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed) 
*
 Correlation is significant at the 0.10 level (1-tailed) 
S_ABDISX = Square root of absolute value of abnormal discretionary expenses; CONC = the proportion of 
common shares held by the largest shareholder and his/her relatives; INST = the proportion of common shares 
held by the institutions; FRGN = the proportion of common shares held by the foreign investors; BRDS = 
number of directors on the board; LEV = total liabilities scaled by total assets; GRWTH = the change in total 
assets scaled by lagged total assets; SIZE = natural logarithm of total assets. 
 
Also unlike other models, the Point-Biserial correlation test presented in table 6.11 shows 
that the coefficient for dichotomous variable CNTRL is positive for the first time. However, 
the coefficient is not statistically significant, and hence, the research hypothesis H4b fails to 
hold. Similarly, H4e fails to hold as the Point-Biserial correlation coefficient for the 
dichotomous variable BIG_5 is not statistically significant. 
Table 6.11. Results of Point-Biserial Correlation for Dichotomous Variables 
Dependent Variable = S_ABDISX 
  Predicted Direction Point-Biserial Correlation 
CNTRL –  0.077 
BIG_5 +  0.072 
S_ABDISX = Square root of absolute value of abnormal discretionary expenses; CNTRL = a dummy variable 
that equals 1 if the largest shareholder and his/her relatives are in control of the firm, and 0 otherwise; BIG_5 = 
a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is being audited by one of the big-5 auditors in Jordan, and 0 
otherwise. 
 
In brief, except for H4b, the results do not confirm H4a, H4c, H4d, and H3e. As such INST is 
the only corporate governance mechanism that is negatively associated with abnormal 
discretionary expenses.  
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Univariate analysis is conducted performed in this section in order to investigate associations 
between earnings management proxies (i.e. dependent variables) and ownership structure 
mechanisms, auditor size and a set of control variables. However, interpreting correlation 
coefficients provide no indication of causality (Yaffee, 2003). According to Field (2009), 
correlation cannot prove causality for two main reasons: the third-variable problem and 
direction of causality. The first problem relates to variable(s) affecting the causality between 
the correlated two variables. Hence, there is a need to control for all known variables before 
causation can be proven. In terms of the second problem, correlation coefficients do not 
establish the directionality required as a proof for causality. 
Consequently, combined relationships between dependent and independent variables must be 
examined in order to make statistical inferences. As such, multiple regression analysis is 
more appropriate than univariate analysis. Therefore, multiple regressions analyses are 
conducted to construct causal relationships between earnings management proxies (i.e. 
dependent variables) and ownership structure mechanisms, auditor size and a set of control 
variables in section 6.2.7. 
 
6.2.6. Correlation Matrix: 
The correlation coefficients for all corporate governance variables and control variables are 
presented in table 6.12. Pearson correlation coefficients are reported in the first line and 
Kendall’s tau coefficients in the bottom line. The overall correlation matrix shows that no 
perfect linear relationship exists between independent variables (i.e. multicollinearity). 
Statisticians suggest that multicollinearity would be a serious problem if the correlation 
coefficient between two predictors is in excess of 0.8 (e.g. Gujarati, 2003; Fields, 2009). 
Since neither Pearson correlation coefficients nor Kendall’s tau correlation coefficients 
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exceed 0.6 (r < 0.6), multicollinearity does not create a threat the interpretation of correlation 
coefficients of independent variables. 
Ownership concentration (CONC) is positively correlated with controlling shareholders 
(CNTRL) at 0.01 levels of significance. This relationship is expected to exist because of the 
measurement of CNTRL that is based on whether the largest block holder is in control of the 
firm. CONC is also positively and significantly correlated with institutional ownership 
(INST). There are two plausible interpretations for the correlation between CONC and INST. 
First, institutional investors are likely to invest in firms where block holders prefer to invest. 
The second interpretation could be stemmed from the openness of cross-holding in Jordan. 
That is, while block holders might invest as individuals, they could also invest through 
institutions that are either privately-owned or controlled. As such, levels of institutional 
ownership exceed the 5% levels of ownership (i.e. institutional ownership becomes 
ownership concentration). Similar interpretations could be concluded from the positive and 
significant correlation between CONC and foreign ownership (FRGN). The highest 
correlation exists between CONC and the size of boards of directors (BRDS). The negative 
and significant correlation indicates that firms with high concentrated ownership tend to have 
small number of directors. This might be due to the largest block holders voting for 
themselves to set on the board of directors rather than choosing a number of representatives. 
Besides the significant correlation between CNTRL and CONC, CNTRL is significantly 
correlated only with BRDS. The negative correlation is also expected because of the 
measurement method of CNTRL. INST is positively and significantly correlated with FRGN 
and BRDS. This shows that foreign investors are more likely to invest as institutions rather 
than as individuals. Further, institutional investors, either they were foreigners or not, prefer 
to invest in companies where monitoring is practiced by large number of directors. As for the 
biggest 5 audit firms in Jordan (BIG_5), the positive and significant correlation between 
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BIG_5 and INST shows that institutional investors tend to invest in firms audited by big 5 
auditors in Jordan, which is consistent with markets perceptions of big 5 auditors provide 
better audit quality. Possibly for the same reason, the correlation between BIG_5 and BRDS 
is also positive and statistically significant. BIG_5 is negatively correlated with firms’ levels 
of leverage (LEV). Bearing in mind that prior research documents big auditors requiring 
higher fees (Gul et al, 2003), high leveraged firms might prefer to pay less audit fees by 
contracting with non-big auditors. The only other consistent significance involving LEV is 
with firms’ size (SIZE). The positive correlation between LEV and SIZE indicates that debt 
financing might be more accessible to big sized firms. In fact, SIZE is positively correlated 
with INST, BIG_5, BRDS and firms’ growth (GRWTH). The positive correlation with INST 
shows that institutional investors invest more heavily in big firms than they do in small firms. 
The positive correlation between SIZE and, BRDS and BIG_5 shows that as firm’s size 
become larger and more diversified, the number of directors on the board increases as well as 
the need for audit firms that acquire resources sufficient for auditing more diversified firms. 
Finally, while (GRWTH) is only significantly correlated with SIZE, this correlation indicates 
that as firms become larger, their opportunities for growth increase. 
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Table 6.12. Pearson (Top) and Kendall’s tau (Bottom) Correlation Coefficients for Independent Variables 
    CONC CNTRL INST FRGN BIG_5 BRDS LEV GRWTH SIZE 
CONC 
Pearson Correlation 
1         
Kendall's tau 
        
CNTRL 
Pearson Correlation .374
**
 
1        
Kendall's tau .312
**
 
       
INST 
Pearson Correlation .138
*
 .134 
1       
Kendall's tau .096
*
 .104 
      
FRGN 
Pearson Correlation .457
**
 .061 .217
**
 
1      
Kendall's tau .117
*
 -.054 .115
*
 
     
BIG_5 
Pearson Correlation -.004 .032 .151
*
 .054 
1     
Kendall's tau -.005 .032 .137
*
 .126
*
 
    
BRDS 
Pearson Correlation -.524
**
 -.191
**
 .198
**
 -.306
**
 .177
*
 
1    
Kendall's tau -.371
**
 -.129
*
 .170
**
 -.077 .143
*
 
   
LEV 
Pearson Correlation .074 .102 .180
**
 .012 -.155
*
 -.081 
1   
Kendall's tau .104
*
 .063 .051 .021 -.116
*
 -.062 
  
GRWTH 
Pearson Correlation .019 -.004 -.067 .122 -.035 .009 .085 
1  
Kendall's tau .081 .052 .053 .060 .089 .043 .181
**
 
 
SIZE 
Pearson Correlation -.015 .060 .251
**
 .101 .380
**
 .407
**
 .160
*
 .214
**
 
1 
Kendall's tau -.007 .058 .185
**
 .156
**
 .307
**
 .282
**
 .159
**
 .231
**
 
**
 Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
*
 Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
CONC = the proportion of common shares held by the largest shareholder and his/her relatives; CNTRL = a dummy variable that equals 1 if the largest shareholder and 
his/her relatives are in control of the firm, and 0 otherwise; INST = the proportion of common shares held by the institutions; FRGN = the proportion of common shares held 
by the foreign investors; BIG_5 = a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is being audited by one of the big-5 auditors in Jordan, and 0 otherwise; BRDS = number of 
directors on the board; LEV = total liabilities scaled by total assets; GRWTH = the change in total assets scaled by lagged total assets; SIZE = natural logarithm of total 
assets. 
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6.2.7. Multiple Regression Analysis: 
In order to produce statistical inferences, multiple regressions analyses are conducted to 
construct causal relationships. To that end, ordinary least square method (OLS) is employed 
to examine possible relationships between earnings management proxies (i.e. dependent 
variables) and ownership structure mechanisms, auditor size and a set of control variables. 
For statistical inferences to be valid, however, certain assumptions underlying OLS method 
must be satisfied. These assumptions are: normally distributed errors (i.e. normality), 
linearity, homoscedasticity, no autocorrelation, and no multicollinearity. Because a violation 
of the homoscedasticity assumption requires a remedy that affects the significance of 
regressions coefficients, models’ diagnostics are first presented in the following subsection. 
Afterwards, the results of each of the four models, which are based on four types of earnings, 
management are presented and discussed separately. These model are, abnormal accruals 
model (S_ABAC), abnormal operating cash flow model (S_ABCFO), abnormal production 
costs model (S_ABPROD) and abnormal discretionary expenses model (S_ABDISX). 
 
6.2.7.1. Multiple Regressions Diagnostics: 
In this subsection, five tests are performed for each model to check whether the assumptions 
of OLS are satisfied. Table 6.13 shows the statistics and significance of four of those tests 
and table 6.14 shows the results of the fifth test. The tests performed concerning each 
assumption are as follows, 
First, Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) is performed to test for normality of errors distributions. If 
the test produces an insignificant statistic, then the null hypothesis of normally distributed 
error is accepted. K-S statistics presented in table 6.13 indicate normality for all models. That 
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is, K-S statistic for errors produced from (S_ABAC), (S_ABCFO), (S_ABPROD) and 
(S_ABDISX) are 0.031, 0.057, 0.048 and 0.051, respectively. The significance levels for 
these values of test statistics are more than 0.200 and accordingly, the null hypothesis of 
normally distributed errors is accepted. 
The second test is the White’s test of heteroscedasticity. F-statistics for (S_ABAC), 
(S_ABCFO) and (S_ABDISX) are 1.509, 1.167 and 1.238, respectively. None of these values 
are statistically significant indicating that OLS estimated coefficients are efficient. However, 
F-statistic for (S_ABPROD) is 2.164 and is statistically significant at 0.05 levels. This 
indicates that the errors terms do not have the equal variances and hence, the assumption of 
homoscedasticity is violated. It is worth noting that in the presence of unequal variances (i.e. 
heteroscedasticity) the estimated coefficients are no longer efficient and their use can lead to 
incorrect inferences (Long and Ervin, 2000). To correct for heteroscedasticity, White’s 
estimators are used in abnormal production costs model. 
The third test relates to the assumption that the functional form of OLS model is linear. 
Ramsey’s RESET tests for misspecification such as omitting relevant variable or non-
linearity in the functional form. As mentioned in the methodology chapter, the assumption of 
linearity is satisfied if the null hypothesis of linearity is not rejected. From table 6.13, F-
statistics are with values for (S_ABAC), (S_ABCFO), (S_ABPROD) and (S_ABDISX) are 
0.018, 0.103, 0.077 and 0.872, respectively. The results are not statistically significant 
indicating that the assumption is satisfied and the models are correctly specified. 
The fourth assumption of no autocorrelation is satisfied if the residual terms are uncorrelated 
(i.e. independent) for any two observations. Durbin-Watson test can be used to test for 
autocorrelation (i.e. serial correlation). Field (2009) suggests that Durbin-Watson values less 
than 1 and greater than 3 are cause for concern. From table 6.13, Durbin-Watson values for 
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all earnings management models show that autocorrelation does not exist as the values lie in 
the acceptable range specified by Field (2009). 
Table 6.13. OLS Regression Assumptions Diagnostics 
  S_ABAC S_ABCFO S_ABPROD S_ABDISX 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of Normality 0.031 0.057 0.048 0.051 
White’s test of Heteroscedasticity 1.509 1.167 2.164
**
 1.238 
Ramsey RESET test of Linearity 0.018 0.103 0.077 0.872 
Durbin-Watson test of Autocorrelation 1.905 2.006 2.108 1.817 
**
Significant at 0.05 level. 
S_ABAC = abnormal accruals model; S_ABCFO = abnormal cash flow from operating activities model; 
S_ABPROD = abnormal production costs model; S_ABDISX = abnormal discretionary expenses model. 
 
In terms of the assumption of no multicollinearity, the correlation matrix presented in section 
6.2.6 shows that there are no perfect linear relationships between independent variables 
indicating that the assumption of no multicollinearity is satisfied (i.e. r < 0.8). However, 
statisticians recommend conducting Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) to test for 
multicollinearity, where a value of VIF greater than 10 signifies the existence of 
multicollinearity problem (e.g. Gujarati, 2003). Table 6.14 shows that VIF values in all 
models do not exceed 2.052, which is well below the acceptable value of 10. 
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Table 6.14. Collinearity Diagnostic between Independent Variables in each Model 
Variable 
Abnormal Accruals Model Abnormal Operating Cash 
Flow Model 
Abnormal Production Costs 
Model 
Abnormal Discretionary 
Expenses Model 
Tolerance VIF Tolerance VIF Tolerance VIF Tolerance VIF 
CONC 0.499 2.004 0.533 1.875 0.504 1.985 0.518 1.931 
CNTRL 0.797 1.254 0.816 1.225 0.831 1.204 0.801 1.248 
INST 0.788 1.270 0.744 1.344 0.760 1.315 0.728 1.373 
FRGN 0.682 1.466 0.633 1.580 0.635 1.574 0.641 1.559 
BIG_5 0.789 1.268 0.811 1.233 0.794 1.259 0.801 1.248 
BRDS 0.503 1.987 0.499 2.002 0.472 2.119 0.487 2.052 
LEV 0.849 1.177 0.797 1.254 0.795 1.257 0.829 1.206 
GRWTH 0.823 1.214 0.778 1.285 0.800 1.250 0.804 1.243 
SIZE 0.576 1.735 0.553 1.809 0.530 1.888 0.560 1.787 
CONC = the proportion of common shares held by the largest shareholder and his/her relatives; CNTRL = a dummy variable that equals 1 if the largest shareholder and 
his/her relatives are in control of the firm, and 0 otherwise; INST = the proportion of common shares held by the institutions; FRGN = the proportion of common shares held 
by the foreign investors; BIG_5 = a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is being audited by one of the big-5 auditors in Jordan, and 0 otherwise; BRDS = number of 
directors on the board; LEV = total liabilities scaled by total assets; GRWTH = the change in total assets scaled by lagged total assets; SIZE = natural logarithm of total 
assets. 
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6.2.7.2. Abnormal Accruals Model: 
Table 6.15 reports results of multiple regression analysis for abnormal accruals model where 
the dependent variable is the transformed absolute values of abnormal accruals measured by 
Kothari et al.’s model (2005). The model’s F-statistic is 2.998, and is statistically significant 
at 0.01 levels. The adjusted R
2
 is 10.9% suggesting that the combination of independent 
variables explains 10.9% of the variation in accruals earnings management. With reference to 
section 6.2.3, the model tests five hypotheses relating to five independent variables. 
The coefficient of ownership concentration (CONC) is not statistically significant. This is 
inconsistent with H1a that predicts a significant relationship between accruals earnings 
management and levels of ownership concentration. Although no direction is made in H1a, 
the sign on the coefficient is positive indicating that abnormal accruals increase as levels of 
ownership concentration increase in Jordan. However, the insignificant difference implies 
that firms with highly concentrated ownership do not report much higher abnormal accruals. 
This result is consistent with prior research that finds no significant relationship between 
ownership concentration and abnormal accruals in developed countries (e.g. Ballesta and 
Meca, 2007; Park and Shin, 2004). It is worth noting that this result is also consistent with the 
findings of Al-Fayoumi et al. (2010) who investigate the effect of ownership concentration in 
Jordan but proxy for it differently. Therefore, the result is neither in favour of the effective 
monitoring nor the opportunistic behaviour of large block holders. 
The coefficient of managerial ownership (CNTRL) is negative and statistically significant at 
0.01 levels. As such, H1b holds indicating that when the largest shareholder is also the 
chairman or the chief executive officer (i.e. in charge of the firm’s affairs), abnormal accruals 
decline in Jordan. Hence, the result is supportive of the incentive alignment effect in Jordan. 
Although this result is consistent with prior research that finds managerial ownership an 
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effective corporate governance deterrence mechanism (e.g. Warfield et al., 1995; Wang, 
2006), it contradicts that found by Al-Fayoumi et al. (2010). This is probably due to the 
difference in the measurement of managerial ownership proxies between the two studies. 
Unlike the findings of previous research that documents a negative effect of levels of 
institutional ownership on abnormal accruals (e.g. Rajgopal et al., 1999; Cornett et al., 2008; 
Chung et al., 2002; Charitou et al., 2007; Yu, 2008), H1c fails to hold as the coefficient of 
institutional ownership (INST), although negative, is statistically insignificant. However, this 
result provides confirmatory evidence to that of Al-Fayoumi et al. (2010) that institutional 
investors do not serve effectively in constraining accruals earnings management in Jordan. 
Possible interpretations for the contradicting results might be that institutional investors in 
Jordan are either less sophisticated than those in developed markets or act passively in the 
governance of their corporate holdings. 
Although foreign investors, at least in theory, are considered as deterrence corporate 
governance mechanism, the limited prior research fails to document such inverse relationship 
between levels of foreign ownership and levels of abnormal accruals (e.g. Sarkar et al., 2006; 
Ali et al., 2008). Similar to those findings, table 6.15 shows that the coefficient of foreign 
ownership (FRGN) in this study is negative but statistically insignificant. Hence, H1d is 
rejected as foreign investors are found ineffective in mitigating the practice of earnings 
management in Jordan. 
Interestingly and unexpectedly, the significant positive coefficient of the dummy variable 
(BIG_5) contrasts the well-know convention that clients of big audit firms are less likely to 
report high abnormal accruals than clients of small audit firms. The positive sign shows that 
non-big auditors who are superior in thwarting accruals earnings management in Jordan. An 
alternative interpretation may simply be that good companies are more likely to elect big 5 
191 
 
auditors and are less likely to manage earnings, and accordingly, are more likely to have 
higher quality earnings (Francis, 2004). Regardless of the interpretation, this finding will 
indeed affect the predicted sign on the coefficient of BIG_5 included in real activities models. 
This is because the substitutive effect relies on the effect of BIG_5 on accruals earnings 
management. Put differently, the sign on the coefficient of BIG_5 was initially predicted to 
be negative in abnormal accruals model. Based on this expectation, it was initially predicted 
to be positive in real activities model. Since the actual sign in abnormal accruals model 
appeared positive, the predicted sign in real activities model must be changed to negative. As 
such, clients of big 5 auditors are expected not to engage in real activities earnings 
management because of the poor audit quality provided by big 5 auditors. 
The insignificant coefficient of board size (BRDS) indicates that there is no relationship 
between number of directors and levels of abnormal accruals in Jordan. This is consistent 
with evidence found in Singapore and Malaysia by Bradbury et al. (2006). 
Rates of both leverage (LEV) and growth (GRWTH) are positively related to levels of 
abnormal accruals which is consistent with firms that are in financial distress or experiencing 
poor performance (e.g. Bartov, 1993; Wild, 1996; Nagar, 2002). Although significant 
differences are marginal, these findings suggest that managers of financially distressed firms 
in Jordan engage in accruals earnings management to either avoid violating debt covenants or 
renegotiate lending contracts (DeAngelo et al., 1994). Moreover, managers may use 
abnormal accruals to avoid reporting negative growth rates that might affect their bonuses. 
The coefficient of firm size (SIZE) is negative and statistically significant at 0.01 levels. This 
is consistent with Bushmen et al. (2003) and Xie et al. (2003) who find that the demand for 
systematic corporate governance is higher in large-sized firms relative to small-sized firms 
due to high information asymmetry between managers and shareholders in the larger firms 
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with complex and dispersed ownership structure. Therefore, this result implies that large 
firms in Jordan operate under high scrutiny and hence, are less likely to report abnormal 
accruals. 
Table 6.15. Results of Pooled Multiple Regression Analysis for Abnormal Accruals Model 
S_ABAC = α + β1 CONC + β2 CNRTL + β3 INST + β4 FRGN + β5 BIG5 + β6 BRDS + β7 SIZE + β8 GRWTH + β9 LEV + β10-12 YR 
 
 Predicted Direction Coefficient t-Statistic 
Constant 
 
0.593 4.427
***
 
CONC ? 0.093 1.843
*
 
CNTRL – -0.055 -3.218*** 
INST – -0.020 -0.604 
FRGN ? -0.045 -1.122 
BIG_5 – 0.060 3.506*** 
BRDS 
 
-0.008 -1.513 
LEV 
 
0.001 1.935
*
 
GRWTH 
 
0.063 1.707
*
 
SIZE 
 
-0.044 -2.032
**
 
Adjusted R
2
 10.9% 
F-statistic 2.998
***
 
*** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level. 
**
 Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level. 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.10 level. 
S_ABAC = Square root of the absolute value of abnormal accruals; CONC = the proportion of common shares 
held by the largest shareholder and his/her relatives; CNTRL = a dummy variable that equals 1 if the largest 
shareholder and his/her relatives are in control of the firm, and 0 otherwise; INST = the proportion of common 
shares held by the institutions; FRGN = the proportion of common shares held by the foreign investors; BIG_5 
= a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is being audited by one of the big-5 auditors in Jordan, and 0 
otherwise; BRDS = number of directors on the board; LEV = total liabilities scaled by total assets; GRWTH = 
the change in total assets scaled by lagged total assets; SIZE = natural logarithm of total assets. 
 
 
6.2.7.3. Abnormal Cash Flow from Operating Activities Model: 
Table 6.16 reports results of multiple regression analysis for abnormal cash flow from 
operating activities model. The dependent variable is the transformed absolute values of 
abnormal cash flow from operating activities measured by Roychowdhury’s model (2006). It 
is important here to recall that this dependent variable proxies for sales manipulation 
activities. That is, boosting sales by offering price discounts and more lenient credit terms 
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will increase current period’s earnings but will also results in lower cash flows in the current 
period, and vice versa (Cohen and Zarowin, 2010). However, regressing cash flows on sales 
to generate abnormal cash flow might give rise to a potential problem in interpreting the 
results of the current empirical model. There are non-sales related factors that could also 
affect abnormal cash flow. To illustrate, while the practice of overproduction activities has a 
negative effect on abnormal cash flow, the reduction of discretionary expenses has a positive 
effect. As a result, Roychowdhury (2006) argues that the net effect on abnormal cash flow 
could be ambiguous.  In order to conclude valid interpretations, the results of this particular 
empirical model must be considered along with the results produced from the empirical 
models of abnormal production costs and abnormal discretionary expenses. Therefore, the 
following statistical inferences are tentative
26
. 
The model’s F-statistic is 2.127, and is statistically significant at 0.05 levels. The adjusted R2 
is 7.1% suggesting that the combination of independent variables explains 7.1% of the 
variation in sales earnings management. With reference to section 6.2.3, the model tests five 
hypotheses relating to five independent variables. 
The positive and statistically significant coefficient of ownership concentration (CONC) 
confirms H2a which predicts a direct relationship between abnormal cash flow from 
operating activities and CONC. The positive relationship shows that largest shareholders 
might exert pressure on managers that leads the latter to engage in sales manipulation. A 
possible interpretation is that large shareholders in Jordan might be less financially 
sophisticated than those in the US and UK, as their main concern is the current value of their 
wealth regardless of the consequences of sales manipulation. 
                                                 
26 Final conclusions for independent variables in this particular model are discussed in the alternative analysis 
section 7.9 where the results of income-increasing and decreasing models are considered collectively. 
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Consistent with the findings of Cohen et al. (2008), the results confirm H2b as the coefficient 
of managerial ownership (CNTRL) is negative and statistically significant at 0.05 levels. This 
implies that when the largest shareholders are in the position of controlling firms’ affairs, 
they become effective in deterring manager from practicing sales manipulation. As such, 
managerial ownership in Jordan can potentially align the interests of shareholders with those 
of minority shareholders. 
The results concerning the remaining three hypotheses indicate that H2c, H2d and H2e fail to 
hold. First, H2c fails to hold as the coefficient of institutional ownership (INST) is neither 
positive nor statistically significant. Although the hypothesis is based on the findings of Li 
(2010) that depicts institutions as short-term oriented investors, the results in this research are 
rather consistent with Roychowdhury (2006). Second, the coefficient of foreign ownership is 
statistically insignificant indicating that H2d also fails to hold. This result might be 
attributable to the similarity between the monitoring roles of institutional and foreign 
investors (Dahlquist and Robertson, 2001). Hence, institutional and foreign investors are 
found ineffective in mitigating the practice of sale manipulation in Jordan. Third, the findings 
in abnormal accruals model show that non-big 5 auditors who actually prevent accruals 
earnings management, which in turn leads to predict a negative sign, instead of the originally 
predicted positive sign, on the coefficient of BIG_5 in abnormal operating cash flow model. 
Consistent with this, the coefficient of BIG_5 is negative. However, the coefficient is not 
statistically significant implying that managers do not resort to sales manipulation because of 
the enhanced scrutiny over abnormal accruals provided by non-big 5 in Jordan. As such, the 
results reject H2e, which is inconsistent with Cohen and Zarowin (2010). 
As for the directors-specific control variable, the coefficient of board size (BRDS) is also 
insignificant. Therefore, the number of directors is not a limiting factor of abnormal cash 
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flow from operating activities in Jordan. Similar evidence is found by Visvanathan (2008). 
The positive and statistically significant coefficient of leverage (LEV) is consistent with the 
findings of Cohen and Zarowin (2010). The interpretation of this result is not as 
straightforward as it might be in other models because this relationship involves operating 
cash flow. In general, financially distressed firms have been associated with high leverage 
(e.g. Beneish and Press, 1995). Accordingly, Bartov (1993) and DeFond and Park (1994) 
predict and find a positive relation between levels of firm leverage and abnormal accruals as 
firms are motivated to avoid debt covenant violations. But if firms with high leverage have 
low cash holdings, they become exposed to increased risk of financial distress. Based on this 
reasoning, sales manipulation could only be expected to increase operating cash flow 
indicating income-decreasing practices. Therefore, it could be concluded that firms in Jordan 
engage in income-decreasing sales manipulation in order to depict healthier financial 
position. Finally, the coefficients of the remaining control variables are not statistically 
significant, which indicates that firms in Jordan engage in sales earnings management 
regardless of their growth rates (GRWTH) or sizes (SIZE). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
196 
 
Table 6.16. Results of Pooled Multiple Regression Analysis for Abnormal Operating Cash 
Flow Model 
S_ABCFO = α + β1 CONC + β2 CNRTL + β3 INST + β4 FRGN + β5 BIG5 + β6 BRDS + β7 SIZE + β8 GRWTH + β9 LEV + β10-12 YR 
 
 Predicted Direction Coefficient t-Statistic 
Constant 
 
0.478 3.417
***
 
CONC + 0.094 1.761
*
 
CNTRL – -0.037 -2.073
**
 
INST + -0.005 -0.133 
FRGN ? 0.069 1.486 
BIG_5 + -0.007 -0.402 
BRDS 
 
0.000 -0.085 
LEV 
 
0.001 1.974
**
 
GRWTH 
 
0.053 1.335 
SIZE 
 
-0.035 -1.534 
Adjusted R
2
 7.1% 
F-statistic 2.127
 **
 
*** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level. 
**
 Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level. 
*
 Correlation is significant at the 0.10 level. 
S_ABCFO = Square root of absolute value of abnormal cash flow from operating activities; CONC = the 
proportion of common shares held by the largest shareholder and his/her relatives; CNTRL = a dummy variable 
that equals 1 if the largest shareholder and his/her relatives are in control of the firm, and 0 otherwise; INST = 
the proportion of common shares held by the institutions; FRGN = the proportion of common shares held by the 
foreign investors; BIG_5 = a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is being audited by one of the big-5 
auditors in Jordan, and 0 otherwise; BRDS = number of directors on the board; LEV = total liabilities scaled by 
total assets; GRWTH = the change in total assets scaled by lagged total assets; SIZE = natural logarithm of total 
assets. 
 
 
6.2.7.4. Abnormal Production Costs Model: 
Table 6.17 reports results of multiple regression analysis for abnormal production costs 
model. The dependent variable is the transformed absolute values of abnormal production 
costs measured by Roychowdhury’s model (2006). Five hypotheses are tested relating to five 
the independent variables included in the model.  
The model’s F-statistic is 2.027, and is statistically significant at 0.05 levels. The adjusted R2 
is 6.1% suggesting that the combination of independent variables explains 6.1% of the 
variation in manipulated production costs. 
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Although the sing is negative as predicted, the results indicate that H3a is rejected as the 
coefficient of ownership concentration (CONC) is not statistically significant. Consistent 
with Cheng et al. (2010), block holders seem ineffective in monitoring managers’ 
manipulations of production costs. 
The coefficient of controlling shareholders (CNTRL) is negative and statistically significant 
at 0.05 levels. The result confirms H3b which is consistent with Demers and Wang (2010) 
and Cohen et al. (2008) indicating managerial ownership helps align the interests of 
controlling shareholders with those of minority shareholders. As such, managerial ownership 
does serve as an effective deterrence mechanism of production costs manipulations in Jordan. 
Both of H3c and H3d are rejected as neither the coefficient of institutional ownership (INST) 
nor the coefficient of foreign ownership (FRGN) is statistically significant. In terms of 
institutional ownership, the result is neither consistent with Li (2010) who finds institutional 
investors as short-term oriented nor with Roychowdhury (2006) who finds institutional 
investors as an effective constraining corporate governance mechanism. Similarly, the result 
show that levels of abnormal production costs do not differ among firms with different levels 
of foreign ownership. Therefore, institutional and foreign investors do not seem to have 
mitigating or motivating effects on levels of abnormal production costs.  
Consistent with Demers and Wang (2010) and Cohen et al. (2008), the coefficient of big 5 
auditors in Jordan (BIG_5) is statistically insignificant although it holds the correct newly 
predicted sign. Thus, H3e is also rejected implying that managers do not manipulate 
production costs in response to the enhanced scrutiny over abnormal accruals provided by 
non-big 5 in Jordan. 
The coefficient of board size (BRDS) is negative and statistically significant indicating that 
larger boards are more effective than smaller boards in mitigating abnormal production costs 
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in Jordan. As for firm characteristic variables, only the coefficient of growth (GRWTH) is 
statistically significant at 0.01 levels. However, the positive sign of the coefficient does not 
indicate that only firms with higher growth rates are likely to manipulate production costs. 
This is based on the findings of Li (2010) that show growth rates positively associated with 
inventory levels regardless of whether the firm were suspect of practicing production costs 
manipulation or not. Both of the remaining control variables, leverage (LEV) and firm size 
(SIZE) are statistically insignificant, which is consistent with prior research such as 
Visvanathan (2008) and Cheng et al. (2010). 
Table 6.17. Results of Pooled Multiple Regression Analysis for Abnormal Production Costs 
Model 
S_ABPROD = α + β1 CONC + β2 CNRTL + β3 INST + β4 FRGN + β5 BIG5 + β6 BRDS + β7 SIZE + β8 GRWTH + β9 LEV + β10-12 YR 
 
 Predicted Direction Coefficient t-Statistic 
Constant 
 
0.340 2.709
***
 
CONC – -0.016 -0.259 
CNTRL – -0.047 -2.591** 
INST + 0.048 1.325 
FRGN ? -0.055 -1.223 
BIG_5 + -0.002 -0.127 
BRDS 
 
-0.011 -2.418
**
 
LEV 
 
0.000 -0.529 
GRWTH 
 
0.108 2.862
***
 
SIZE 
 
0.005 0.227 
Adjusted R
2
 6.1% 
F-statistic 2.027
**
 
*** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level. 
**
 Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level. 
*
 Correlation is significant at the 0.10 level. 
S_ABPROD = Square root of absolute value of abnormal production costs; CONC = the proportion of common 
shares held by the largest shareholder and his/her relatives; CNTRL = a dummy variable that equals 1 if the 
largest shareholder and his/her relatives are in control of the firm, and 0 otherwise; INST = the proportion of 
common shares held by the institutions; FRGN = the proportion of common shares held by the foreign 
investors; BIG_5 = a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is being audited by one of the big-5 auditors in 
Jordan, and 0 otherwise; BRDS = number of directors on the board; LEV = total liabilities scaled by total assets; 
GRWTH = the change in total assets scaled by lagged total assets; SIZE = natural logarithm of total assets. 
Note: Heteroscedasticity is corrected through White’s heteroscedasticity-consistent estimator.  
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6.2.7.5. Abnormal Discretionary Expenses Model: 
Table 6.18 reports results of pooled multiple regression analysis for the abnormal 
discretionary expenses model. The dependent variable is the transformed absolute values of 
abnormal discretionary expenses measured by Roychowdhury’s model (2006). Five 
hypotheses are tested relating to five the independent variables included in the model.  
The model’s F-statistic is 2.326, and is statistically significant at 0.01 levels. The adjusted R2 
is 8.2% suggesting that the combination of independent variables explains 8.2% of the 
variation in discretionary expenses manipulations. 
Garven (2009) and Cheng et al. (2010) find that levels of ownership concentration do not 
affect levels of abnormal discretionary expenses. Similar to the findings of prior research, the 
coefficient of ownership concentration is statistically insignificant, and hence, H4a is 
rejected. Therefore, the result is neither in favour of the effective monitoring nor the 
opportunistic behaviour of large block holders. 
For the first time, the coefficient of managerial ownership (CNTRL) is statistically 
insignificant. Accordingly, H4b is rejected as there no relationship between managerial 
ownership and abnormal discretionary expenses, which is consistent with Demers and Wang 
(2010). This suggests that no difference occurs in the levels of abnormal discretionary 
expenses whether the largest shareholder occupies the position of chairman or chief executive 
officer. Hence, the fact that the largest shareholder is being in charge of the firm’s affairs 
does not create incentive alignment effect or the entrenchment effect in Jordan. 
Also for the first time, the coefficient of institutional ownership (INST) is statistically 
significant. This result is consistent with the findings of Bushee (1998) and Roychowdhury 
(2006) that portray institutional investors as an effective corporate governance mechanism. 
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Therefore, H4c is confirmed implying that, in Jordan, levels of abnormal discretionary 
expenses decrease as levels of institutional ownership increase. Thus, this inverse relationship 
refutes that institutional investors in Jordan have a myopic behaviour. 
Similar to other real activities models, the coefficients of foreign ownership (FRGN) and big 
5 auditors (BIG_5) are not statistically significant. Hence, both H4d and H4e are rejected.  
Consistent with prior research (e.g. Garven, 2009; Demers and Wang, 2010; Cohen et al., 
2008), the insignificant coefficient of BIG_5 implies that the enhanced scrutiny over 
abnormal accruals provided by non-big 5 in Jordan does not motivate managers to manipulate 
discretionary expenses. 
The marginal significant coefficient of board size (BRDS) might be interpreted as larger 
boards bring greater number of experienced directors who seem to play a role in mitigating 
abnormal discretionary expenses. The insignificant coefficients of firms’ leverage (LEV) and 
growth (GRWTH) indicates that LEV and GRWTH are not associated with abnormal 
discretionary expenses in Jordan as they are not in the US (e.g. Garven, 2009) and China (e.g. 
Cheng et al., 2010). Finally, the coefficient of firms’ size (SIZE) is highly significant and 
positive consistent with Gunny (2010). This indicate the larger the firm, the higher levels of 
abnormal discretionary expenses. 
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Table 6.18. Results of Pooled Multiple Regression Analysis for Abnormal Discretionary 
Expenses Model 
S_ABDISX = α + β1 CONC + β2 CNRTL + β3 INST + β4 FRGN + β5 BIG5 + β6 BRDS + β7 SIZE + β8 GRWTH + β9 LEV + β10-12 YR 
 
 Predicted Direction Coefficient t-Statistic 
Constant 
 
-0.104 -1.344 
CONC – -0.012 -0.424 
CNTRL – 0.010 0.958 
INST – -0.054 -2.572
**
 
FRGN ? -0.010 -0.425 
BIG_5 + -0.003 -0.255 
BRDS 
 
-0.005 -1.848
*
 
LEV 
 
0.000 -1.263 
GRWTH 
 
0.002 0.111 
SIZE 
 
0.044 3.537
***
 
Adjusted R
2
 8.2% 
F-statistic 2.326
***
 
*** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level. 
**
 Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level. 
*
 Correlation is significant at the 0.10 level. 
S_ABDISX = Square root of absolute value of abnormal discretionary expenses; CONC = the proportion of 
common shares held by the largest shareholder and his/her relatives; CNTRL = a dummy variable that equals 1 
if the largest shareholder and his/her relatives are in control of the firm, and 0 otherwise; INST = the proportion 
of common shares held by the institutions; FRGN = the proportion of common shares held by the foreign 
investors; BIG_5 = a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is being audited by one of the big-5 auditors in 
Jordan, and 0 otherwise; BRDS = number of directors on the board; LEV = total liabilities scaled by total assets; 
GRWTH = the change in total assets scaled by lagged total assets; SIZE = natural logarithm of total assets. 
 
 
 
6.3. Alternative Analysis: 
In this section, an alternative approach of earnings management proxies is conducted. Signed 
values of earnings management are used instead of the absolutes values. In addition, current 
accruals are estimated and used instead of total accruals. The following subsection discusses 
the limitations associated with the main analysis that has motivated this alternative analysis. 
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6.3.1. Measurement of Earnings Management Proxies: 
The aim of these changes is overcome some limitations that became apparent in the main 
analysis. These limitations are: 
- At the beginning of this chapter, section 6.2.1 in particular, it is stated that property, 
plant and equipment are included in Kothari et al.’s (2005) model in net values rather 
than gross values due to data limitation. Because depreciation expense could be 
manipulated itself, property, plant and equipment might not accurately control for the 
non-discretionary portion of depreciation expense. As a remedy, current accruals are 
calculated where depreciation expenses is obsolete as follows, 
CAt/At‒1= (∆CAt ‒ ∆Casht ‒ ∆CLt + ∆STDt)/At‒1 
Where, CA = current accruals; A = total assets; ∆CA = change in current assets; ∆CL 
= change in current liabilities; ΔCash = change in cash and cash equivalent; ΔSTD = 
change in debt included in current liabilities. 
Afterwards, normal current accruals are estimated through the model of Kothari et al. 
(2005) yet excluding property, plant and equipment. The residuals of this model are 
considered as the measure for abnormal current accruals. The model can be expressed 
symbolically as follows, 
CAt /At-1 = α + β1 [1/Ait-1] + β2 [(ΔREVt – ∆RECt)/At-1] + β4 ROAt-1 + εit 
Where, CA = current accruals; A = total assets; ΔREV = change in revenues; ε = error 
term; t = year index for the years included in the estimation period. 
- In Chapter Five, section 5.4.1.1, the justification of the appropriateness of using 
absolute values of earnings management is discussed. The reason is that a specific 
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directional prediction is absent in the current research as well as most of prior 
research (Hribar and Nichols, 2007), and hence, the extent to which firms manage 
earnings is best measured by the absolute values of residuals (i.e. amounts of 
managed earnings). Nevertheless, the approach of absolute values of earnings 
management suffers from a certain limitation. Upwards earnings management become 
indistinguishable from downwards earnings management when residuals are taken in 
absolute terms. By doing so, frequencies in which each direction occurs are ignored. 
So if firms tend to manage earnings in a certain direction more frequently than the 
other direction or if a certain corporate governance mechanism act more effectively in 
mitigating one directional earnings management more than the other, interpretations 
of relationships between corporate governance mechanisms and earnings management 
might be clouded. Therefore, conducting an analysis using signed residuals would 
indeed enhance the robustness of the statistical inferences stemmed from the main 
analysis concerning the effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms in 
mitigating all types of earnings management in Jordan. 
- The preceding discussion is of a particular importance to real activities models in 
general and to abnormal cash flow from operating activities model in particular. The 
example given in this chapter, section 6.2.7.3, shows that causal relationships are 
better examined and understood through the use of signed residuals because of joint 
effect of all types of real activities earnings management on operating cash flow. 
Therefore, in order to provide evidence on whether there are differential relations between 
independent variables and measures of earnings management conditional on whether 
managed earnings are income-increasing or income-decreasing, each population is partitioned 
into two groups based on the sign of observations residuals. Examples of studies that use this 
approach include Ashbaugh et al., 2003; Kim et al., 2004; Li, 2008. 
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6.3.2. Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Analysis: 
This subsection presents descriptive statistics for, and means differences between, dependent 
and independent variables in income-increasing and income-decreasing groups. The objective 
is to consider these differences in the interpretation of the results of multiple regression 
analyses. T-statistic (i.e. parametric test) and Mann Whitney tests (non-parametric test) are 
used to measure the significance of mean differences if existed. 
 
6.3.2.1. Singed Abnormal Current Accruals Model: 
Table 6.19 presents mean and median income-increasing abnormal current accruals are 29% 
and 28.2% of total assets, respectively. This is significantly higher than 25.2% mean and 24% 
median income-decreasing abnormal current accruals in both parametric and non-parametric 
tests, namely at 0.05 levels. The interpretation is that listed manufacturing companies in 
Jordan engage in income-increasing accruals earnings management more than they engage in 
income-decreasing accruals earnings management.  
The only case where mean and median of an independent variable in the income-increasing 
group are higher than those in the income-decreasing group relates to ownership 
concentration. As for controlling shareholder, institutional ownership, foreign ownership and 
big 5 auditors, means and medians of these independent variables are lower in the income-
increasing group than those in the income-decreasing group. Nevertheless, no significant 
differences exist between means of all independent variables in both groups. Although the 
differences are statistically insignificant, the implication is vital. In the later regression 
analyses of the effectiveness of independent variables in constraining income-increasing and 
income-decreasing abnormal current accruals, causal relationships would not be a result of 
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differences in levels of ownership or the presence controlling shareholder and big 5 auditors. 
For example, if institutional ownership is found to be negatively associated with income-
increasing abnormal current accruals but not significantly associated with income-decreasing 
abnormal current accruals, this would not arise because of high (low) levels of institutional 
ownership in income-increasing (-decreasing) group. 
Table 6.19. Pooled Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Tests for Abnormal Current 
Accruals Model  
Variable 
Income-Increasing Income-Decreasing Mean Difference 
Mean Median 
Std. 
Dev. Mean Median 
Std. 
Dev. t-stat 
Mann 
Whitney 
S_CA 0.290 0.282 0.135 0.252 0.240 0.114 2.145** -2.032** 
CONC 0.346 0.332 0.191 0.319 0.250 0.223 0.883 -1.629 
CNTRL 0.432 0.000 0.498 0.445 0.000 0.499 -0.191 -0.192 
INST 0.422 0.444 0.252 0.465 0.462 0.252 -1.195 -1.278 
FRGN 0.160 0.054 0.194 0.176 0.085 0.237 -0.524 -0.570 
BIG_5 0.511 1.000 0.503 0.591 1.000 0.494 -1.117 -1.116 
BRDS 7.841 7.000 1.844 8.345 8.000 2.324 -1.703* -1.660* 
LEV 0.400 0.389 0.195 0.319 0.274 0.287 2.217** -3.604*** 
GRWTH 0.178 0.128 0.256 0.066 -0.009 0.644 1.541 -5.681*** 
SIZE 7.170 7.116 0.426 7.147 7.116 0.492 0.341 -0.102 
*** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level. 
**
 Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level. 
*
 Correlation is significant at the 0.10 level. 
S_CA = Square root of abnormal current accruals; CONC = the proportion of common shares held by the largest 
shareholder and his/her relatives; CNTRL = a dummy variable that equals 1 if the largest shareholder and 
his/her relatives are in control of the firm, and 0 otherwise; INST = the proportion of common shares held by the 
institutions; FRGN = the proportion of common shares held by the foreign investors; BIG_5 = a dummy 
variable that equals 1 if the firm is being audited by one of the big-5 auditors in Jordan, and 0 otherwise; BRDS 
= number of directors on the board; LEV = total liabilities scaled by total assets; GRWTH = the change in total 
assets scaled by lagged total assets; SIZE = natural logarithm of total assets. 
 
 
6.3.2.2. Signed Abnormal Cash Flow from Operating Activities Model: 
The results exhibited in table 6.20 presents mean and median income-increasing abnormal 
operating cash flow are 24.1% and 23.9% of total assets, respectively. As for income-
decreasing abnormal operating cash flow, the mean and median are 26% mean and 26.2% of 
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total assets, respectively. Both parametric and non-parametric tests are not statistically 
significant indicating that the magnitude of income-increasing sales manipulation is not 
different from that of income-decreasing sales manipulation in Jordan. 
Means differences in levels of ownership concentration and foreign ownership are 
statistically insignificant between the groups of income-increasing and income-decreasing 
abnormal operating cash flow. Similarly, means of the presence of big 5 auditors does not 
statistically differ between the two groups. This indicates that any possible differences in the 
effectiveness of these independent variables would not be dependent on differences in levels 
of ownership concentration, foreign ownership or the presence of big 5 auditors. 
A marginal significant difference exists between means managerial ownership. Mean 
managerial ownership in income-increasing group, 35.4%, is lower than mean managerial 
ownership, 50%, in income-decreasing group. Further, there is a statistically significant 
difference among means of institutional ownership between the two groups. Mean 
institutional ownership is 42.1% in income-increasing group which is lower than the 48.6% 
in income-decreasing group. Bearing in mind that there is statistical means difference 
between reported abnormal operating cash flow, if any of these variables appear significant in 
one regression and insignificant in the other, then there is a possibility, not a probability, 
these findings result from differences in means between the two groups. 
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 Table 6.20. Pooled Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Tests for Abnormal Operating Cash 
Flow Model  
Variable 
Income-Increasing Income-Decreasing Mean Difference 
Mean Median 
Std. 
Dev. Mean Median 
Std. 
Dev. t-stat 
Mann 
Whitney 
S_CFO 0.241 0.239 0.091 0.260 0.262 0.101 -1.275 -1.465 
CONC 0.314 0.283 0.189 0.337 0.295 0.219 -0.718 -0.523 
CNTRL 0.354 0.000 0.481 0.500 0.500 0.503 -1.910
*
 -1.891
*
 
INST 0.421 0.404 0.237 0.486 0.512 0.244 -1.738
*
 -2.042
**
 
FRGN 0.176 0.065 0.214 0.179 0.101 0.236 -0.093 -0.200 
BIG_5 0.519 1.000 0.503 0.636 1.000 0.484 -1.533 -1.530 
BRDS 7.835 7.000 1.996 8.352 8.500 2.264 -1.557 -1.363 
LEV 0.398 0.347 0.305 0.296 0.267 0.194 2.609
**
 -2.760
***
 
GRWTH 0.164 0.047 0.771 0.040 0.020 0.167 1.475 -1.180 
SIZE 7.152 7.125 0.486 7.168 7.116 0.484 -0.215 -0.365 
*** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level. 
**
 Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level. 
*
 Correlation is significant at the 0.10 level. 
S_CFO = Square root of abnormal cash flow from operating activities; CONC = the proportion of common 
shares held by the largest shareholder and his/her relatives; CNTRL = a dummy variable that equals 1 if the 
largest shareholder and his/her relatives are in control of the firm, and 0 otherwise; INST = the proportion of 
common shares held by the institutions; FRGN = the proportion of common shares held by the foreign 
investors; BIG_5 = a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is being audited by one of the big-5 auditors in 
Jordan, and 0 otherwise; BRDS = number of directors on the board; LEV = total liabilities scaled by total assets; 
GRWTH = the change in total assets scaled by lagged total assets; SIZE = natural logarithm of total assets. 
 
 
6.3.2.3. Singed Abnormal Production Costs Model: 
Table 6.21 shows that the mean and median of income-increasing abnormal production costs 
are 22.5% and 24.3% of total assets, respectively. As for income-decreasing abnormal 
production costs, the mean and median are 26.5% mean and 24.5% of total assets, 
respectively. Although mean abnormal production costs in income-decreasing group is 
higher, results of parametric and non-parametric tests are not statistically significant 
indicating that magnitudes of abnormal production costs reported by listed manufacturing 
firms in Jordan do not differ between income-increasing and income-decreasing groups. 
218 
 
The only statistically significant difference of means among independent variables exists 
between means of big 5 auditors. Mean big 5 is 50% in income-increasing group which is 
lower than the 62.2% mean big 5 in income-decreasing group. Although the statistical 
difference is marginal, namely at 0.1 levels, the results indicate that while big and non-big 5 
auditors have the same number of clients, big 5 auditors provide audit services to more that 
62% of firms in income-decreasing group. 
The results for the other four independent variables show no statistically significant 
differences in means. Therefore, this indicates that any possible differences in the 
effectiveness of these independent variables in both groups would not be dependent on 
differences in levels of ownership concentration, managerial ownership, institutional 
ownership and foreign ownership. 
 Table 6.21. Pooled Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Tests for Abnormal Production 
Costs Model 
Variable 
Income-Increasing Income-Decreasing Mean Difference 
Mean Median 
Std. 
Dev. Mean Median 
Std. 
Dev. t-stat 
Mann 
Whitney 
S_PROD 0.255 0.243 0.111 0.265 0.245 0.124 -0.578 -0.724 
CONC 0.325 0.294 0.195 0.343 0.297 0.225 -0.580 -0.260 
CNTRL 0.444 0.000 0.500 0.418 0.000 0.496 0.359 -0.360 
INST 0.467 0.460 0.263 0.449 0.479 0.242 0.493 -0.274 
FRGN 0.198 0.105 0.243 0.160 0.067 0.221 1.132 -1.264 
BIG_5 0.500 0.500 0.503 0.622 1.000 0.487 -1.693
*
 -1.687
*
 
BRDS 8.022 8.000 2.072 8.061 7.500 2.219 -0.124 -0.093 
LEV 0.415 0.342 0.323 0.298 0.298 0.161 3.090
***
 -2.541
**
 
GRWTH 0.113 0.076 0.280 0.034 0.030 0.169 2.307
**
 -1.929
*
 
SIZE 7.150 7.104 0.492 7.119 7.116 0.442 0.452 -0.054 
*** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level. 
**
 Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level. 
*
 Correlation is significant at the 0.10 level. 
S_PROD = Square root of abnormal production costs; CONC = the proportion of common shares held by the 
largest shareholder and his/her relatives; CNTRL = a dummy variable that equals 1 if the largest shareholder 
and his/her relatives are in control of the firm, and 0 otherwise; INST = the proportion of common shares held 
by the institutions; FRGN = the proportion of common shares held by the foreign investors; BIG_5 = a dummy 
variable that equals 1 if the firm is being audited by one of the big-5 auditors in Jordan, and 0 otherwise; BRDS 
= number of directors on the board; LEV = total liabilities scaled by total assets; GRWTH = the change in total 
assets scaled by lagged total assets; SIZE = natural logarithm of total assets. 
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6.3.2.4. Signed Abnormal Discretionary Expenses Model: 
Like the aforementioned real activities earnings management, table 6.22 shows that mean 
difference between income-increasing and income-decreasing abnormal discretionary 
expenses are statistically insignificant, either according to parametric or non-parametric tests 
results. Mean and median of income-increasing abnormal discretionary expenses are 13.7% 
and 14.2% of total assets, respectively. As for income-decreasing abnormal discretionary 
expenses, the mean and median are higher than those in the other group, namely a mean of 
15.7% and a median of 14% of total assets, respectively. Yet the insignificant mean 
difference implies that magnitudes of abnormal discretionary expenses reported by listed 
manufacturing firms in Jordan do not differ between income-increasing and income-
decreasing groups. 
Significant differences in means of institutional ownership and foreign ownership appear in 
table 6.22. Mean institutional ownership in income-increasing group is 48.3% and is higher 
the 40.6% mean institutional ownership in the other group. Mean foreign ownership in 
income-increasing group is 19.2% and is also higher the 10.2% mean foreign ownership in 
the other group. Therefore, if institutional and/or foreign ownership are found significantly 
associated with abnormal discretionary expenses in one group and insignificantly associated 
with abnormal discretionary expenses in the other, then there is a possibility that these 
findings result from differences in means between the two groups. 
As for ownership concentration, managerial ownership, and big 5 auditors, the results show 
no statistically significant differences in means between the two groups. As such, any 
possible differences in the effectiveness of these independent variables in regression analyses 
would not be dependent on means differences between the two groups. 
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 Table 6.22. Pooled Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Tests for Abnormal Discretionary 
Expenses Model 
Variable 
Income-Increasing Income-Decreasing Mean Difference 
Mean Median 
Std. 
Dev. Mean Median 
Std. 
Dev. t-stat 
Mann 
Whitney 
S_DISX 0.137 0.142 0.044 0.157 0.140 0.088 -1.335 -0.813 
CONC 0.338 0.322 0.203 0.300 0.231 0.212 1.182 -1.624 
CNTRL 0.415 0.000 0.495 0.429 0.000 0.499 -0.171 -0.171 
INST 0.483 0.508 0.245 0.406 0.416 0.219 2.057
**
 -2.086
**
 
FRGN 0.192 0.102 0.237 0.102 0.039 0.139 3.106
***
 -2.632
***
 
BIG_5 0.519 1.000 0.502 0.603 1.000 0.493 -1.067 -1.062 
BRDS 8.462 9.000 2.006 7.873 7.000 2.189 1.785
*
 -1.873
*
 
LEV 0.369 0.350 0.216 0.320 0.288 0.189 1.492 -1.424 
GRWTH 0.095 0.049 0.246 0.046 0.018 0.201 1.361 -1.304 
SIZE 7.256 7.177 0.437 6.999 7.031 0.436 3.701
***
 -3.267
***
 
*** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level. 
**
 Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level. 
*
 Correlation is significant at the 0.10 level. 
S_DISX = Square root of abnormal discretionary expenses; CONC = the proportion of common shares held by 
the largest shareholder and his/her relatives; CNTRL = a dummy variable that equals 1 if the largest shareholder 
and his/her relatives are in control of the firm, and 0 otherwise; INST = the proportion of common shares held 
by the institutions; FRGN = the proportion of common shares held by the foreign investors; BIG_5 = a dummy 
variable that equals 1 if the firm is being audited by one of the big-5 auditors in Jordan, and 0 otherwise; BRDS 
= number of directors on the board; LEV = total liabilities scaled by total assets; GRWTH = the change in total 
assets scaled by lagged total assets; SIZE = natural logarithm of total assets. 
 
 
6.3.3. Multiple Regression Analysis: 
6.3.3.1. Signed Abnormal Current Accruals Model: 
Table 6.23 presents results of multiple regression analyses for income-increasing and income-
decreasing abnormal current accruals. Income increasing and income-decreasing models’ F-
statistics (R
2
) are 3.501 (25.7%) and 2.557 (14.6%), respectively. Both F-statistics are 
statistically significant at 0.01 levels.  
Similar to the results of absolute abnormal accruals model, the coefficients for ownership 
concentration (CONC) are statistically insignificant in income-increasing and income-
decreasing groups. Also similar to the findings of absolute abnormal total accruals, 
211 
 
managerial ownership (CNTRL) is negatively and significantly associated with current 
accruals in both directions. Bearing in mind that there is no significant difference in mean 
CNTRL between the two groups, the result substantiates the findings of the main analysis: 
the largest block holders in Jordan become effective in monitoring managerial opportunistic 
behaviour when they play managerial roles themselves (i.e. controlling shareholders). This 
implies that agency theory predictions are validated partially as only managerial ownership 
appears to align the interests of controlling shareholders with those of minority shareholders.  
As for institutional ownership (INST), the coefficients are statistically insignificant, thus 
substantiating the probability that institutional investors are passive shareholders as they do 
not actively participate in the governance of their corporate holdings in Jordan. Therefore, the 
results provide no evidence consistent with agency predictions that institutional investors use 
their superior abilities and resources in acquiring and processing information to monitor the 
opportunistic behaviour of managers. 
The coefficient for foreign ownership (FRGN) is statistically insignificant in the income-
increasing group and negative and statistically significant in the income-decreasing group. 
These results indicate that foreign investors in Jordan, who only prevent income-decreasing 
practices, are focused on current earnings performance but to a certain extent because if they 
were excessively short-term oriented, the coefficient would have appeared positive and 
significant in the income-increasing group. 
The positive and significant coefficient of big 5 auditors (BIG_5) validates the findings of 
absolute abnormal accruals that non-big 5 auditors in Jordan who actually constrain earnings 
management. Yet this result applies only to income-decreasing abnormal current accruals. No 
significant relationship is found between auditor size and income-increasing abnormal current 
accruals. Consistent with Ashbaugh et al. (2003), this indicates that the negative association 
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between non-big 5 and absolute abnormal accruals, found in the main analysis, is mainly 
driven by income-decreasing practices. Another possible interpretation is that the earnings 
management proxy in alternative analysis is current accruals not total accruals as in the main 
analysis. It is plausible that managers manipulate depreciation expense downwards to 
increase abnormal accruals. With property, plant and equipment obsolete from the estimation 
model of abnormal current accruals, the amounts of income-increasing abnormal current 
accruals might have decreased and hence making auditor size appears ineffective in 
mitigating accruals earnings management. 
Board size (BRDS) is negatively and significantly related to income-decreasing abnormal 
current accruals but not significantly associated with income-increasing abnormal accruals. A 
possible interpretation is as boards become larger, income-decreasing accruals that affect 
earnings-based managers’ bonus contracts decrease. 
The findings in the main analysis suggest that managers of financially distressed firms in 
Jordan engage in accruals earnings management to either avoid violating debt covenants or 
renegotiate lending contracts yet the results in table 6.23 indicates otherwise. None of these 
motivations seems to have an effect as the coefficients of leverage (LEV) is not significantly 
associated with signed accruals. Even though the mean of leverage in the income-increasing 
group is significantly higher, the results show that leverage rates are not high enough to 
support firms’ avoidance of violating debt covenants.  
The coefficient of growth (GRWTH) is positively related to income-increasing abnormal 
current accruals. Not only this result is consistent with abnormal absolute accruals model, but 
also is reflective of mean difference found between growth rates between the two groups. 
Higher growth rates in the income-increasing group imply that managers might use abnormal 
current accruals to avoid reporting negative growth rates that might affect their bonuses. 
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Firm size (SIZE) is negatively associated with income-increasing abnormal current accruals. 
This is consistent with large firm reporting less abnormal accruals (Dechow and Dichev, 
2002). However, this finding is only consistent with income-increasing group as the 
coefficient of SIZE is not statistically significant in the income-decreasing group. 
Table 6.23. Results of Pooled Multiple Regression Analysis for Income-Increasing and 
Decreasing Abnormal Current Accruals Model 
S_ABCA = α + β1 CONC + β2 CNRTL + β3 INST + β4 FRGN + β5 BIG5 + β6 BRDS + β7 SIZE + β8 GRWTH + β9 LEV + β10-12 YR 
  
Income-Increasing Income-decreasing 
Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic 
Constant 0.922 3.412
***
 0.229 1.385 
CONC 0.089 0.884 0.050 0.802 
CNTRL -0.065 -2.046
**
 -0.078 -3.536
***
 
INST 0.023 0.413 0.025 0.538 
FRGN 0.087 1.145 -0.112 -2.018
**
 
BIG_5 0.009 0.310 0.048 2.066
**
 
BRDS -0.007 -0.782 -0.027 -3.797
***
 
LEV 0.001 1.199 0.000 -0.378 
GRWTH 0.276 4.666
***
 0.015 0.876 
SIZE -0.092 -2.258
**
 0.035 1.257 
Adjusted R
2
 25.7% 14.6%  
F-statistic 3.501
***
  2.557
***
 
*** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level. 
**
 Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level. 
*
 Correlation is significant at the 0.10 level. 
S_ABCA = Square root of abnormal current accruals; CONC = the proportion of common shares held by the 
largest shareholder and his/her relatives; CNTRL = a dummy variable that equals 1 if the largest shareholder 
and his/her relatives are in control of the firm, and 0 otherwise; INST = the proportion of common shares held 
by the institutions; FRGN = the proportion of common shares held by the foreign investors; BIG_5 = a dummy 
variable that equals 1 if the firm is being audited by one of the big-5 auditors in Jordan, and 0 otherwise; BRDS 
= number of directors on the board; LEV = total liabilities scaled by total assets; GRWTH = the change in total 
assets scaled by lagged total assets; SIZE = natural logarithm of total assets. 
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6.3.3.2. Singed Abnormal Real Activities Models: 
As noted earlier, the impact of real activities earnings management on cash flows could be 
ambiguous. Specifically, income-increasing practices such as price discounts and 
overproduction decrease cash flows while cutting discretionary expenses increase cash flows 
from operations. Therefore, the effect of ownership structure and auditor size on income-
increasing and income-decreasing levels of real activities earnings management are discussed 
collectively in this section. 
Table 6.24 presents results of multiple regression analyses for income-increasing and income-
decreasing abnormal operating cash flow model, abnormal production costs model and 
abnormal discretionary expenses. All six regressions are statistically significant at either 0.05 
or 0.01 levels. Moreover, adjusted R
2’s for the six regressions range from 11.5% to 26.1% 
indicating that these regressions have reasonable explanatory power. 
The coefficient of ownership concentration (CONC) in abnormal operating cash flow model 
is positive and highly significant. As such, the largest shareholder seems to put pressure on 
managers to increase sales and hence increase reported earnings. This implies that those 
shareholders are not financially sophisticated or adopt short-term strategies. The other 
significant coefficient is found in abnormal discretionary expenses model. However, the sign 
on the coefficient is negative indicating that large shareholders mitigate discretionary 
expenditures because of a suspicion that managements might be channelling wealth from the 
firm to their own benefits. 
Coefficients of controlling shareholders (CNTRL) appear negative and significant in the 
income-increasing group of abnormal operating cash flow model and in the income-
decreasing group of abnormal production costs model. These results provide confirmatory 
evidence of the effectiveness of controlling shareholders (i.e. managerial ownership) in 
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constraining real activities earnings management that is found in the main analysis. That is, 
controlling shareholders seems to prevent real manipulations because of the costly 
consequences of this type of manipulation whether these manipulations were income-
increasing or income-decreasing and regardless of the net effect on cash flow from 
operations. 
The coefficients of institutional ownership (INST) are statistically significant in the income-
decreasing groups of abnormal production costs and abnormal discretionary expenses 
models. However, these coefficients have opposite signs. The former is positive indicating 
that high levels of institutional ownership are directly associated with underproduction 
practices. It seems difficult to comprehend that institutional investors would benefit from 
such income-decreasing practices. Therefore, a possible interpretation of this positive 
association the effect on cash flow rather reported earnings as underproduction practices lead 
to abnormally high operating cash flow which might be desirable to institutional investors. 
The latter coefficient is negative leading to two possible interpretations. The first 
substantiates that high levels of institutional ownership are interested in high cash flows. 
Bearing in mind that income-decreasing abnormal discretionary expenses entail more 
spending which results in lower cash flows, institutional investors might exert pressure on 
managers to decrease discretionary expenses to increase cash flows from operations. The 
second interpretation is that institutional investors are simply concerned with higher reported 
earnings figures as they attempt to prevent discretionary expenses that decrease reported 
earnings. These interpretations pour into one conclusion that institutional investors in Jordan 
are short-term oriented as they act passively in the governance of their corporate holdings. 
Foreign ownership (FRGN) is positively associated with income-decreasing abnormal 
operating cash flow and negatively associated with income-decreasing abnormal production 
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costs. A plausible interpretation is that firms with high levels of foreign ownership tend to 
have a healthy operating process as they prevent underproduction so as to have sufficient 
levels of inventory, but at the same time, those firms have more stringent credit terms so as to 
avoid high bad debt expenses. Similar to the effect on reported earnings, the overall effect of 
FRGN on cash flow seems neutral as well. That is, high levels of foreign ownership is 
positively associated with high abnormal operating cash flow (i.e. income-decreasing sales 
manipulation) and negatively associated with high abnormal operating cash flow (i.e. 
income-decreasing production costs manipulation). 
Although the discussion above relates only to statistically significant relationships, it is 
important to note that coefficients of big 5 auditors in Jordan (BIG_5) are not statistically 
significant in both groups and in all models. This finding supports those found in the main 
analyses where no substitutive effects are documented. Accordingly, the scrutiny of external 
audit over abnormal accruals does not lead managers to manipulate earnings through real 
activities whether such manipulations were income-increasing or income-decreasing. 
Board size (BRDS) appears significant only in preventing income-decreasing abnormal 
discretionary expenses. Two indications could be stemmed from this finding. First, as number 
of directors increases the more effective they become in preserving shareholders wealth from 
managerial actions that aim to cover wealth channelling practices. Second, larger boards are 
not as effective as expected in mitigating sales and production costs manipulations. Leverage 
(LEV) seems to be associated with high levels of inventory. Because lenders consider the 
intrinsic value in the inventory, the coefficient of LEV is positive in the income-increasing 
group and negative in the income-decreasing group. As for the coefficients of growth 
(GRWTH), the overall results indicate that firms with high growth rate have lower cash flows 
(i.e. the net effect of types of manipulations) than firms with low growth rates. Finally, the 
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positive and statistically significant coefficients of firm size (SIZE) in both groups of 
abnormal discretionary expenses model indicate that large firms have superior abilities to 
manipulate discretionary expenses than small firms. This might be because large firms have 
more diversified and complex accounts than small firms.      
218 
 
Table 6.24. Results of Pooled Multiple Regression Analyses for Income-Increasing and Decreasing Real Activities Earnings Management Models 
Variable 
Abnormal Operating Cash Flow Abnormal Production Costs Abnormal Discretionary Expenses 
Inc-Increasing Inc-Decreasing Inc-Increasing Inc-Decreasing Inc-Increasing Inc-Decreasing 
Coef. t-Stat Coef. t-Stat Coef. t-Stat Coef. t-Stat Coef. t-Stat Coef. t-Stat 
Constant 0.194 1.212 0.229 1.255 0.473 2.586
**
 0.379 1.704
*
 -0.090 -1.198 -0.459 -2.368
**
 
CONC 0.277 3.676
***
 -0.054 -0.797 -0.029 -0.297 0.036 0.507 -0.065 -2.097
**
 -0.025 -0.427 
CNTRL -0.068 -2.884
***
 -0.008 -0.357 -0.031 -1.182 -0.074 -2.889
***
 0.002 0.164 -0.008 -0.355 
INST -0.031 -0.678 0.049 0.942 0.027 0.560 0.147 2.286
**
 -0.012 -0.597 -0.105 -2.050
**
 
FRGN -0.053 -0.999 0.143 2.257
**
 -0.036 -0.571 -0.164 -2.238
**
 0.020 0.822 -0.058 -0.728 
BIG_5 0.022 0.969 -0.025 -1.010 -0.031 -1.229 -0.015 -0.534 -0.013 -1.415 0.009 0.396 
BRDS 0.002 0.296 -0.003 -0.351 -0.011 -1.466 -0.011 -1.364 -0.001 -0.289 -0.016 -2.466
**
 
LEV 0.000 0.996 0.001 1.492 0.001 2.111
**
 -0.002 -2.325
**
 0.000 -1.547 0.000 -0.750 
GRWTH 0.017 1.260 -0.122 -1.799
*
 0.190 3.961
***
 0.125 1.625 0.032 1.690
*
 0.094 1.732
*
 
SIZE -0.009 -0.377 0.010 0.305 -0.023 -0.775 0.004 0.113 0.036 3.101
***
 0.112 3.457
***
 
Adj. R
2
 15.60% 11.5%  18.50% 12.7%  11.60%  26.1% 
F-Stat. 2.200
**
  1.940
**
 2.689
***
  2.171
**
 2.145
**
  2.822
***
 
***
 Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level. 
**
 Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level. 
*
 Correlation is significant at the 0.10 level. 
CONC = the proportion of common shares held by the largest shareholder and his/her relatives; CNTRL = a dummy variable that equals 1 if the largest shareholder and 
his/her relatives are in control of the firm, and 0 otherwise; INST = the proportion of common shares held by the institutions; FRGN = the proportion of common shares held 
by the foreign investors; BIG_5 = a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is being audited by one of the big-5 auditors in Jordan, and 0 otherwise; BRDS = number of 
directors on the board; LEV = total liabilities scaled by total assets; GRWTH = the change in total assets scaled by lagged total assets; SIZE = natural logarithm of total 
assets. 
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6.3.3.3. Additional Analysis: The Substitutive Effect: 
The findings in the previous analyses concerning the substitutive effect in Jordan suggest that 
enhanced external audit quality (i.e. auditor size) over abnormal accruals does not affect 
levels of real activities manipulations. In Chapter Three, however, it is articulated that costs 
of each type of earnings management represent an important factor that might affect 
managers decisions concerning the extent to which each type is used to arrive at the desired 
levels of earnings. Moreover, the timing of each type of manipulation is also another 
important factor. On the one hand, accruals earnings management takes place at the end of 
the fiscal year. However, if the accruals available for manipulation have been constrained by 
the manipulation in prior periods and/or the scrutiny of auditors, firms might run at the risk of 
a shortfall on meeting target earnings (Gunny, 2010). On the other hand, the manipulation of 
real activities must take place during a fiscal period because such manipulation would not 
affect reported earnings if practiced at the end of the financial period. Therefore, Zang (2012) 
concludes that managers use accruals and real activities manipulation strategies in a 
sequential order. 
Based on this reasoning, Zang (2012) explores whether costs that managers bear, and 
constraints they face, for manipulating accruals would affect their decisions about real 
activities manipulations. After the estimation of abnormal levels of real activities (accruals) 
manipulation according to Roychowdhury’s (modified Jones) model, she creates a measure 
(ABRM) that aggregates the abnormal levels of production costs and discretionary expenses. 
That is, abnormal discretionary expenses are multiplied by negative one (so that higher values 
indicate income-increasing practices) then added to abnormal production costs. As such, she 
excludes abnormal operating cash flow from the aggregate measure because of the 
ambiguous net effect of abnormal production costs and abnormal discretionary expenses on 
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abnormal operating cash flow. Afterwards, she fashions a recursive model based on costs, 
timing and constraints associated with both types of earnings management. Symbolically, 
ABRM = β0 + ∑ β1,k cost of ABRMk + ∑ β2,L cost of ABACL + ∑ β3,m control variables + µ 
ABAC = γ0 + ∑ γ1,k cost of ABACk + ∑ γ2,L cost of ABRML + γ3 Unexpected RM  
 + ∑ γ4,m control variables +   
The recursive model aims to capture the sequential relationship between accruals and real 
activities earnings management. Therefore, the residual values from the first equation 
(Unexpected RM) are included in the second equation because the extent of accruals earnings 
management is determined by the unexpected amount of real activities manipulation realised 
along with the costs associated with earnings management activities. 
Zang’s (2012) model is employed in the current research with minor changes. The costs 
associated with real activities manipulations that are included in this research are market 
share (M_SHARE) and Altman’s Z-score for emerging markets (EM_Z-score)27. The former 
is measured as the ratio of a firm’s sales to the total sales of its industry which captures the 
inverse of the costs associated with real activities manipulation. The latter is a measure of a 
firm’s financial health where higher values of Z-score indicate a healthier financial condition 
and a lower cost associated with real activities manipulation. The costs associated with 
accruals earnings management that are included in this research are net operating assets 
(NOA) and the length of operating cycle (CYCLE). The former measure is aimed to proxy 
for abnormal accruals in previous periods. As such the cost of accruals earnings management 
in the current period would increase if NOA was overstated at the beginning of the period. 
                                                 
27 Zang (2012) uses a Z-score developed by Altman (2000) that is based on US data. The Z-score used in this 
research is that developed by Altman (2005) for emerging markets which is:  
EM Z-score = 3.25 + 6.56 (working capital / total assets) + 3.26 (retained earnings / total assets) + 6.72 
(operating income / total assets) + 1.05 (book value of equity / total liabilities). 
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NOA is proxied by a dummy variable that equals one if NOA (t-1) / lagged sales is above the 
median of the corresponding industry-year, and zero otherwise. The second measure aims to 
proxy for the firm’s flexibility for accruals earnings management as firms with longer 
operating cycles have greater flexibility for accruals manipulations. CYCLE is measured as 
days inventory plus days receivable minus days payable at the beginning of the year. 
Along with leverage (LEV), growth (GRWTH) and size (SIZE), three more control variables 
are included in this model. First, return on assets (ROA) is included to control for 
performance only in the regression of RM because ABCA has already been estimated 
through Kothari et al.’s model that includes ROA as a driver. Second, managerial ownership 
or controlling shareholders (CNTRL) is included in both models as the results obtained from 
previous analyses provide evidence concerning its effectiveness in constraining both types of 
earnings management. Finally, following Zang (2012), the predicted amount of real activities 
manipulation (Pred_RM) is included only in ABCA model to control for the extent of real 
manipulations. 
Table 6.25 exhibits the results of the recursive model to measure the trade-off between 
accruals and real activities earnings management in Jordan. F-statistic and adjusted R
2
 for 
ABRM regression are 4.339, which is statistically significant at 0.01 levels, and 19.9%, 
respectively. F-statistic and adjusted R
2
 for ABAC regression are 6.999, which is statistically 
significant at 0.01 levels, and 34.8%, respectively. 
The first result is the one that directly relates to the trade-off effect. The coefficient of 
Unexpected RM is significant and positive. This is opposite to the negative relationship found 
in Zang’s study which indicates that unexpectedly high (low) real activities manipulation 
realised is offset by lower (higher) amount of accrual earnings management, and hence 
supports the substitutive effect in US market. Therefore, unlike the US, the positive 
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relationship shows that managers in Jordan use both types of earnings management 
simultaneously to arrive at target levels of earnings. This is consistent with the argument 
proposed by Fields et al. (2001). Further, the result substantiates the findings in the previous 
analyses where levels of real activities manipulations are found not to be affected by the 
enhance scrutiny of external auditors over abnormal accruals. That is, managers in Jordanian 
firms manipulate earnings using both types of earnings management regardless of the 
scrutiny from regulatory bodies and external audit. 
Coefficients of Market share (M_SHARE) are not statistically significant in both regressions 
implying that costs associated with real activities manipulation do not prevent firms in Jordan 
from engaging in the costly real earnings management, and similarly, in the less costly 
accruals earnings management. As for financial health condition, the coefficients of EM Z-
score are positive and statistically significant at 0.01 levels. This indicates that firms in 
Jordan with healthy financial conditions manipulate their earnings more than other firms 
because costs associated with both types of earnings management are less for financially 
healthy firms. In terms of net operating assets, the coefficient of NOA is negative in both 
regressions. Yet it is insignificant in ABRM regression and significant in ABAC regression. 
The difference in significances validates the finding of no substitutive effect in Jordan. The 
fact that both types are practiced simultaneously in Jordan supports this result which suggests 
that real activities earnings management are not affected by prior period’s abnormal accruals. 
But because prior period’s accruals earnings management reverses in the current period, the 
coefficient of NOA is significant in the ABAC regression. The coefficients of CYCLE are 
statistically insignificant in both regressions which are suggestive of the simultaneous 
engagement in both types of earnings management. Further, firms with longer operating 
cycles do not have greater flexibility for accruals manipulations than firms with shorter 
operating cycles (i.e. the greater flexibility does not affect accruals manipulations). 
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As for control variables, the significant coefficient of return on assets (ROA) highlights the 
importance for controlling for performance  in real activities model similar to accruals model. 
Managerial ownership (CNTRL) is as expected have an inverse relationship with both types 
of earnings management. The coefficient of the control variable (Pred_RM) is statistically 
insignificant contrast to that in Zang’s (2012). This result is also suggestive of the 
simultaneous effect in Jordan as levels of real activities manipulations are not affected by 
levels of abnormal accruals. As such, it could be concluded that both types of earnings 
manipulations are not determined sequentially. The coefficients of leverage (LEV) and 
growth (GRWTH) are positive and statistically significant and hence these results provide 
confirmatory evidence of the findings obtained from previous analyses. That is, managers of 
financially distressed firms in Jordan manipulate earnings to either avoid violating debt 
covenants or renegotiate lending contracts, and to avoid reporting negative growth rates that 
might affect their bonuses. The coefficient of firm size (SIZE) appears insignificantly 
associated with real activities earnings management regression which is generally consistent 
with previous analyses’ findings. Yet unlike previous findings, the coefficient appears 
insignificant in abnormal accruals model. This might be due to controlling for the costs of 
real activities earnings management.  
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Table 6.25. The Substitutive Relation between Real Activities-based and Accruals-based 
Earnings Management 
Variable 
ABRM ABAC 
Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic 
Constant -0.283 -2.195
**
 -0.080 0.566 
Unexpected RM - - 0.192 2.268
**
 
Costs associated with real activities 
manipulation:     
M_SHARE 0.013 0.338 -0.015 -0.381 
EM_Z-Score 0.006 2.878
***
 0.007 2.638
***
 
Costs associated with accruals 
earnings management:     
NOA -0.005 -0.375 -0.030 -2.139
**
 
CYCLE 0.000 -0.901 0.000 -0.775 
Control variables: 
    
ROA -0.324 -4.108
***
 - - 
CNTRL -0.052 -3.607
***
 -0.068 -3.456
***
 
Pred_RM - - -0.379 -1.347 
LEV 0.134 3.748
***
 0.147 2.645
***
 
GRWTH 0.141 3.877
***
 0.317 6.930
***
 
SIZE 0.030 1.655 -0.006 -0.348 
Adjusted R2 19.90% 34.80% 
F-Statistic 4.339
***
 6.999
***
 
*** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level. 
**
 Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level. 
ABRM = abnormal production costs plus negative one multiplied by abnormal discretionary accruals; ABAC = 
abnormal accruals; Unexpected RM = the estimated residual from ABRM regression; M_SHARE = the 
percentage of a firm’s sales to total sales in its industry-year; EM_Z-score = Altman’s Z-score for emerging 
markets; NOA = dummy variable that equals one if net operating assets divided by lagged sales is above the 
median of the corresponding industry-year, and zero otherwise; CYCLE = receivable days plus inventory days 
minus payable days; ROA = rate of return of assets; CNTRL = a dummy variable that equals 1 if the largest 
shareholder and his/her relatives are in control of the firm, and 0 otherwise; Pred_RM = the predicted value 
from ABRM regression; LEV = total liabilities scaled by total assets; GRWTH = the change in total assets 
scaled by lagged total assets; SIZE = natural logarithm of total assets. 
 
7.4. Summary:  
This chapter aims to predict and analyse potential associations between ownership structure 
and external audit corporate governance mechanisms, and earnings management practices in 
Jordan. The hypotheses variables comprise ownership structure mechanisms including 
ownership concentration, controlling shareholders, institutional ownership and foreign 
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ownership, and external audit proxied by auditor size. Further, four earnings management 
measures are developed to proxy for manipulations through accruals, sales, production costs 
and discretionary expenses, where each type of manipulation represents a dependent variable. 
Theses earnings management proxies are measured through the popular models of Kothari et 
al. (2005) for abnormal accruals, and Rouchowdhury (2006) for abnormal cash flow from 
operating activities, abnormal production costs and abnormal discretionary expenses.  
Two analyses are conducted based on the measurement of earnings management proxies. In 
the main analysis, earnings management proxies are considered in absolute terms in order to 
examine the effect of the hypotheses variables on magnitudes of earnings manipulations. The 
empirical findings suggest that controlling shareholders (i.e. managerial ownership) and non-
big 5 auditors in Jordan are effective in constraining accruals earnings management. As for 
sales and productions costs manipulations, controlling shareholders remain the main 
ownership structure mechanism that mitigates abnormal operating cash flow and abnormal 
production costs. Institutional ownership appears to negatively affect abnormal discretionary 
expenses. Finally, the effectiveness of non-big 5 auditors in reducing magnitudes of abnormal 
accruals does seem to induce managers to engage more in real activities earnings 
management in Jordan. Put differently, no evidence is found concerning the substitutive 
effect that supposedly arises from the enhanced scrutiny over abnormal accruals. 
The alternative analysis differs from the main analysis in terms of earnings management 
proxies in several ways. First, all proxies are considered with their actual signs and according 
to this, populations are divided into two groups in each model: income-increasing and 
income-decreasing. Second, abnormal current accruals are estimated and replaced abnormal 
total accruals. The alternative analysis also differs in terms of explaining relationships 
between ownership structure mechanisms and real activities earnings management. That is, 
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interpretations of the results are considered collectively so as to consider the net effect on 
cash flow. Moreover, an additional analysis is conducted to investigate the substitutive effect 
based on costs associated with earnings management practices rather than external 
monitoring. For this purpose, an aggregate measure of abnormal production costs and 
abnormal discretionary expenses is developed. The empirical findings are twofold. First, 
conclusions drawn from the alternative analysis are similar to those drawn from the main 
analysis with one exception; along with the effectiveness of controlling shareholders, foreign 
investors appear to have healthy operating process rather than acting passively in the 
governance of firms in which they own a portion of the shareholdings. Second, the results 
obtained from employing the model of Zang (2012) suggest that accruals-based and real 
activities-based earnings management are used simultaneously in Jordan with little regard to 
costs associated with each type. Although a more research is needed in order to further 
investigate this relationship, this finding could be considered as the first step for future 
research on the relationship between the two types of earnings management in emerging 
markets. 
Overall, the findings provide little support for agency theory predictions when applied in the 
context of the emerging market of Jordan. Accordingly, both regulatory bodies and 
stakeholders in Jordan need to consider agency problems in future reforms and in the process 
of making contractual business decisions, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
227 
 
Table 6.26 summarises the results of hypotheses testing found in the main analysis. 
Table 6.26. Hypotheses Tests on Relationships Between Earnings Management Proxies and Both 
Ownership Structure and External Audit 
No. Hypothesis 
Predicted 
Sign 
Actual 
Sign 
Result 
H1a Ownership concentration and abnormal accruals ? + NS 
H1b Managerial ownership and abnormal accruals – – Sig 
H1c Institutional ownership and abnormal accruals – – NS 
H1d Foreign ownership and abnormal accruals ? – NS 
H1e Abnormal accruals and the big 5 auditors in Jordan – + Sig 
H2a Ownership concentration and abnormal operating cash flow + + Sig 
H2b Managerial ownership and abnormal operating cash flow – – Sig 
H2c Institutional ownership and abnormal operating cash flow + – NS 
H2d Foreign ownership and abnormal operating cash flow ? – NS 
H2e Abnormal operating cash flow and the big 5 auditors in Jordan + – NS 
H3a Ownership concentration and abnormal production costs – – NS 
H3b Managerial ownership and abnormal production costs – – Sig 
H3c Institutional ownership and abnormal production costs + + NS 
H3d Foreign ownership and abnormal production costs ? – NS 
H3e Abnormal production costs and the big 5 auditors in Jordan + – NS 
H4a Ownership concentration and abnormal discretionary exp. – – NS 
H4b Managerial ownership and abnormal discretionary exp. – + NS 
H4c Institutional ownership and abnormal discretionary exp. – – Sig 
H4d Foreign ownership and abnormal discretionary expenses ? – NS 
H4e Abnormal discretionary exp. and the big 5 auditors in Jordan No 
relation 
– NS 
Sig = significant; NS = not significant 
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Chapter Seven 
Summary and Conclusions 
 
7.1. Overview: 
This final chapter starts by providing a summary of research motivations, objectives and the 
overall approach in section 7.2. The key findings and conclusions of the two empirical 
analyses conducted in this research are summarised in section 7.3. A summary of theoretical 
and practical implications of the study are demonstrated in section 7.4. Contributions made in 
this study to existing knowledge are discussed in section 7.5. This chapter also highlights the 
limitations of the study in section 7.6. Finally, recommendations for future research avenues 
are discussed in section 7.7.  
 
7.2. Summary of Research Motivations, Objectives and Approach: 
The phenomenon of earnings management has an intrinsic importance affecting stakeholders 
such as shareholders, investors, and regulators all over the world. Against all economic 
difficulties and political circumstances, Amman Stock Exchange has witnessed significant 
increases in the number of listed companies, trading volumes and market capitalisation in 
recent years.  Apparently, foreign ownership has contributed to that increase as Jordan 
became one of the favourable investment destinations in the Middle East. Given these 
characteristics, it is intuitive to expect the presence of earnings management in Jordan. 
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Recent accounting scandals involved real activities earnings management at least as much as 
accruals earnings management although the majority of early research focuses on the latter 
type. Even recent research that started investigating real activities earnings management is 
yet to provide evidence concerning the pervasiveness on real manipulations outside the US 
market. Therefore, this study has investigated the constraining effect of ownership structure 
and external audit on accruals and real activities earnings management in the emerging 
market of Jordan. In addition, the extant studies have turned up conflicting evidence about the 
effectiveness of corporate governance monitoring mechanisms in constraining accruals 
earnings management. One apparent reason for the inconclusive findings is that corporate 
governance mechanisms seem to be largely affected by the institutional settings in different 
countries. In Jordan, good corporate governance is a part of Jordan’s reform efforts to create 
a more attractive investment climate and protect investors’ interests. However, the Jordanian 
guidance of good corporate governance has not been actually enforced. Thus, capital market 
may face difficulties in convincing investors that their investments are managed responsibly. 
With little evidence about the role of corporate governance mechanisms in monitoring 
managerial behaviour in Jordan, this study aims to examine the effectiveness of ownership 
structure mechanisms including ownership concentration, controlling shareholders, 
institutional ownership and foreign ownership in mitigating accruals-based earnings 
management. 
Evidence concerning the effect of ownership structure mechanisms on real activities earnings 
management has yet to be presented outside the US market. Therefore, this study embarks on 
this issue in the developing market of Jordan. As such, this study has provided evidence that 
extends the literature on real activities earnings management. 
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The literature has long recognised the role of external audit in mitigating levels of abnormal 
accruals. This study adopts the popular proxy for audit quality which is auditor size. Bearing 
in mind that big 4 auditors include Ernst and Young, Deloitte and Touche, 
PricewaterhouseCoopers and KPMG, the last two auditors are found to provide audit services 
to one listed manufacturing firm each in Jordan. Therefore, this study follows the 
classification of Faraj (2005) and Balhaj (2006) who conclude that big 5 auditors in Jordan 
include Ernst and Young, Deloitte and Touche, Grant Thornton, Ibrahim Al-Abbasi, and 
Talal Abu Ghazalah. Based on this classification, this study aims to investigate the effect of 
big 5 auditors in Jordan on accruals earnings management. 
Finally, real activities earnings management is beyond the control of external auditors 
because it occurs in daily course of business. US-based scholarly evidence suggest that 
managers resort to real activities earnings management when the better audit quality provided 
by big auditors mitigate their use of accruals earnings management. This study aims to 
investigate the substitute effect in Jordan by including a dummy variable for big 5 auditors in 
Jordan in real activities three regressions. 
Accordingly, four measures of earnings management are estimated through the models of 
Kothari et al. (2005) and Roychowdhury (2006). Abnormal accruals are the residuals 
obtained from the former model and abnormal cash flow from operating activities, abnormal 
production costs and abnormal discretionary expenses are the residuals obtained from the 
latter model. As a result, four empirical models are constructed in which the estimated 
earnings management measures represent the dependent variables. Independent variables in 
each empirical model are the same and are classified into three categories: first, ownership 
structure variables include ownership concentration, controlling shareholders, institutional 
ownership and foreign ownership. Ownership concentration is measured by the proportion of 
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shares held by the largest shareholder. Controlling shareholder is a dummy variable that 
equals one if the largest shareholder is also either the chairman of the board of directors or 
the chief executive officer. Institutional ownership is measured by the proportion of shares 
held by institutions. Foreign ownership is measured by the proportion of shares held by 
foreign investors. The second category includes external audit quality measured by auditor 
size. Third, a set of control variables include board size, leverage, growth and firm size. 
The literature review in this study presents these arguments using the findings of prior 
research. The methodology chapter shows the development of research hypotheses utilising 
these arguments. The following section relates to statistical methods used in this study to test 
the research hypotheses. Further, it summarises the statistical inferences and implications 
obtained from the analyses.  
 
7.3. Summary of the Findings and Conclusions: 
This section presents the key findings in relation to the research question structured in 
Chapter One of the thesis. The first and second research questions have been structured to 
examine potential relationships between ownership structure mechanisms including, 
ownership concentration, managerial ownership, institutional ownership and foreign 
ownership, and both accruals and real activities earnings management, respectively. With 
reference to section 1.3, the first two research questions are: 
1- What is the relationship between ownership structure monitoring mechanisms and 
accruals earnings management in Jordan? 
2- What is the relationship between ownership structure monitoring mechanisms and real 
activities earnings management in Jordan? 
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The main analysis reveals results that answer these two questions. The key findings of the 
main analysis as a whole are summarised below. 
Except for a marginally positive and significant relationship between ownership 
concentration and abnormal cash flow from operating activities, the results show that high 
levels of shareholdings owned by the largest shareholders in Jordan do not inversely affect 
levels of abnormal accruals, abnormal production costs and abnormal discretionary expenses. 
This indicates that the largest shareholders not only act ineffectively in monitoring 
managerial manipulation of accrual, production costs and discretionary expenses but also 
exhibit marginal opportunistic behaviour as to sales manipulation. 
Yet when the largest shareholders occupy a managerial post, controlling shareholders (i.e. 
managerial ownership) become effective in mitigating manipulations in accruals, sales and 
production costs. Despite that controlling shareholders do not have the same mitigating effect 
over discretionary expenses, the overall results provides evidence supportive of the incentive 
alignment in Jordan. 
Contrary to controlling shareholders, levels of institutional ownership are inversely 
associated with levels of discretionary expenses, but no significant association is found with 
abnormal accruals, abnormal cash flow from operating activities and abnormal production 
costs. The overall indication is that institutional investors do not display high level of 
sophistication; institutional investors do not use their superior abilities and resources in 
acquiring and processing information in monitoring the opportunistic behaviour of managers. 
Different levels of foreign ownership appear ineffective in deterring any of the four types of 
earnings manipulations. Therefore, the statistically insignificant coefficients of foreign 
ownership in all empirical models suggest that foreign investors seem to act passively in the 
governance of their corporate shareholdings in Jordan. 
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The remaining two research questions relate to the effect of auditor size on both accruals and, 
although indirectly, real activities earnings management. The third and forth research 
questions are: 
3- Has the scrutiny of auditor size been effective in constraining accruals earnings 
management in Jordan? 
4- If yes, have managers in Jordan been induced to substitute the reduction in accruals 
earnings management with real activities earnings management? 
The results pertaining to the effect of external audit on abnormal accruals interestingly reveal 
that non-big 5 auditors in Jordan who in fact deter accruals earnings management. That is, the 
unexpected positive sign is still significant. Accordingly, the expected sign of the dummy 
variable of big 5 auditors (BIG_5) should be negative instead of the initially expected 
positive sign in the following three real activities models. The results obtained from real 
activities models show negative signs on the coefficients of BIG_5 which coincides with the 
new expectation. However, there is no significant association between non-big 5 auditors in 
Jordan and all of abnormal cash flow from operating activities, abnormal production costs 
and abnormal discretionary accruals. This indicates that the firms in Jordan do not substitute 
the reduction in their use of accruals earnings management with an increased the use of more 
costly real activities earnings management.   
An Alternative analysis has also been conducted in this thesis to answer the research 
questions. The alternative analysis has been conducted for two reasons. First, Kothari et al. 
(2005) include property, plant and equipment in net values. Because depreciation expense 
could be manipulated itself, property, plant and equipment might not accurately control for 
the non-discretionary portion of depreciation expense. To overcome this limitation, current 
accruals are estimated as depreciation expenses and property, plant and equipment become 
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obsolete. Second, signed residuals are used as proxies for the four types of earnings 
manipulations. Each set of observations is partitioned into income-increasing are income-
decreasing groups based on the sign of residuals. Therefore, conducting this alternative 
analysis would indeed enhance the robustness of the statistical inferences stemmed from the 
main analysis concerning the effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms in 
mitigating all types of earnings management in Jordan.  
The key findings of the alternative analysis relating to the first two research questions are 
summarised below. 
Similar to the results of absolute abnormal accruals model, the coefficients for ownership 
concentration are statistically insignificant in income-increasing and income-decreasing 
groups. The marginal significance appeared with absolute abnormal operating cash flow 
improves in income-increasing and disappears in income-decreasing groups. This explains 
the finding in the main analysis as the largest shareholders in Jordan pressure managers to 
manage earnings upwards through sales manipulations. Also similar to absolute abnormal 
production costs, the coefficients for ownership concentration are statistically insignificant in 
income-increasing and income-decreasing groups. The alternative analysis reveals the 
ownership concentration is negatively associated with income-increasing discretionary 
expenses. A possible interpretation is that large shareholders mitigate discretionary 
expenditures because of a suspicion that managements might be channelling wealth from the 
firm to their own benefits. Except for that, it could be concluded that large shareholders in 
Jordan either adopt short-term strategies or are not financially sophisticated. 
Substantiating the findings of absolute abnormal total accruals, controlling shareholders (i.e. 
managerial ownership) is negatively and significantly associated with current accruals in both 
directions. As for real activities earnings management, controlling shareholders appear 
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inversely associated with abnormal operating cash flow in income-increasing group and with 
abnormal production costs in the income-decreasing group. These results provide 
confirmatory evidence of the effectiveness of controlling shareholders (i.e. managerial 
ownership) in constraining real activities earnings management that is found in the main 
analysis. That is, controlling shareholders tend to prevent real manipulations because of the 
costly consequences of this type of manipulation whether these manipulations were income-
increasing or income-decreasing and regardless of the net effect on cash flow from 
operations. 
The overall findings suggest that institutional investors in Jordan are interested in reported 
cash flows rather than reported earnings. The results justify this conclusion. First, because 
accruals earnings management has no direct effect on cash flows, institutional ownership is 
not significantly associated with income-increasing and income-decreasing abnormal current 
accruals. Second, there is positive relationship between institutional ownership and income-
decreasing abnormal production costs. Because it is difficult to comprehend that institutional 
investors would benefit from such income-decreasing practices, a possible interpretation of 
this positive association is that underproduction practices lead to abnormally high cash flows. 
Third, there is a negative association between institutional ownership and income-decreasing 
abnormal discretionary expenses. This result does not only mean that institutional investors 
prevent income-decreasing practices but it also means that institutional investors prevent 
spending to increase cash flows. Therefore, the results support the myopic behaviour of 
institutional investors. 
Concerning the role of foreign investors in the governance of their corporate shareholdings, 
the alternative analysis reveals interesting findings that differ slightly from the 
ineffectiveness found in the main analysis. The first difference is the negative association 
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between foreign ownership and income-decreasing abnormal current accruals. This indicates 
that foreign investors in Jordan focus on current earnings performance but only to a certain 
extent. That is, if foreign investors were excessively short-term oriented, a positive 
relationship would have appeared in the income-increasing group. The second difference 
pertains to real activities earnings management. Foreign ownership is positively associated 
with income-decreasing abnormal operating cash flow and negatively associated with 
income-decreasing abnormal production costs. This indicates that firms with high levels of 
foreign ownership tend to have a healthy operating process as they prevent underproduction 
so as to have sufficient levels of inventory, but at the same time, those firms have more 
stringent credit terms so as to avoid high bad debt expenses. Moreover, the overall effect of 
foreign investors on cash flow seems neutral as well. That is, high levels of foreign 
ownership is positively associated with high abnormal operating cash flow (i.e. income-
decreasing sales manipulation) and negatively associated with high abnormal operating cash 
flow (i.e. income-decreasing production costs manipulation). 
As for research questions number three and four, the findings in the previous analyses 
concerning the substitutive effect in Jordan suggest that enhanced external audit quality (i.e. 
auditor size) over abnormal accruals does not affect levels of real activities manipulations. To 
examine the presence of the substitutive effect further, an additional analysis is conducted 
using the model of Zang (2012). She fashions a recursive model based on costs, timing and 
constraints associated with both types of earnings management. Next, she creates a measure 
that aggregates the abnormal levels of production costs and discretionary expenses. The 
findings obtained from the recursive model show a positive relationship between unexpected 
levels of real earnings manipulations and abnormal accruals. This suggests that managers in 
Jordan use both types of earnings management simultaneously to arrive at target levels of 
earnings, which is unlike the US where there is evidence consistent with the trade-off 
237 
 
between accruals and real activities earnings management. Further, the result substantiates 
the findings in the previous analyses where levels of real activities manipulations are found 
not to be affected by the enhance scrutiny of external auditors over abnormal accruals. That 
is, managers in Jordanian firms manipulate earnings using both types of earnings 
management regardless of the scrutiny from regulatory bodies and external audit. 
 
7.4. Implications of the Study: 
The novelty of the findings provides understanding and extension for agency theory literature 
that focuses on corporate governance mechanisms and earnings management in general and 
in emerging markets in particular. In addition, the findings provide practical implications for 
users of financial statements in Jordan. The theoretical and practical implications stemmed 
from the main and the alternative analyses of this study are discussed separately below. 
 
7.4.1. Theoretical and Practical Implications of the Main Analysis:  
The research hypotheses have been tested and relationships between earnings management 
proxies and corporate governance independent variables have been presented and discussed 
in the previous chapter. In this subsection, the results of the main analysis are considered 
collectively in order to derive theoretical and practical implications concerning agency theory 
and regulatory bodies and stakeholders in Jordan. 
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7.4.1.1. Theoretical Implications: 
Agency theory posits that managers’ decisions are motivated by self-interest and hence will 
not always perform in the best interests of the shareholders (Arnold and Lange, 2004). Using 
this reasoning, this research attempts to provide valuable insights into the scope of 
effectiveness of ownership structures and external audit corporate governance monitoring by 
further examining the opportunism hypothesis in the emerging market of Jordan. In the 
following, the theoretical contributions that this research provides to the validity of agency 
theory predictions in the emerging market of Jordan are summarised. 
Within the theoretical framework of agency theory, Denis et al. (1999) argue that conflicts of 
interests between shareholders and managers can be mitigated by monitoring managerial 
actions by board of directors or shareholders themselves. However, they emphasise that small 
shareholders have little incentive to monitor and thus, implying that block holders (i.e. 
ownership concentration) are more motivated to act as monitors – either themselves or 
through electing directors (Ronen and Yaari, 2008). Moreover, Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
suggest that monitoring by block holders can potentially reduce agency costs. On this basis, 
Zhong et al. (2007) argue that higher levels of ownership concentration can reduce earnings 
management practices. However, the results discussed earlier show that ownership 
concentration in Jordan is generally an ineffective monitoring mechanism in constraining 
earnings management. Thus, the results provide no evidence substantiating agency theory 
predictions.  
Denis et al. (1999) suggest another primary way that could mitigate the divergence of 
interests:  when managers own portions of total shareholdings themselves, their interests 
become aligned with those of other shareholders (i.e. inventive alignment effect). But 
because ownership is highly concentrated in contexts other than the US and UK, Dechow et 
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al. (2010) state that agency problem exists primarily between controlling and minority 
shareholders. The agency problem in such contexts is that controlling shareholders (i.e. 
managerial ownership of block shareholdings) may expropriate the interest of minority 
shareholders for their own private advantage (i.e. entrenchment effect). With one exception, 
the results indicate that controlling shareholders are effective in constraining earnings 
management, and validate agency theory prediction. The exception is that controlling 
shareholders are not significantly associated with abnormal discretionary expenses. Rather, 
institutional investors become effective in preventing managerial manipulations through 
discretionary expenses. Because the research population consists of listed manufacturing 
firms, some discretionary expenses, such as Research and Development (R&D) are essential 
for future value of these firms. This might indicate that institutional investors dedicate more 
resources to monitor the quality of managements. Consequently, institutional investors only 
successfully monitor discretionary expenses manipulations in Jordan. In terms of the other 
three types of earnings management, the results provide no evidence consistent with agency 
predictions that institutional investors use their superior abilities and resources in acquiring 
and processing information in monitoring the opportunistic behaviour of managers. 
Dahlquist and Robertson (2001) consider foreign ownership as an effective mechanism that 
could complement current governance structure because its role resembles that of 
institutional investors. Further, Leuz et al. (2009) find that foreign investors prefer to invest 
in good governed firms, which indicate that firms seeking additional financing will enhance 
their corporate governance to attract the desired investment for foreigners. However, the 
results reveal that foreign investors do not reduce the practice of earnings management which 
is inconsistent with reducing agency problems in Jordan. 
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While agency theory suggests that ownership structure mechanisms better align the interests 
of managers with those of shareholders, agency theory also views external audit as the most 
important, independent and professional mechanism that reduces the scope for information 
asymmetry and mitigate the latitude for managerial opportunistic behaviour. As for audit 
quality and accruals earnings management in Jordan, the results interestingly suggest that 
non-big 5 auditors in Jordan who in fact are effective in preventing accruals earnings 
management. Although this conclusion contradicts those found in the US and UK in terms of 
auditor size, the result still validates agency theory predictions. 
Regarding the substitutive effect, no significant relationship is found between non-big 5 
auditors and any type of real activities manipulations, and thus the substitutive effect 
hypothesis is rejected in Jordan. The reasoning for the development of this hypothesis is the 
findings of Cohen and Zarowin (2010). Yet the Cohen et al. (2008), Garven (2009) and 
Demers and Wang (2010) reject that the enhanced scrutiny of external audit quality over 
accruals earnings management would tempt managers to engage in real activities earnings 
management. The insignificant results of the latter studies are due to their use of pre- 
Sarbanes-Oxley data whereas the findings of Cohen and Zarowin (2010) are significant 
because of the use of post-Sarbanes-Oxley data. This contradiction might suggest that there is 
a high correlation between Sarbanes-Oxley act and big 4 auditors. As such, the positive 
relationship between big 4 and real activities earnings management found in Cohen and 
Zarowin (2010) is a result of the Sarbanes-Oxley act as suggested by Graham et al. (2005), 
rather than enhanced scrutiny over accruals by big 4 auditors. 
Accordingly, the novelty of the findings provides understanding and extensions for agency 
theory literature that focuses on corporate governance mechanisms and earnings management 
in general and in emerging markets in particular. First, the current research concludes that of 
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the five corporate governance mechanisms only two mechanisms, namely managerial 
ownership and external audit, act effectively in deterring earnings management practices and 
in preserving shareholders wealth in Jordan. Further, the novelty of the proxy of controlling 
shareholders (i.e. managerial ownership) provide some extension for research studying 
earnings management in an agency setting in emerging markets. More importantly, from the 
literature review, foreign ownership has not gained as much attention as other corporate 
governance mechanisms. Therefore, its ineffectiveness found for the first time in this research 
might be valuable for research investigating real activities earnings management not only in 
emerging markets but also in general. By taking into consideration the aforementioned along 
with the findings on ownership concentration and institutional ownership, this research 
highlights challenges to applicability of agency theory in emerging markets where corporate 
governance mechanisms are supposed to mitigate agency problems. 
 
7.4.1.2. Practical Implications: 
As mentioned in Chapter Two, Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) seems the main regulatory 
body for listed firms in Jordan. Evidence found in this research might be sufficient to suggest 
that owner-controlled firms in Jordan do indeed act efficiently and hence, do not seem to 
engage in earnings management practices that are harmful to minority shareholders. Other 
ownership structure mechanisms, however, are not as efficient as managerial ownership. 
Given that more than half of publically traded firms are not owner-controlled and the 
ineffectiveness of other ownership structure mechanisms, the findings highlight the need for 
additional corporate governance reforms in order to restrain the practice of earnings 
management and to mitigate its negative consequences. For instance, ASE could impose the 
Jordanian guidance of good corporate governance. By doing so, more than one third of 
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boards of directors would include independent directors and audit committees would be 
actually activated. Moreover, ASE could place additional monitoring on listed firms. 
However, a caution must be considered in the process of promoting the scrutiny over listed 
firms. That is, ASE could benefit from US’s experience in Sarbanes-Oxley act that has led 
managers to reduce accruals earnings management and engage more in the costly real 
activities earnings management. Therefore, for any recommended reforms and additional 
monitoring to be successfully implemented, both types of earnings management should be 
considered to restrain their harmful consequences. 
As regards stakeholders, an increased awareness of practices and consequences of earnings 
management is required indeed. The evidence found in this research is in favour of increased 
awareness in order for investors and other stakeholders to see through the earnings figures 
and thus make rational contractual decisions, especially when such decisions involve non-
owner-controlled firms. In addition, stakeholders need to recognise that audit services 
provided by big 5 auditors in Jordan do not necessarily indicate better quality and more 
important, the need to recognise that more costly real activities earnings management is 
beyond the monitoring responsibility of external audit. 
 
7.4.2. Theoretical and Practical Implications of the Alternative Analysis:  
This subsection aims merely to incorporate theoretical and practical implications that could 
be stemmed from the alternative analyses with those found in the main analyses. In general, 
there are no material differences between the implications stemmed from models where 
dependent variables are measured in absolute values and those found in models where signed 
values of earnings management are introduced as dependent variables. 
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7.4.2.1. Theoretical Implications: 
Beginning with ownership concentration, the largest shareholder remains ineffective in 
constraining income-increasing and income-decreasing abnormal current accruals. In terms of 
real activities earnings management, the new results substantiate those found in the main 
analyses. First, no effect of ownership concentration is found on income-increasing or income 
decreasing abnormal levels of production costs. Therefore, consistent with previous findings, 
agency prediction of ownership concentration as a deterrence mechanism is not validated. 
Second, the largest shareholders in Jordan seem to pressure managers to increase reported 
income through sales manipulation which is supportive of the entrenchment effect found in 
the main analyses. The only difference is that when abnormal discretionary expenses are 
divided into income-increasing and income-decreasing, the largest shareholders in Jordan 
appear effective in preventing cutting discretionary expenses that aims to increase income. 
Controlling shareholders remain an effective monitoring mechanism as they persistently deter 
earnings management practices with no regards to direction of manipulation, type of 
manipulation or the net effect on cash flows. As such the results validate agency theory 
predictions of controlling shareholders (i.e. managerial ownership) aligns the interests of 
block holders with those of minority shareholders. 
With no significant effect of institutional ownership on income-increasing or income-
decreasing abnormal current accruals and abnormal operating cash flow, institutional 
investors in Jordan can be characterised as short-term oriented because the results show that 
they act passively in the governance of their corporate holdings. Even though they are found 
to affect income-decreasing abnormal production costs and abnormal discretionary expenses, 
the directional effect is contrasting and hence, it could be concluded that institutional 
investors in Jordan seek high levels of cash flows implying less sophistication. Hence, the 
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results provide no evidence consistent with agency predictions that institutional investors use 
their superior abilities and resources in acquiring and processing information in monitoring 
the opportunistic behaviour of managers. 
The alternative analysis provides new perspectives concerning foreign investors in Jordan. 
Unlike the absolute measure of abnormal accruals, high levels of foreign ownership do 
prevent income-decreasing abnormal current accruals. In terms of business operating 
decisions, the collective interpretation of the effect of foreign ownership on real activities 
earnings management is in favour of firms with high levels foreign investors having healthy 
operating process as they prevent underproduction so as to have sufficient levels of inventory, 
but at the same time, have more stringent credit terms so as to avoid high bad debt expenses. 
Apparently, this healthy behaviour supports agency consideration of foreign ownership as an 
effective mechanism that could complement current governance structure. 
As for auditor size, non-big 5 auditors in Jordan are found to prevent income-decreasing 
abnormal current accruals, which is consistent with previous findings. However, auditor size 
does not seem to have the same mitigating effect on income-increasing accruals earnings 
management. A possible interpretation is that the earnings management proxy in alternative 
analysis is current accruals not total accruals as in the main analysis. It is plausible that 
managers manipulate depreciation expense downwards to increase abnormal accruals. With 
property, plant and equipment obsolete from the estimation model of abnormal current 
accruals, the amounts of income-increasing abnormal current accruals might have decreased 
and hence making auditor size appears ineffective in mitigating accruals earnings 
management. In terms of the substitutive effect in Jordan, the results confirm that the scrutiny 
of external auditor that reduces the use of accruals earnings management does not induce 
managers to engage more in real activities earnings management. 
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7.4.2.2. Practical Implications: 
In general, the findings of the alternative analysis confirm the previous practical implication 
concerning the need for regulatory bodies in Jordan to carry out additional corporate 
governance reforms in order to restrain the practice of earnings management and to mitigate 
its negative consequences.  
Moreover, the additional results obtained from employing Zang’s (2012) model also confirm 
the inexistence of a substitution between accruals and real activities earnings management in 
Jordan. Rather, the results show that managers in Jordan engage in both types of 
manipulations simultaneously. This finding emphasises the need for considering real 
activities earnings management in implementing future reforms. Specifically, managers 
reliant on the costly real activities manipulation does not seem to be limited by costs 
associated with this type of manipulation. Therefore, regulatory bodies in Jordan should 
ensure the effectiveness of internal monitoring mechanisms such as the role of independent 
directors because unlike external auditors, internal corporate governance mechanism can 
have a mitigating effect on real activities manipulations. 
The alternative analysis reveals that firms with high levels of foreign ownership tend to 
operate in a healthier manner than those with no or low levels of foreign ownership. 
Therefore, stakeholders could benefit from the conclusions of this research in terms of 
making informed decisions in which the role of controlling shareholders as well as foreign 
investors are considered. 
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7.5. Contributions to Knowledge: 
The current study contributes to the ongoing debate on the unity, feasibility and hence, 
validity of agency theory predictions. Overall, the findings highlight challenges to 
applicability of agency theory in emerging markets where corporate governance mechanisms 
are supposed to mitigate agency problems. Accordingly, this research extends agency theory 
by providing new perceptions. 
- Most studies concentrate on the shareholders-managers problem. Such studies are 
conducted in the US where ownership is dispersed. In contexts where ownership is 
concentrated, agency problem occurs between controlling shareholders and minority 
shareholders. Accordingly, the contribution made to accounting research on earnings 
management and to agency theory is that owner-controlled firms are less likely to 
manage earnings through real activities than management-controlled firms. To the 
best of the researcher’s knowledge, no such contribution has been achieved in 
contexts where ownership is concentrated. 
- Within the agency theory, on the one hand, foreign investors are expected to act as an 
effective mechanism that complements governance structure or at least have the 
capability to invest in firms with good corporate governance. On the other hand, 
foreign investment could be considered, simply, as motivation. With too little 
evidence on accruals, and no evidence on real activities, the findings of this research 
contribute for the first time to accounting research on earnings management and to 
agency theory. That is, the results do not validate agency predictions in general, and 
in contexts where levels of foreign ownership are very high. 
- The results confirm the ineffectiveness of outside block holders in constraining 
accruals earnings management (i.e. ownership concentration). Moreover, this research 
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extends prior literature by documenting the ineffectiveness of outside block holders in 
constraining real activities manipulations outside the US market. 
- The findings confirm that the apparent inconsistency in empirical results, especially 
concerning institutional ownership and auditor size, is a result of differences in 
institutional settings of different contexts. 
- For the first time, this research finds evidence suggestive of the simultaneous use of 
accruals and real activities earnings management in emerging markets. Moreover, by 
employing the model developed in Zang (2012), the results reject the substitutive 
effect in Jordan. Therefore, with little research investigating this issue in the US, this 
research is the first to employ these new approaches in the setting of emerging 
markets. 
- To the best of the researcher’s knowledge, this research considers abnormal levels of 
real manipulations in absolute terms for the first time. Although effects of corporate 
governance mechanisms on magnitudes of abnormal accruals have widely been 
investigated in the literature, such effects on magnitudes of real earnings 
manipulations have never been tested before. 
 
 
7.6. Limitations of the Study: 
This study is subject to the several potential limitations. Accordingly, a caution should be 
considered in the interpretation of the study’s findings. 
- A common yet inevitable limitation associated with earning management studies is 
measurement error in the estimation of earnings management proxies. So far, the 
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literature offers no model that estimates normal levels of earnings without criticism. 
Therefore, abnormal levels of earnings do not necessarily identify firms that actually 
managed their earnings with total accuracy. 
- An apparent limitation in this study is the limited number of listed manufacturing 
firms in each industry. With only 2 or 3 firms in more than half of the industries in the 
manufacturing sector in Jordan, the cross-sectional estimation of normal levels of 
earnings is conducted on a year-by-year basis rather than year-industry basis as in the 
original models. Although this remedy seems acceptable, the measurement errors 
might be higher. 
- The generalisation of the findings is limited to listed manufacturing firms in Jordan. 
Other sectors differ in their accounts and managerial discretion offered by accounting 
standards. As such, levels of earnings management might be different. 
- This study is conducted within the framework of agency theory where earnings 
management practices are expected to be opportunistic not beneficial. Therefore, 
interpretations of the empirical results are restricted to the opportunistic hypothesis. 
- The explanatory power of the empirical models suggest that there are still other 
independent variables that could explain the variation in amounts of managed 
earnings, such as independent variables pertaining to characteristics and compositions 
of boards of directors. 
 
7.7. Recommendations for Future Research: 
There are several avenues through which future research could extend this study. 
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- Investigating the effect of foreign ownership in developed and other developing 
markets. Incorporating foreign ownership in future research on earnings management 
is expected to enrich the literature in two ways. The literature review in this study 
shows that foreign ownership can motivate manager to engage in earnings 
management to attract additional capital. No research is found investigating this issue 
with respect to real activities earnings management. To lesser extent, the effectiveness 
of foreign investors in mitigating both types of earnings management has yet to be 
investigated in developed and other emerging markets. Using this reasoning, another 
area for future research arises. Introducing a sampling design containing firms before 
and after foreign investment is made would distinguish the effect of foreign 
ownership on earnings management and hence, constitutes a significant contribution 
to accounting research on earnings management in general. 
- Research on the simultaneous use of accruals and real activities earnings management 
in emerging markets is needed. While the results of this study reject the substitutive 
effect and suggest a simultaneous use of accruals and real activities manipulations, 
further evidence similar to the US evidence provided by Graham et al. (2005) would 
provide new insights about the extent of earnings management practices outside the 
US market. 
- Further research on what motivates managers to engage in earnings management 
practices is still an understudied topic in Jordan. For example, conducting a research 
using a stimulus such as benchmark or initial public offerings according to which 
abnormal earnings of suspect firms could be compared to the rest of the sample. 
- Conducting a research under the beneficial hypothesis would enrich the literature with 
new perceptions about corporate governance and the practice of earnings 
management. For instance, if managers were to convey value relevant information, 
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directors may allow the practice of earnings management. As such, the interpretations 
would be different that those made under the opportunistic hypothesis. 
- The collection of data, through a survey similar to that in Gabrielsen et al. (2002), 
about managerial ownership, composition of board of directors, directors’ expertise, 
etc, would indeed increase the explanatory power of any empirical model and hence, 
provide better understanding about the effectiveness of corporate governance 
mechanisms in deterring the practice of earnings management in Jordan. 
- Investigating the effect of more attributes of good audit quality such as audit hours 
and audit fees on accruals earnings management, then examining the substitutive 
effect in Jordan might provide alternative perception about the effect of external audit 
in Jordan. 
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